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M.A. Thesis R.J.Richards J u l y 1967 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe from 
the Munich Agreement t o the 
P o l i s h Guarantee, September 
29 , 1938 t o March 3 1 , 1939. 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o examine the motives and execution of 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe between the s t a t e d dates. 
One theme i s h e l d t o run c o n t i n u a l l y through t h i s p e r i o d -
the i n t e n t i o n t o r e s t r a i n the d i c t a t o r s from p r e c i p i t a t i n g European 
war. Emphasis i s l a i d upon Chamberlain's stubborn b e l i e f i n h i s own 
a b i l i t y t o p a c i f y H i t l e r , though t h i s personal p o l i c y of appeasement 
i s shown t o be s t r o n g l y supported by other s i g n i f i c a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s 
of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
A survey i s made of B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p s v/ith t h e : other 
Munich s i g n a t o r i e s p r i m a r i l y , though d e a l i n g s w i t h other powers are 
examined when r e l e v a n t . I t i s shown t h a t as the promise of success 
f o r appeasement waned so Chamberlain 1s a t t i t u d e t o France became 
i n c r e a s i n g l y more open-handed, and t h a t f o r the same reason-greater 
emphasis was put on'rearmament. Both of these movements are construed 
as supports t o a sagging appeasement, not a d e n i a l of i t . 
A s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y i s seen i n B r i t a i n ' s 
d e c l a r a t i o n of s o l i d a r i t y v/ith France e a r l y i n February but again 
t h i s swing i s i n t e r p r e t e d as being s t i l l very appeasement-minded. I t 
i s t h i s new avenue of appeasement t h a t Chamberlain was t o explore more 
thoroughly when f o r c e d t o re-appraise h i s p o l i c y a f t e r 'Prague',, That 
he refused even then t o abandon h i s hopes of p a c i f y i n g H i t l e r i s , seen 
i n the f a c t t h a t he devised a p l a n u n l i k e l y t o be f u l l y acceptable t o 
the powers i t concerned, and t h a t by f i n a l l y anchoring B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
t o Poland r a t h e r than the Soviet Union Chamberlain was avoiding the 
anti-German r o l e he had appeared t o propose and which was so 
i n c o n s i s t e n t v/ith the p r i n c i p l e s on which appeasement was founded. 
Appeasement was thus a c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c y and though i t s 
d i r e c t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n were o f t e n remoulded t o s u i t the s i t u a t i o n 
i n . Europe a t the t i m e , i t was never i n t h i s s i x months abandoned. 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe 
from the Munich Agreement 
to the P o l i s h Guarantee, 
September 29, 1938 to 
March 31, 1939. 
Being a t h e s i s submitted f o r *the. degree o f 
Master o f Arts at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Durham. 
Presented by Roger J. Richards July 1967. 
" I am a man o f peaoe to the depths o f my s o u l . " 
( N e v i l l e Chamberlain, i n a "broadcast 
message to the n a t i o n , September 27, 1938) 
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Chapter one 
Munich in Ferment 
I 
! 
i 
| On the eve of Munich, Masaryk the Czechoslovak 
M i n i s t e r i n London, said t o Chamberlain and H a l i f a x : 
" I f you have s a c r i f i c e d my n a t i o n t o 
preserve the peace of the world, I w i l l 
be t h e f i r s t t o applaud you. But i f n o t , 
gentlemen, God help your souls." (1 ) 
These words h i g h l i g h t the essence of the Munich Agreement 
by which the f o u r great powers of Europe, Great B r i t a i n , 
France, Germany and I t a l y , decided the s a c r i f i c e s t o be 
made by Czechoslovakia i n the i n t e r e s t s of world peace. 
Twelve months were t o show t h a t i t was God's help and 
not Masaryk's applause t h a t was deserved ; Germany, t h a t 
(2) 
'inexorable O l i v e r T w i s t 1 was t o r e t u r n f o r more. The 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t between the Nazi t e r r i t o r i a l 
a p p e t i t e and the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Western democracies 
to p r o t e c t Europe from domination by a s i n g l e power l e d 
i n e v i t a b l y t o v/ar. 
Chamberlain and H a l i f a x worked c o n t i n u o u s l y and 
c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y t o a v e r t a major European catastrophe 
and t o persuade H i t l e r t o achieve h i s apparent ambitions 
by l i m i t e d and peaceful means. The f a c t t h a t h i s t o r y 
shows them t o have been f o l l o w i n g a p i t i f u l l y v a i n hope 
(3 ) 
does not d i s c r e d i t the honesty of t h e i r e f f o r t s . Nor, 
d e s p i t e the evidence of H i t l e r ' s deeds, can they be he l d 
e n t i r e l y culpable f o r f a i l i n g t o recognise the consummate 
1 . 
g u i l e of t h i s one man who made t h e i r e f f o r t s worthless 
from the s t a r t . Por they d i d not, and could not, know 
H i t l e r . General Haider's testimony at Nuremberg on 
(4) 
February 26th 1946 supports t h i s view: 
"Whoever d i d not know Adolf H i t l e r 
cannot imagine what a master of deception 
and camouflage t h i s man was." 
I t i s easy to scwrn Chamberlain's estimation of H i t l e r 
a f t e r t h e i r meeting at Berchtesgaden as being a man 
(5) 
'who could be r e l i e d upon when he had given h i s word' 
but t h a t was probably the impression t h a t he was intended 
to gain. Chamberlain's f a u l t as such l a y i n the assump-
t i o n t h a t H i t l e r ' s a s p i r a t i o n s were confined, to the 
redressal of c e r t a i n grievances inherent i n the 1918 
peace settlement and t h a t these being s a t i s f i e d he could 
be brought t o s i t at a conference t a b l e thus enabling 
a general and peaceful European settlement t o be achieved. 
Chamberlain's p o l i c y during the p e r i o d covered by t h i s 
t h e s i s was determined by t h i s b e l i e f , a b e l i e f which was 
not t o t a l l y banished from h i s mind t i l l i t was f u l l y 
d i s c r e d i t e d by the outbreak of the second w o r l d war. 
I t should not be denied t h a t the s i t u a t i o n at the 
time of the September c r i s i s made an e f f o r t of the k i n d 
h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e . The Munich Conference, the ensuing 
2 
agreement, and the Anglo-German Declaration were a f u l l 
expression of Chamberlain's policy, for here was 
consultation of the European powers in order to achieve 
a p a c i f i c agreement and promote mutual understanding and 
collaboration for the future. But t h i s meant a price 
had to be paid and to many distinguished politicians of 
a l l p a r t i e s the le g a l i s e d rape of Czechoslovakia was 
too high a pri c e . On the l e v e l of international 
diplomacy, however, Munich had l e f t hopes high. 
Dr. Benes, who resigned as President of Czechoslovakia 
f i v e days a f t e r Munich paid respect to a 'new development 
(6) 
and new European co-operation'• He was resigning 
because the s a c r i f i c e s demanded of h i s country had been 
'exaggerated and unjust' but believed that the new forces 
i n Europe should not be hindered by himself because of h i s 
personal attitude. 
What, i n fact, was the r e a l achievement of Munich 
from the B r i t i s h point of view? To understand thi s 
f u l l y i t i s necessary to look at the composition of 
Czechoslovakia prior to the agreement. According to 
the census of 1930 the state was made up of 7,447,000 
Czechs, 3,231,600 Germans, 2,309,000 Slovaks and a 
sprinkling of Magyars, Ruthenians and Poles. B r i e f l y the 
3. 
problem concerned the three m i l l i o n Sudeteriland Germans 
whom H i t l e r wanted to be brought within the Reicho The 
new boundaries of Czechoslovakia a f t e r Munich s t i l l 
contained a quarter of a milli o n Germans (who could make 
further trouble l a t e r on) but Czechoslovakia also l o s t 
nearly a m i l l i o n Czechs who found themselves incorporated 
i n Germany. The importance of Munich does not r e a l l y 
l i e i n the remapping of the Czechoslovak-German fro n t i e r 
for this had already been decided at Berchtesgaden and 
Godesberg. The purpose of Munich from the B r i t i s h 
point of view was to get H i t l e r to achieve h i s desires 
i n less haste and by a different method than he had 
obviously been intending. The l a t t e r days of September 
had l e f t few people i n doubt that a German invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was Imminent. The Czechoslovak army had 
been f u l l y mobilised and so too had the B r i t i s h navy. 
Czechoslovakia had pacts with both Prance and the Soviet 
Union which she hoped would become operative i n the event 
of German aggression. The Soviet Union however would 
not recognise her obligations u n t i l Prance had begun to 
(7) 
f u l f i l hers, but the French army 'either did not want 
(8) 
or was unable to make such preparations. 1 On September 
19 both Prance and Great B r i t a i n had recommended to Prague 
•that the Sudeten areas be transferred to the Reich as 
(9< the only effective assurance of the maintenance of peace' ' 
The i n f e r i o r defence positions of both Prance and B r i t a i n 
together with the apparent unwillingness of the commonwealth 
countries to go to war over the issue of Czechoslovakia^"*"^ 
made i t a l l the more desirable that an alternative solution 
to the problem should be found, i f at a l l possible. For 
the B r i t i s h government the Munich agreement was such a 
solution and, in fact, the l e s s e r of two e v i l s . 
Both at home and abroad the immediate reaction to 
Munich was one of intense r e l i e f - with the exception at 
l e a s t of Czechoslovakia. A si t u a t i o n pregnant with the 
notions of war had been saved by peaceful negotiation. 
Even the German peoples, i n c o n f l i c t with t h e i r Puhrer's 
deepest motives, had shrunk from the aspect of war and 
f e l t a d i s t i n c t gratitude to Chamberlain for h i s peaceful 
intervention. A l e t t e r , dated October 2, from a Gottingen 
professor gives evidence of thi s German reaction: 
"•••We know how much the B r i t i s h Prime 
Minister has done to prepare the s e t t l e -
ment • The crowds cheering him during 
h i s three days' t r i p through Germany 
r e a l l y expressed the general feeling of 
admiration, even of love, which he has. 
won." Xm 
This feeling was equally shared across the Atlantic 
where basic i s o l a t i o n did not mean that the United States 
were not intimately concerned with the a f f a i r s of Europe, 
Indeed, on September 26 President Roosevelt had appealed 
to H i t l e r not to break off negotiations and again two days 
l a t e r begged Mussolini to intercede with H i t l e r . A 
l e t t e r written by Roosevelt on October 11 expresses 
the genuine r e l i e f f e l t i n America: 
" . . . I can assure you that we i n the United 
States r e j o i c e with you, and the world at 
large, that the outbreak of war was averted. 
To me the most heartening aspect of 
the s i t u a t i o n i s the fact that this feeling 
of r e l i e f has been so spontaneous and has 
been expressed with such obvious spontan-
ei t y throughout the world." (12) 
I n B r i t a i n and Prance the steps taken by 
Chamberlain and Deladier for the preservation of peace 
were i n f u l l accord with the overwhelming sentiment of 
the general public i n t h e i r countries. Views expressed 
i n 'the Times' of October 1 probably endorsed majority 
opinion: 
"No conqueror returning from a victory 
on the b a t t l e f i e l d has come home adorned 
with nobler l a u r e l s than Mr. Chamberlain 
from Munich yesterday". 
On h i s return he was ha i l e d as a God-sent bringer of 
peace, the saviour of European man-kind. Forty 
6. 
thousand persons of a l l classes and nations wrote to him 
to express t h e i r gratitude for what he had achieved at 
Munich, Hie reason for t h i s hectic emotion that the 
Munich Agreement had l e t loose has teen summed up by 
Duff Cooper i n the following words: 
"For many days they (the English people) 
had been preparing for war with a l l the 
anguish that such preparation i n f l i c t s 
upon the human mind. They had foreseen t f i n a n c i a l ruin and sudden death.••• 
Suddenly i n the twinkling of an eye, the 
clouds dispersed, the sky was blue, the 
sun shone. There was to be no war. 
neither now nor at any future date. * ' 
But there was another side to the reaction i n 
B r i t a i n which saw mainly the 'stink of Munich'.^ 1 4^ This 
was an i n t e l l e c t u a l rather than emotional reaction which 
found i n Munich not a cause for joy but a sense of shame. 
There were moral aspects of the 'way i n which Czecho-
(15) 
Slovakia was thrown to the wolves at the l a s t minute' 
that were by no means compensated for by the fact that 
war had been averted. The p r i n c i p a l argument l e v e l l e d 
against the government was that they had acted dishonourably 
i n encouraging France to desert Czechoslovakia, her 
f a i t h f u l a l l y i n her hour of need. Churchill, one of 
the sternest c r i t i c s of Munich, believed that the choice 
facing the government had been between war and shame. 
To him Munich had merely postponed the e v i l day: 'They 
chose shame and they w i l l get war too'. He vigorously 
condemned the whole a f f a i r as a 'disaster of the f i r s t 
magnitude'. * 1 6* 
To the opponents of Munich there were more f a r -
reaching arguments to be aimed at the government than 
the betrayal of a minor a l l y . A deeper implication 
was a surrender of the democracies to the Nazi threat 
of force. Harold Nicolson i n the House of Commons 
strongly denounced the Munich Agreement as the abdication 
of B r i t a i n ' s t r a d i t i o n a l policy i n Europe: 
"For 250 years at l e a s t the great foundation 
of our foreign policy...has been to prevent 
by every means i n our power the domination 
of Europe by any single Power...By that 
paper signed l i g h t l y . . . i n the early hours 
of the morning the Prime Minister of Great 
B r i t a i n put h i s signature to a statement 
that that policy a f t e r 250 years had been 
abandoned. (17) 
The argument was also used that B r i t a i n ' s strategic 
position had been greatly worsened by the 'surrender' of 
Czechoslovakia. Attlee maintained that B r i t a i n ' s 
position was now 'one of great danger'. B r i t a i n , he 
(18) 
complained, was 'isolated'. 
The debate on the Munich settlement opened i n 
the Commons on October 3. The c r i t i c s , apart from 
members of the regular opposition, included Duff Cooper, 
8 
Churchill, Eden, Crariborne, Amery, and Harold Nicolson. 
Duff Cooper resigned h i s office as F i r s t Lord of the 
Admiralty so that he might continue to 'walk about the 
(iq) 
world with my head er e c t ' . N ' He f e l t nothing but shame 
at the whole a f f a i r . To his mind H i t l e r could have been 
forced into moderating h i s demands over Czechoslovakia 
had the government pursued a firmer l i n e with him and 
shown that B r i t a i n was prepared to fight for the rights 
of a far-away country. 
Churchill was vehement i n his h o s t i l i t y to 
Chamberlain's appeasement of H i t l e r . The deference that 
he believed had been shown to the Nazis touched the depth 
of his B r i t i s h pride. 
"What I find unendurable i s the sense of 
our country f a l l i n g into the power, into 
the orbit and influence of Nazi Germany, 
and of our existence becoming dependent 
upon th e i r goodwill or pleasure. ( 20) 
Moreover the moral relapse of Munich was, he maintained, 
the thin end of the wedge. 
"This i s only the beginning of the reckoning. 
This i s only the f i r s t s ip, the f i r s t fore-
taste of a b i t t e r cup which w i l l be profferred 
to us year by year unless by a supreme 
recovery of moral health and martial vigour, 
we a r i s e again and take our stand for 
freedom as i n the olden times." (21) 
C h u r o h i l l was so f a r i n opposition to the government's 
handling of the r e c e n t c r i s i s t h a t he tried, to i n f l u e n c e 
the t h i r t y or f o r t y Tory d i s s e n t i e n t s to vote a g a i n s t the 
(22) 
government i n the d i v i s i o n . As i t was they r e g i s t e r e d 
t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s by a b s t a i n i n g . The voting f i g u r e s i n 
favour of the government's p o l i c y by 366 votes to 144 
endorsed Chamberlain's mission to Munich, a mission on 
which he had gone, i n any case, w i t h the support and 
b l e s s i n g s of a l l p a r t i e s . 
The Munich debate records v i v i d l y the sharp 
d i v i s i o n t h a t was l e f t i n p u b l i c opinion once the auto-
matic and very n a t u r a l emotional r e l i e f at l i v i n g s t i l l 
i n peace had subsided. The c o n f l i c t of 'peace but 
(23) 
not j u s t i c e ' was to c u t across p a r t y a l l e g i a n c e s 
and p e r s o n a l f r i e n d s h i p s . Duff Cooper, a f t e r h i s 
r e s i g n a t i o n , was .ignored by p o l i t i c a l acquaintances 
(24) 
and avoided by an o l d f r i e n d . These d i f f i c u l t i e s 
emanating from a marginal moral case gave r i s e to 
• b i t t e r controversy...and the word 'Munich 1 became a 
(25) 
gage of b a t t l e ' . 
J u s t as the f e r v e n t expressions of r e l i e f 
accumulated around Chamberlain so too did the a c c u s a t i o n s , 
doubts and f e a r s of those who questioned Munich. 
10. 
As Chamberlain w i l l "be seen to be the i n i t i a t o r of 
B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y i n t h i s period under examination 
i t w i l l be relevant to inspect b r i e f l y the method and 
manner of his policy-making* For there was much i n 
Chamberlain's very i n d i v i d u a l approach to foreign a f f a i r s , 
l e t alone i n his actual p o l i c i e s , which created suspicions 
and doubts i n the minds of many. Prom the time of his 
becoming prime minister Chamberlain had spurned the 
t r a d i t i o n a l mechanism of foreign policy formulation. The 
dominant voice i n these a f f a i r s was to be h i s own and not 
the foreign secretary's. The influence of the foreign 
o f f i c e decreased as Chamberlain's i n t e r e s t and a c t i v i t y 
i n foreign a f f a i r s became greater. 
I n one branch of foreign policy p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
Chamberlain exercised a very close personal c o n t r o l . 
This was concerning B r i t a i n ' s relationship w i t h the two 
European dictatorships. As 1938 progressed and the 
l i k e l i h o o d of h o s t i l i t i e s increased so did Chamberlain 
take t h i s branch of B r i t i s h foreign policy more personally 
i n hand. Lord Strang, Head of the Central Department 
of the Foreign Office at the time, believed that 
Chamberlain's i n d i v i d u a l conduct of these a f f a i r s did not 
11. 
mean that he ignored more conventional methods; he 
maintained that Chamberlain 1 c e r t a i n l y made f u l l use 
of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Cabinet 1. 
Strang admits, however, that especially at times of 
c r i s i s Chamberlain -
"tended to consult and carry with him an 
inner group of Cabinet Ministers composed 
of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, 
and two former holders of that o f f i c e , 
S i r John Simon and S i r Samuel Hoare.•••• 
As his agent and chief o f f i c i a l adviser 
i n these matters he c a l l e d i n S i r Horace 
Wilson, Chief I n d u s t r i a l Adviser to the 
Cabinet." (26) 
The testimony of one of t h i s inner group, Hoare 
puts a d i f f e r e n t emphasis on the matter and i t i s probably 
nearer the t r u t h -
" i t was i n the l a t e summer of 1938 that 
the Inner Cabinet of Chamberlain, 
Halifax, Simon and myself tended to 
take the place of the Foreign Policy 
Committee." (27) 
Hoare explains, l e g i t i m a t e l y enough, that 'the summoning 
of a large committee became p r a c t i c a l l y impossible' 
because 'the c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n at the time was changing 
so constantly 1. 
Such comparatively informal methods were bound 
to bring the government and especially Chamberlain 
12. 
under suspicion. The role of S i r Horace Wilson, who had 
a room i n 10 Downing Street during Chamberlain's premier-es) 
ship, gave r i s e to much j u s t i f i a b l y scepticism. The 
arrangement was specially d i s t a s t e f u l to o f f i c i a l s of 
the foreign o f f i c e . 
"This was the feeling of the Foreign Office, 
that the Prime Minister preferred the 
amateur advice of S i r Horace Wilson, chief 
i n d u s t r i a l adviser, to t h e i r own expert 
counsel." (29) 
The r e a l influence of Wilson was, at the time, 
much over-estimated, f o r Chamberlain was too masterful and 
stubborn a man to be swayed much by others. I n fact 
he was not influenced by Wilson but merely assisted and 
reassured by him. But, that being so f i x e d i n his views 
should mean that he at times ran contrary to and frequently 
ignored the advice of his foreign o f f i c e was reasonably a 
cause f o r d i s t r u s t . And distrusted i n many c i r c l e s he 
c e r t a i n l y was. Some credited him wi t h ideas of d i c t a t o r -
ship, while his self-righteousness and treatment of 
c r i t i c i s m as a personal a f f r o n t i r k e d many of his supporters 
almost as much as i t did Liberal and Labour members of 
Parliament. This d i s t r u s t did not stop at Chamberlain 
himself but devolved on the government and even on 
Parliament. Many members of the government were quite 
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u n d i s t i n g u i s h e d but even a f t e r Munich Chamberlain resisted 
c ounsel to r e c o n s t r u c t h i s government and strengthen i t to 
(30) 
meet c r i t i c i s m . A contemporary view of the l a c k of 
confidence i n the government can be seen i n a l e t t e r 
w r i t t e n a t the s t a r t of the Munich c r i s i s by Thomas Jones, 
a convinced peace-at-any-price man. 
" I wish I f e l t more confidence i n the 
c o l l e c t i v e wisdom and s t r e n g t h of the 
c a b i n e t . Nobody does - they don't 
themselves." (31) 
Of those concerned v/ith the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of Munich some found i t n e c e s s a r y to r e g i s t e r the i n t e n s i t y 
of t h e i r b e l i e f i n the moral wrongness of the government 
by r e s i g n a t i o n . That of Duff Cooper has a l r e a d y been 
mentioned. He b e l i e v e d Chamberlain was as gl a d to be 
(32) 
r i d of him as 'he was determined to go'. Another mann 
whose d i s g u s t a t Munich brought s i m i l a r r e a c t i o n was 
Con O ' N e i l l who had been w i t h the F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n the 
B e r l i n embassy f o r h a r d l y a y e a r . Antony Winn r e s i g n e d 
from the s t a f f of 'the Times' because Dawson suppressed 
h i s a r t i c l e on Duff Cooper's r e s i g n a t i o n , s u b s t i t u t i n g 
one of h i s own but s t i l l p u b l i s h i n g i t under Winn's t i t l e 
(33) 
as loboy correspondent. 
I n France too t h e r e were r e s i g n a t i o n s symptomatic 
of s i m i l a r f e e l i n g s of ignominy a t l e a v i n g a f a i t h f u l 
a l l y i n the l u r c h . Reynaud and Mandel abandoned the 
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Deladier cabinet; Churchill had e a r l i e r warned them that (34) 
auch action would seriously weaken the French government, 
but the s i t u a t i o n had now changed. But perhaps the most 
expressive reaction came from General Faucher who had been 
t r a i n i n g Czechoslovak troops. His sense of shame was so-
deep that he relinguished his French n a t i o n a l i t y and applied 
f o r enrolment as a Czech c i t i z e n . This was probably 
something of an exaggerated s a c r i f i c e but there can be no 
doubt that the betrayal of the Czech nation was more a 
matter to perturb French souls than B r i t i s h . 
The French nevertheless were not i d e a l i s t s . 
They.were r e a l i s t s , and two decisive influences had 
shaped t h e i r role at Munich. F i r s t l y there was t h e i r 
grave defence p o s i t i o n and the moral weakness of the 
nation behind i t ; secondly, the v i t a l influence of the 
United Kingdom. Domestically France was depressed and 
weakened through the existence of innumerable p o l i t i c a l 
factions. Throughout the whole of the September c r i s i s 
the French government had been deeply divided between 
resistance and surrender. French defences were i n a 
state worse than Britain's.. A gloomy picture was painted 
by S i r Maurice Hankey on the deficiencies i n the French 
defence p o s i t i o n i n a memorandum to Fhipps soon a f t e r 
Munich* 
" I need h a r d l y mention the deplorable s t a t e 
of t h e i r a v i a t i o n nor the defects i n the 
quantity and q u a l i t y of t h e i r machines... 
even t h e i r a n t i - a i r c r a f t a c t i v e and p a s s i v e 
defences are weak. I f I am c o r r e c t l y 
informed, there i s not a s i n g l e r e a l l y 
up-to-date f a s t f i g h t e r i n the a c t i v e defences 
of P a r i s , and the gun and e l e c t r i c - l i g h t 
( s i c ? s e a r c h l i g h t s ) defences of the country 
s t i l l require.two years before they can be 
regarded as s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
Even the p a s s i v e defences...revealed 
grave d e f i c i e n c i e s . There were no gas-
masks f o r the g e n e r a l populat ion . . . they were 
l a t e w ith t h e i r design and no masks were yet 
a v a i l a b l e . Trench refuges had not been 
constructed on anything l i k e the same s c a l e 
as i n England. I am t o l d that the men 
engaged on s h e l t e r s and on widening bridges 
over the Seine on the west of P a r i s went on 
s t r i k e during the c r i t i c a l week,"(35) 
I n such circumstances the i n f l e x i b l e determination of 
Chamberlain to avoid war was no doubt viewed w i t h some 
considerable r e l i e f . D e l a d i e r was pleased to l e t 
Chamberlain take the l e a d and Chamberlain was pleased 
to have i t . 
There i s evidence that Chamberlain's opinion of 
(36) 
the French was low but i n any case h i s purpose was 
too f i x e d , h i s s k i n too t h i c k to be troubled by the 
s e n s i t i v e way i n which the French regarded t h e i r formal 
t r e a t y w i t h Czechoslovakia. From the s t a r t of the c r i s i s 
Chamberlain was i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l and i n much of what he 
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did i n pursuing his p o l i c y l e f t the French so i n the dark 
that Deladier and Bonnet were commuting between Paris and 
London to f i n d out what was happening. The foreign o f f i c e 
was deluged w i t h communiques wanting to know the exact 
p o s i t i o n of B r i t a i n with reference to the Franco-Czech 
Treaty. While the c r i s i s had not deteriorated too f a r 
replies were guarded: 
"His Majesty's Government, while they would 
never allow the security of France to be 
threatened, are unable to make precise 
statements of the character of t h e i r future 
action, or the time a t which i t would be 
taken, i n circumstances they cannot at 
present foresee." (37) 
The tenor of the French notes was that they would stand 
by t h e i r obligations i n respect of Czechoslovakia but 
Chamberlain's insistence soon brought a French acceptance 
to the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination i n that country as 
the only way of avoiding war. A communication from Phipps, 
the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Paris, sensied a changed a t t i t u d e 
i n France by September 24. Though Phipps had quite 
possibly l o s t much of his o b j e c t i v i t y i n the defeatist 
atmosphere of Paris, the text of his despatch of th a t 
date caused Chamberlain much joy. 
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" A l l that i s "best i n France i s against war, 
almost at any price*•• 
To embark upon what w i l l ' presumably be the 
biggest c o n f l i c t i n h i s t o r y w ith our a l l y , 
who w i l l f i g h t , i f f i g h t she must without 
eyes (Air Force) and without r e a l heart 
must surely give us f u r i o u s l y to think." (38) 
This telegram gave the foreign o f f i c e f u r i o u s l y to think 
how outrageous i t was that the best i n France was against 
war, but Chamberlain welcomed the decline i n French 
militancy. He and some of his ministers had been quite 
worried that the French might take p r e c i p i t a t e action 
and involve themselves i n war thus facing the B r i t i s h 
government w i t h a f a t e f u l decision. By September 27 
Chamberlain had obtained the entire agreement of the 
French government 'not to take any offensive measures 
without previous consultation w i t h and agreement by* 
(39) 
the B r i t i s h government. 
By the time that the Munich conference took place 
the French party were l i t t l e less desperate than the 
B r i t i s h to avoid war* Deladier defended the cause of 
the Czechs without much conviction complaining that 
what was happening was 'due solely to the pig-headedness 
(40) 
of Benes*. The French were i n fact 'resolved to reach 
(41) 
agreement a t any cost*. Certainly the French 
a t t i t u d e had mellowed i n the past f o r t n i g h t but Deladier, 
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had been constrained by Chamberlain's determination to 
toe the B r i t i s h l i n e , rather than been following a pol i c y 
of which he was e n t i r e l y convinced. Chamberlain was 
f u l l y aware of the po s i t i o n the French were i n and handled 
Paris to h i s own advantage. He was dubious of the kind 
of influence France might t r y to put on him and t h i s was 
c l e a r l y expressed by his refusal to communicate the idea 
and essence of his pet b r a i n - c h i l d , the Anglo-German 
Protocol, to the French before obtaining H i t l e r ' s signature 
to i t . Strang, who drew up the tex t of this agreement 
has put this on record: 
" I urged that he should inform M.Deladler, 
who was s t i l l i n Munich and staying near-
by, of h i s i n t e n t i o n to seek t h i s d i r e c t 
agreement with H i t l e r . He said that he 
saw ho reason whatever f o r saying anything 
to the French." (42) 
This then was the state of Anglo-French relations 
at the time of Munich. B r i t a i n , a f r a i d of impulsive 
action on the part of France, had i n s i s t e d upon consulta-
t i o n before any decisive steps should be taken i n 
honouring the Franco-Czech Pact. But at the same time 
she did not want too close a degree of collaboration while 
pursuing her i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c y towards Germany. For 
that policy might w e l l have been d i s t i n c t l y embarrassed 
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by France had she been i n t i m a t e l y acquainted with i t s 
d e t a i l s , France had been happy enough to leave the 
i n i t i a t i v e and immediate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to B r i t a i n -
t h i s helped to s a l v e her conscience - but the B r i t i s h 
conduct i n e v i t a b l y l e f t her with s u s p i c i o n s e s p e c i a l l y 
(43) 
once the Anglo-German Agreement had been announced. 
Of the two d i c t a t o r powers r e l a t i o n s w i t h I t a l y 
despite, continuing- d i f f i c u l t i e s over b r i n g i n g the Anglo-
I t a l i a n Agreement into f o r c e , had been by f a r the more 
p r o p i t i o u s . Despite the f a c t that the Rome-Berlin 
Axis was by t h i s time the corner-stone of I t a l i a n 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y , Mussolini had c e r t a i n l y not seen eye to 
eye with H i t l e r over the Sudeten question. I n the f i r s t 
p l a c e I t a l y had wanted an o v e r a l l s o l u t i o n to the 
Czechoslovak problem b e l i e v i n g that the Hungarian and 
P o l i s h m i n o r i t i e s should be considered as w e l l as the 
(44) 
Ge-rman. I n the second p l a c e I t a l y did not want 
war. Even i n the darkest days of the l a s t week of 
September Mussolini continued to hope that H i t l e r would 
get a l l he wanted by p e a c e f u l means without p l a c i n g 
I t a l y i n the acute p o s i t i o n of having to f i g h t a war 
f o r which she was not prepared. The I t a l i a n f o r e i g n 
m i n i s t e r , Ciano, wrote i n h i s d i a r y on September 26: 
"There i s now an atmosphere of war. 
The l a s t hopes of a l l are attached to 
i 
i 
the message sent by Chamberlain to 
the Fuhrer a f t e r the meeting which 
took place i n London* These hopes 
are of b r i e f d u r a t i o n , . . I t i s war. 
May God protect Itialy and the Duce."(45) 
I t was by v i r t u e of Mussolini's intervention w i th H i t l e r , 
pressed f o r by Chamberlain, that H i t l e r postponed 
invasion hour thus permitting the idea of a four-power 
conference to be mooted and accepted. 
Kir k p a t r i c k has put on record that at the 
conference the I t a l i a n s were 'clearly t e r r i f i e d of being 
landed by H i t l e r i n t o a European war'.^ 4 6^ This might 
suggest that Mussolini took only a passive part i n the 
deliberations, but i t was quite the opposite. This 
point i's elaborated by Ki r k p a t r i c k i n his biography of 
Mussolini. He i s described as assuming 'the p r i n c i p a l 
r o l e . i n an a f f a i r i n which the Fuhrer desired to play no 
(47). 
p a r t 1 . The a c t i v i t y might have been Mussolini's, 
but the influence was s t i l l H i t l e r ' s . I n everything 
the Duce said or did there was a determination not to 
upset his Axis partner i n any way. This I t a l i a n 
awareness of German s e n s i t i v i t y was a d i f f i c u l t y i n the 
way of any genuine improvement i n Anglo-Italian r e l a t i o n s . 
Chamberlain had hoped to achieve more w i t h respect to 
I t a l y but the German shadow came between them. 
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Just before the opening of the conference Chamberlain 
t r i e d to t a l k w i th Mussolini but the B r i t i s h opening was 
coldly refused and the opportunity l o s t . Later, however, 
during the conference, the two d i d converse but a 
suggestion that Mussolini might delay' his departure so 
that they could have a private meeting was ruled out 
because Mussolini thought i t might 'offend German 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s . • ^ 4 8 ^  
I n spite of these d i f f i c u l t i e s Chamberlain did 
receive from the Duce an in d i c a t i o n t h a t he was concerned 
to have good relations w i t h Great B r i t a i n . This was 
conveyed i n his stated i n t e n t i o n of shortly withdrawing 
ten thousa nd troops from Spain which would f a c i l i t a t e the 
implementation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of A p r i l 16 
(49) 
1938. This factor concurred with the obvious I t a l i a n 
desire,for peace and t h e i r timely intervention to prevent 
German action p r i o r to Munich, l e f t a very favourable 
impression on Chamberlain's mind. I n his diary on 
October 2 he wrote of Mussolini: 
"He seemed to be cowed by H i t l e r , but 
undoubtedly he was most anxious f o r a 
peaceful settlement, and he played an 
indispensable part i n a t t a i n i n g i t . 0 . His manner to me was more than f r i e n d l y ; 
he li s t e n e d w i t h the utmost at t e n t i o n to 
a l l I said, and expressed the strong 
hope that I would v i s i t him early i n I t a l y , 
where I should receive *a very warm welcome0 (50) 
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Although as a r e s u l t of the tensions and s t r a i n of the 
p a s t few weeks Chamberlain had probably over-estimated 
the s i n c e r i t y of Mussolini's i n t e n t i o n s w ith reference to 
B r i t a i n , n e v e r t h e l e s s i t was evident t h a t hopes f o r the 
maintenance of European peace would be more p r o f i t a b l y 
pursued with the I t a l i a n end of the Rome-Berlin Axis 
than w i t h the German. A f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s 
f a c t was found i n the I t a l i a n i n i t i a t i v e to put down an 
appendix to the Munich Agreement v/hereby d i r e c t negotia-
tions between Prague, Warsaw and Budapest were to be 
opened i n order to s o l v e the problem of the P o l i s h and 
Hungarian m i n o r i t i e s incorporated i n the Czechoslovak 
s t a t e . For the present, A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s seemed 
to be i n an o p t i m i s t i c s t a t e , but time was to t e l l t h a t 
there v/ere deeper motives i n I t a l i a n p o l i c y than those 
Chamberlain had seemed to see. 
With Germany r e l a t i o n s were i n e v i t a b l y l e s s 
d i s t i n c t but H i t l e r ' s demeanour at Munich and the 
w i l l i n g n e s s w i t h which he signed the subsequent Anglo-
German D e c l a r a t i o n were again eagerly taken as signs of 
improved r e l a t i o n s and hope f o r the futu r e . C e r t a i n l y 
was such 'moderate and reasonable' behaviour (as described 
(51) 
by Chamberlain) on the p a r t of H i t l e r a cause for 
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great r e l i e f following the tirades and b e l l i c o s i t y of 
(52) 
the previous days. But the unfortunate t r u t h was 
that the reasonable outcome of the Munich Conference was 
not so much a triumph f o r the peacemakers as i t was a 
personal defeat f o r H i t l e r . His tone was subdued not 
because he was i n any way genuinely convinced by the 
ideals and principles of the appeasers but because he had 
been denied his war and immediate t o t a l v i c t o r y over 
Czechoslovakia by factors over which the appeasers had 
had l i t t l e c o n t r o l . I t was a sulking rather than sub-
missive H i t l e r that was present at Munich. 
I t was not u n t i l the eleventh hour intervention 
by his a l l y Mussolini that H i t l e r gave up his resolve to 
bring about a war. This appeal from I t a l y , continued 
pressure from B r i t a i n , an entreaty from the United States, 
together w i t h H i t l e r ' s own r e a l i s a t i o n of how much he was 
r e a l l y being offered had a l l helped to influence his 
decision to r e l e n t . There was, however, one other factor 
which was decisive. This was the peaceful sentiments 
of the German people. As a r e s u l t of a march by an armoured 
d i v i s i o n r i g h t through B e r l i n H i t l e r had been m o r t i f i e d 
to f i n d that his people were f a r from sharing his l u s t 
(53) 
f o r war. 
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H i t l e r had been a l l the more determined on war 
over Czechoslovakia because of the very shape and form 
of the national existence of that state which was, to 
him, an insufferable challenge. His hatred of Czecho-
slovakia was intense f o r several reasons. The Republic 
was the embodiment of Versailles, Slav nationalism and 
democracy, three factors which were anathema to the 
Puhrer. Apart from t h i s she was the a l l y of France 
and Bolshevism and a haven of refuge f o r Jews and 
others escaping from the Reich. These ingredients i n 
the. make-up of Czechoslovakia together w i t h the f a c t 
that that country represented an immense strategic 
h a r r i e r to German domination of Europe had made H i t l e r 
(54) 
a l l the more 'bent on having his l i t t l e war'. 
H i t l e r ' s reaction to Munich was one of fury. 
He had been interested i n the Sudeten Germans only 
because they served as a lever w i t h which to break up 
the Czechoslovak state. Despite the defences; put up 
by his Foreign Minister, Rlbbentrop, of the German action 
i n the Sudetenland, there i s no doubt that H i t l e r ' s 
purpose from the s t a r t had been p l a i n l y aggressive. 
German dominance of the Czechoslovak state would have 
secured a powerful p o s i t i o n i n Central Europe f o r the 
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Reich and from there H i t l e r had intended to launoh h i s 
drive f o r 'Lebensraum1 i n the East. But Munich had 
interrupted these plans and t h i s caused H i t l e r intense 
annoyance. Ribbentrop who owed hi s p o s i t i o n i n the 
Reich e n t i r e l y to his success i n winning H i t l e r ' s favour, 
claims that 'the Puhrer was very s a t i s f i e d with Munich' 
and th a t there was 'never as much as a h i n t to the 
(55) 
contrary'. I t must be appreciated that Ribbentrop 
wrote t h i s i n prison while he was on t r i a l f o r his l i f e 
and that he was concerned i n his memoirs, as i n his 
defence at the t r i a l , to create an impression favourable 
to h i s t o r y and the j u r y . The captured German documents 
expose Ribbentrop's deceits as too do some remarks, 
revealed i n the Nuremberg T r i a l , that H i t l e r had made to 
his supreme commanders at a secret meeting on November 23, 
1939s-
" i t was clear to me from the f i r s t moment 
that I could not be s a t i s f i e d w i th the 
Sudeten German t e r r i t o r y . That was only 
a p a r t i a l solution. The decision to 
march i n t o Bohemia was made. Then 
followed the erection of the Protectorate 
and with that the basis of the action 
against Poland was laid."(56) 
Although Munich was a great triumph f o r 
Germany i t had been a harrowing experience f o r H i t l e r . 
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He objected to the method of diplomacy through personal 
contact - by which Chamberlain l a i d such store - and i t 
was fu r t h e r g a l l i n g f o r him to be i n the company of 
three men who were his equals instead of being surrounded 
by a crowd of obedient cycophants. Even so, once the 
conference was under way he had largely managed to 
control himself and Chamberlain discerned l i t t l e trace 
(57) 
of his true feelings. . K i r k p a t r i c k , however, had 
been more observant. I n a broadcast he made during the 
war he referred back to the Munich Conference saying 
how Hitler's face had been •black as thunder'. As the 
talks progressed H i t l e r ' s discomfort became more obvious. 
" H i t l e r s i t s moodily apart. He 
wriggles on the sofa, he crosses 
and uncrosses his legs, he folds 
his arms and glares around the 
room." (58) 
When the Agreement was f i n a l l y ready H i t l e r 
'scratches his signature as i f he were being asked to 
sign away his b i r t h r i g h t ' . 
The Fuhrer's immediate reaction to Munich was 
made known to K i r k p a t r i c k by some members of H i t l e r ' s 
entourage. After the conference had broken up H i t l e r 
i s supposed to have said: 
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"Gentlemen, t h i s has been my f i r s t 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference and I can 
assure you that i t w i l l be the l a s t , . . 
I f ever that s i l l y old man comes 
i n t e r f e r i n g here again with his 
umbrella, I ' l l kick him downstairs and. 
jump on his stomach i n f r o n t of photo-
graphers. " (59) 
The German nation as a whole were unacquainted with 
these sentiments of t h e i r Puhrer and believed that 
Munich had been an unqualified triumph f o r Germany. 
This deviation i n views between the German Chancellor 
and his people was f u l l y appreciated by H i t l e r . I t 
was a r i f t that created the f i r s t doubts i n his mind 
as to whether he would be able to count on the devotion 
of his people i n a l l future circumstances. And i t was 
a r i f t that he was to t r y to heal over the next few 
months by alienating the apparent sympathies of the 
German people f o r Chamberlain and Great B r i t a i n . 
Chamberlain's reaction to H i t l e r as seen i n 
(60) 
h i s diary f o r October 2 was evidently mainly con-
ditioned by the private conversation the two had at 
which the Anglo-German Agreement was tabled and signed. 
Chamberlain put great value on getting H i t l e r ' s 
signature to some statement on the future of Anglo-
German re l a t i o n s . The f i n a l declaration which Lord 
28. 
Strang had o r i g i n a l l y drafted while dressing and having 
breakfast on the f i n a l morning i n Munich, was as follows: 
"We, the German Fuhrer and Chancellor and 
the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, have had a 
fur t h e r meeting today and are agreed i n 
recognising that the question of Anglo-
German rela t i o n s i s of the f i r s t importance 
f o r the two countries and f o r Europe, 
We regard the Agreement signed l a s t 
night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement 
as symbolic of the desire .of our two peoples 
never to go to war w i t h one another again. 
We are resolved that the method of 
consultation s h a l l be the method adopted 
to deal with any other questions that 
may concern our two countries, and we 
are determined to continue our e f f o r t s 
to remove possible sources of difference 
and thus to contribute to assure the peace 
of Europe."(61) 
Mussolini described t h i s declaration as 'a glass 
(62) 
of lemonade to a t h i r s t y man'. I t did mean a l o t to 
Chamberlain; on returning to his h o t e l a f t e r being with 
H i t l e r he patted his pocket triumphantly and exclaimed 
(63) 
•I've got i t 1 . But i t meant more to Chamberlain than 
Mussolini seemed to think. The o p t i m i s t i c , i f vague 
terms i n which the declaration was phrased was a welcome 
bonus on top of a successful conference which had saved 
the peace. But i t was not only i n hope that Chamberlain 
had sought H i t l e r ' s signature to t h i s protocol; i t was 
(64) 
also i n calculation. Well might the B r i t i s h Prime 
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Minister display his piece of paper to the crowds at 
Heston and i n Downing Street - i t was a pledged agreement 
to peace and consultation w i t h Germany, I f H i t l e r 
honoured i t , so much the better. But, were i t not 
honoured no one would be l e f t i n doubt as to who was 
(65) 
the 1 guilty party 1 • 
For the present the agreement meant as easing of 
tension between B r i t a i n and Germany. I t encouraged the 
hope of the B r i t i s h people that a comprehensive agreement 
with Germany might, a f t e r a l l , be possible. For a new 
foundation f o r the development of Anglo-German relations 
had been l a i d and t h i s gave impetus to the desire f o r a 
f r i e n d l y settlement. These were vain hopes. Von 
Dirkecn, the German ambassador i n London, was to learn a 
few days a f t e r Munich that 'the signing of the protocol 
meant no change of poli c y ' , as f a r as Germany was concerned. 
But f o r several weeks, and despite ominous murmurs from 
H i t l e r , hopes i n B r i t a i n were mainly high and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the minds of several leading p o l i t i c i a n s and government 
(66) 
members. I t was believed f o r the time being that, as 
Chamberlain had expressed i n the Munich debate, the 
declaration was a sign of genuine desire on the part of 
Germany to reach an u l t i m a t e l y peaceful understanding 
30. 
w i t h Great B r i t a i n , 
" I believe there are many who w i l l f e e l 
with me that such a declaration,..is 
something more than a pious expression 
of opinion...I believe that there i s 
s i n c e r i t y and go©^oill on both sides i n 
t h i s declaration. That i s why to me 
i t s significance goes f a r beyond i t s 
actual words," (67) 
Moreover no one could deny that at Munich H i t l e r had f o r 
the very f i r s t time made some concession to the forces 
of reason. Chamberlain could also gain encouragement 
from the blatant desire f o r peace of the German people 
that he himself had experienced, 
"•••the German desire f o r peace must 
have i t s ef f e c t on H i t l e r , and I hope 
too that the personal contact I have 
established w i t h him w i l l help." (68) 
Here, so i t seemed, were the foundations f o r appease-
ment to b u i l d on. 
This b e l i e f i n the heightened p o s s i b i l i t y of 
a l a s t i n g peace i n Europe was supported by the generally 
pleasant tenor of the t a l k between Chamberlain and H i t l e r , 
Spain, economic relations and disarmanent were a l l 
discussed r a t i o n a l l y and with care. The responsible 
and c i v i l nature of t h i s conversation as compared with 
the hysteria and war panic of a few days before brought 
a re a l atmosphere of sanity and hope into Anglo-German 
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r e l a t i o n s . The progress of these relations was to 
expose the mirage nature of the atmosphere but f o r the 
present at any rate outward signs j u s t i f i e d the 
exuberant pleasure of the crowds both i n London and 
B e r l i n , 
This then was the s i t u a t i o n i n Europe following 
Munich, which was a s i g n i f i c a n t landmark i n B r i t i s h 
foreign p o l i c y . The diplomatic atmosphere between 
B r i t a i n and the t o t a l i t a r i a n states was a mixture of 
r e l i e f , hope and suspicion, while Chamberlain was now 
concerned to b u i l d on the promise of the Anglo-German 
Declaration,- he and his government were not to- allow 
themselves to be l u l l e d into a sense of false security, 
"Perhaps i f I were d i f f e r e n t l y constituted, 
I might j u s t s i t back and bask i n t h i s 
popularity while i t lasted. But I am 
already a l i t t l e impatient w i t h i t , 
because i t seems to assume so much. We 
have avoided the greatest catastrophe, 
i t i s true, but we are very l i t t l e 
nearer to the time when we can put a l l 
thoughts of war out of our minds,,," (69) 
Chamberlain was a l l too conscious of the s i t u a t i o n 
facing the United Kingdom, The immediate tension 
i n foreign p o l i c y had been largely dissipated, but 
the underlying c o n f l i c t s which had caused t h i s tension 
were s t i l l present and l i a b l e to erupt at any time. 
32. 
I n the ensuing months Chamberlain continued to work to 
avoid any d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n relations but at the same time 
strove to strengthen B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n Europe so that 
she would be prepared to defeat her enemies i f the f i n a l , 
h o r r i b l e catastrophe occurred. I n diplomacy t h i s meant 
a closer collaboration with the p r i n c i p a l a l l y , Prance, 
who sorely needed the moral support and leadership of a 
steadfast guide. I t also meant the fostering of the 
sympathies of Washington and i d e n t i f y i n g basic American 
ideals with B r i t i s h aims i n Europe. 
33. 
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35. 
Chapter two 
German B l i g h t 
I 
i 
Once the immediate dust of Munich had s e t t l e d 
there were important matters to pursue with each of 
the other signatories of the Agreement, The feeling 
of r e l i e f at peace was to he diminished once the true 
state of relations w ith Germany came into focus. 
Policy towards Germany now contained two main elements. 
F i r s t l y she must not be antagonised i n the execution 
of the Munich Agreement so as not to detract from i t s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f e c t s ; secondly, while t h i s was being 
seen to the good contacts presumed to have been made 
wit h H i t l e r at Munich must be fostered and strengthened. 
Mechanism i n the form of an Inte r n a t i o n a l Commission 
had been set up to implement the Agreement, This 
Commission consisted of the German Secretary of State, 
a Czech delegate and the B r i t i s h , French and I t a l i a n 
ambassadors i n B e r l i n , 
Within a few days of i t 3 i n i t i a l meeting the 
Commission was i n deadlock, the stumbling-block being 
the d i f f e r i n g interpretations placed on specific items 
of the Agreement by Germany and Cxechoslovakia, On 
the morning of October 5 S i r Nevile : Henderson, B r i t i s h 
ambassador i n B e r l i n , reported; 
"There was serious divergence i n In t e r n a t i o n a l 
Commission yesterday evening on two questions 
of p r i n c i p l e : -
A. As to what s t a t i s t i c s should be used f o r 
establishing German preponderance. 
B. Percentage that constitutes such 
preponderance." (1) 
The Czechs demanded 1930 or 1921 s t a t i s t i c s and a 
75 per cent majority, while Germany was adamant on 
1910 s t a t i s t i c s and a 51 per cent majority. A 
proposal by the French delegate that 1918 be taken as 
the year and a two-thirds majority f o r the preponderance 
was a compromise satis f a c t o r y to neither party and the 
meeting broke up. The purpose of Germany was obviously 
to squeeze as much of Czechoslovakia f o r herself as 
possible and the lack of assistance from B r i t a i n and 
France i n achieving t h i s purpose was immediately 
seized upon by H i t l e r as an opportunity to accuse 
(2) 
them of going back on the Munich decisions. This 
was a minor disaster from the B r i t i s h point of view 
especially as H i t l e r was intending to order the army 
to occupy the Godesberg l i n e i f the Czechoslovak 
government did not agree to the German demands by 
(3). 
mid-day of the 5th. 
Under these circumstances a c r i s i s was averted by 
the B r i t i s h , French and I t a l i a n ambassadors deciding 37. 
amongst themselves that H i t l e r ' s desires would have 
to be met as they did not actually contravene the 
Munich Agreement. This proposal would be put to the 
Czechs at the next meeting of the Commission and they 
would be asked to accept i t . Henderson claimed that 
i f the three ambassadors had not acted i n t h i s way 
(4) 
'the Munich Agreement might have been n u l l i f i e d 1 . 
By the morning of October 6 Henderson was able to 
report that the m i l i t a r y sub-commission had reached 
agreement i n regard to the whole l i n e to be occupied by 
Germany by October 10. ' Of tantamount importance to 
t h i s achievement had been the resignation of Benes 
announced at 6.00p.m. the previous evening. This 
ushered i n a much more pro-German government i n 
Czechoslovakia which gave promise of a genuine easing 
i n relations between the two countries. As Henderson 
wrote i n his memoirs, 'from the moment Benes resigned 
. ( 6 ) 
the p o s i t i o n became easier . This changed a t t i t u d e 
i n Czechoslovakia is summed up by Weizsacker, the 
German State Secretary i n a memorandum issued on 
the 6th. 
"The new Czechoslovak Cabinet f u l l y 
realised that w i t h her new r e s t r i c t e d 
f r o n t i e r s Czechoslovakia could pursue 
only the policy of close dependance on 
Germany and cooperation w i t h her." (7) 
38. 
The fact of agreement could i n no way be a t t r i b u t e d 
to Germany who continued to refuse to modify her demands. 
This could w e l l be taken i n London as an a t t i t u d e i n -
consistent w i t h that which Germany had generally put 
on evidence at Munich. These doubts were given further 
basis when again German greed caused dissension i n 
the Commission:-
" D i f f i c u l t y has arisen over i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the phrase 'without any existing i n s t a l l a -
t i o n having been destroyed'. The Czechs 
argue that t h i s phtfae applies only to State 
and public property but not to private 
property. The Germans i n s i s t that i t 
applies to a l l i n s t a l l a t i o n s which serve 
any public purposes whatever even i f i n 
pri v a t e ownership, e.g. gas and e l e c t r i c i t y 
works, l o c a l railways." (8) 
The B r i t i s h reaction was to relate t h i s problem 
s t r i c t l y to the terms of the Munich Agreement, main-
ta i n i n g that the d i s t i n c t i o n claimed by the Czechs 
between public and private property was quite immaterial. 
The uppermost thought i n Halifax's mind was not sympathy 
f o r the Czechs but the avoidance of crossing swords 
wi t h Germany. Within the f i r s t week since Munich 
much had happened t o prove that Europe was s t i l l 
walking a tight-rope. There had been outbursts from 
H i t l e r against B r i t i s h and French genuiness at Munich; 
stalemate had temporarily been reached i n the In t e r n a t i o n a l 
Commission and meetings had been suspended at the German 
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request; there had been a H i t l e r ultimatum against 
Czechoslovakia i f the Reich did not get her own way 
in- the detailed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Munich. So again, 
as at Munich, Czechoslovakia's p o s i t i o n could not be 
supported, but was s a c r i f i c e d to the policy of appeasing 
Germany. 
By October 7 the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e concerning the 
fortunes of the Inter n a t i o n a l Commission became more 
e x p l i c i t . Communications of that date from Henderson 
exhibited l i t t l e concern at the fate of the Czechs:-
" i t would be as unwise as i t would be 
misleading to encourage Czechoslovak 
Government to believe they have much 
to hope f o r from In t e r n a t i o n a l Commission... 
The Germans are c e r t a i n l y not a 
magnanimous race...It i s kinder i n the 
end to be outspokenly r e a l i s t i c than 
to encourage false hopes out of excessive 
sympathy and s e n s i t i v i t y . " (9) 
I n the same telegram the Ambassador strongly urged 
that 'the best t a c t i c a l chance f o r the Czechs (lay) 
i n d i r e c t negotiations'. Although the duties 
specified f o r the Commission by the Agreement were 
by no. means finished Henderson was advising that the 
Czechs should be l e f t to themselves i n t h e i r t e r r i -
t o r i a l b a t t l e w i t h Germany. He believed that they 
might achieve more t h i s way and that the Commission 
40. 
was even hampering the Czechs i n t r y i n g to salvage 
what they could o f t h e i r s t a t e . This suggestion 
f o r b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n was q u i t e c o n t r a r y to the 
s p i r i t and word o f the Munich Agreement, I t can 
only be presumed t h a t Henderson, who was i n h i s own way 
as profoundly i n t e n t on preventing war as was Chamber-
l a i n , saw i n the d i f f i c u l t i e s emanating from the 
Commission a possible source o f warfare and a c e r t a i n 
cause o f t r o u b l e i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . He was 
q u i t e ready to do what he could f o r t h e Czechs'behind 
(10) 
the scenes' but the o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e - which 
would be known to the Nazis - must be advice to t h e 
Czechs to acquiesce i n the German demands. 
The desire on the p a r t o f B r i t a i n f o r continued 
harmony i s very apparent. On October 7 H a l i f a x received 
von Dirksen, the German ambassador, a t the f o r e i g n 
o f f i c e and r e f e r r i n g to Munich t o l d him t h a t : 
" i t was the earnest desire o f His Majesty's 
Government to see the contacts t h a t had 
been thus es t a b l i s h e d bearing f r u i t i n 
f u r t h e r d i r e c t i o n s f o r the good o f 
European peace." (11) 
Reports had been received by the f o r e i g n o f f i c e con-
cerning the i l l - t r e a t m e n t o f Sudeten Germans who d i d 
not belong to the Sudeten-German Party. H a l i f a x 
41. 
wished to prevent t h i s unsavoury element i n German 
p o l i c y from embarrassing Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s and 
so requested a diplomatic favour from von Dirksen. 
He emphasised t h a t he: 
"would be g r a t e f u l i f by means o f r e l e v a n t 
German ' reports he might be enabled to 
combat such a s s e r t i o n s , the spreading o f 
which might i n f a c t hamper the advocates 
of f r i e n d l y Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s i n the 
r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s . " (12) 
The B r i t i s h emphasis was b l a t a n t l y on l e a v i n g 
nothing undone t h a t might help to secure a f i r m e r 
(13) 
Anglo-German understanding. 
Despite t h i s emphasis i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y the 
Germans had been f a r from convinced o f the B r i t i s h 
readiness to accept the German i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
Munich. I n a memorandum dated October 7 Weizsflcker, 
the German Secretary o f Sta t e , drew a t t e n t i o n t o h i s 
view t h a t B r i t a i n was f o l l o w i n g an o b s t r u c t i o n i s t 
p o l i c y . 
"Altogether i n questions i n dispute 
between the Czechs and ourselves 
o p p o s i t i o n i n the Commission comes 
from the B r i t i s h r a t h e r than the 
French." (14) 
The f a c t was, no doubt, t h a t Germany had no i n -
t e n t i o n o f recognising any c h a r i t a b l e actions on 
42. 
the p a r t o f B r i t a i n , t h a t H i t l e r was f a s t recovering 
from the a t t a c k o f faintheartedness he had experienced 
a t Munich. Moreover, although the memory of Munich 
n e t t l e d him, he f u l l y appreciated t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n 
and p r e s t i g e i n c e n t r a l Europe had "been g r e a t l y 
(15) 
advanced. He was now determined t o press home 
(16) 
h i s advantage t o i t s e x t r e m i t y . The t e r r i t o r i a l 
gains made by h i s greedy p o l i c y i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Commission were considerable: 
"The rough e f f e c t was t h a t the l i n e 
proposed at Munich was extended to 
something much more l i k e t h a t o f 
Godesberg.."(17) 
This improvement i n the Reich's c e n t r a l European 
p o s i t i o n gave H i t l e r added confidence t o f o l l o w a 
p o l i c y o f g e n e r a l l y a l i e n a t i n g h i s country from 
B r i t a i n . So i t was only a matter o f days f o l l o w i n g 
the t r o u b l e i n the Commission before more t a n g i b l e 
evidence o f German i l l - w i l l towards B r i t a i n was to 
be received. 
Two days a f t e r H a l i f a x ' s i n t e r v i e w w i t h von 
Dirksen there came a p u b l i c speech by H i t l e r a t 
Saarbrucken the tenor o f which was a d i s t i n c t 
embarrassment t o the B r i t i s h attempt to c o n c i l i a t e 
43. 
Germany. H a l i f a x ' s a f f a b l e request concerning the 
Sudeten Germans was t e s t i l y countered. A l l u d i n g to 
the ' V e r s a i l l e s epoch 1 manner i n which he thought 
B r i t a i n continued to t r e a t Germany, H i t l e r smartly 
rapped the knuckles o f the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n secretary. 
"We cannot t o l e r a t e any longer the t u t e l a g e 
o f governesses^ Enquiries o f B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c i a n s . c o n c e r n i n g the f a t e o f Germans 
w i t h i n the f r o n t i e r s o f the Reich - or o f 
others belonging t o the Reich - are not 
i n place." (18) 
There was a c e r t a i n degree o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s 
o b j e c t i o n t o the way i n which B r i t a i n concerned 
h e r s e l f i n German domestic a f f a i r s , and such a r e b u f f 
d i d not e x c i t e any l a s t i n g resentment. But another 
p a r t o f H i t l e r ' s speech harboured a much g r e a t e r ; 
t h r e a t t o B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . This was contained 
i n a vehement a t t a c k on the unstable nature o f the 
democratic governments l e d by Chamberlain and Deladier 
which might at any time b r i n g more m i l i t a n t men to 
pov/er. 
"But they govern i n c o u n t r i e s whose domestic 
o r g a n i s a t i o n makes i t possible t h a t a t any 
moment they may lose t h e i r p o s i t i o n to make 
place f o r others who are not very anxious 
f o r peace. And those others are i n f a c t 
there. I t only needs t h a t i n England 
instead o f Chamberlain, Mr. Duff? Cooper 
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or Mr, Eden or Mr. C h u r c h i l l should 
come t o power, and then we know q u i t e 
w e l l t h a t i t would be the aim of these 
men immediately to begin a new World 
War. They make no secret o f the f a c t , 
they admit i t openly." (19) 
H i t l e r was p l a y i n g on the p a c i f i c sentiments of h i s 
people which had been manifested by t h e i r r e l i e f a t 
Munich. His words were c a r e f u l l y chosen t o act as 
a s t i m u l a n t t o German p u b l i c o p i n i o n by persuading 
the German people o f t h e i r foolishness i n p u t t i n g 
t h e i r t r u s t i n f i c k l e democracies. His i n t e n t i o n 
was t o a l i e n a t e German sympathies from B r i t a i n and 
h i s propaganda machine was soon t o get i n t o f u l l swing 
i n endorsing t h i s p o l i c y . I t was poison t o the 
appeasers i n B r i t a i n . They were however, accustomed 
to H i t l e r ' s t i r a d e s and d i d not immediately take the 
poison o f the speech too s e r i o u s l y . Nevertheless, 
a s e n s i t i v e spot had been touched and when i n the next 
few days, the German press launched a s t u d i e d a t t a c k 
on B r i t a i n t h i s 3pot began t o f e s t e r . 
The f i r s t days o f October had not augured w e l l 
f o r the f u t u r e o f B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany. 
They had exposed the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n the Munich 
Agreement, the o v e r - r i d i n g problem being t h a t i n a 
h i g h l y complex i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere, the tensions 
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created i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission might explode 
i n any d i r e c t i o n 0 The fears mentioned above t h a t 
Munich had only t e m p o r a r i l y shelved and not dissolved 
the menace o f war were being given a r e i n f o r c e d 
foundation. 
Soon a f t e r the Munich c r i s i s Chamberlain had 
s t a t e d p u b l i c l y t h a t B r i t a i n had resolved upon rearma-
ment so as not to stand defenceless should a new c r i s i s 
(20) 
a r i s e . I t was t h i s f a c t t h a t the press i n Germany 
eagerly took up, framing B r i t a i n i n the eyes o f the 
German p u b l i c as a p o t e n t i a l aggressor against the 
Reich who needed very c a r e f u l l y to be watched. On 
October 12 the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung gave 
ominous reports to i t s readers t h a t B r i t a i n was 
rearming r a p i d l y and t h a t the sole o b j e c t o f these 
(21) 
armaments was war. Such d i s t o r t i o n s of the t r u t h 
were to be found i n most o f the leading German d a i l i e s 
and there was mention o f B r i t i s h 'warmongers 1• On 
the 13th Henderson reported t h a t 
"The whole press, obviously under o f f i c i a l 
i n s p i r a t i o n , p r o t e s t s today against the 
re-armament campaign i n England. Germany, 
i t i s s a i d , must watch developments care-
f u l l y and ' i n c e r t a i n circumstances might 
be f o r c e d to draw t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l 
conclusions'." (22) 
The argument was f r e q u e n t l y used t h a t even i f the 
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prime minister's intentions were honourable Germany 
must reckon that when the opposition got to power i t 
would use against Germany the instrument that the 
present government was creating. 
The German documents show to v/hat extent t h i s 
(23) 
press campaign was due to o f f i c i a l i n s p i r a t i o n . 
Apart from achieving the desired effect on the German 
people t h i s campaign was also aimed at creating a s p l i t 
i n B r i t i s h public opinion by causing a breach between 
those who did not want war with Germany and those 
who demanded a firmer defence position in the event of 
(24) 
further international c r i s i s . Chamberlain's policy 
of moderate, or defensive rearmament could not escape 
t h i s purposeful German policy despite the fact that 
he was concerned that no chance should be given for 
Germany to suspect B r i t i s h good-will. I n a l l h i s 
post-Munich speeches he had been at pains to under-
l i n e the defensive purpose of B r i t a i n ' s armaments 
programme and to establish the f i n a l aim as agreed 
(25) 
disarmament* Such efforts were c l e a r l y abortive and 
thus the action of the German press i n blackening 
B r i t i s h intentions was a definite and serious blow to 
the s p i r i t of the Anglo-German protocol which Chamberlain 
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was t r y i n g t o f o s t e r . Von Dirksen considered t h a t 
t h i s s p i r i t had already been given a m o r t a l blow by 
H i t l e r ' s Saarbrilcken speech w i t h which ' a l l hope of 
a f r e s h Anglo-German detente was k i l l e d i n the eyes of 
(26) 
the general p u b l i c ' • 
By mid-October the appeasers were f a c i n g a most 
unfavourable wind blowing i n from Germany, and an 
atmosphere had been created which could.only aggravate 
t h e i r f r i e n d l y i n t e n t i o n s towards the Reich. As 
Weizsacker explained to von Dirksen on October 17th:-
"Things here are moving r a p i d l y but not 
i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a German - B r i t i s h 
rapprochement a t present." (27) 
I t i s very r e l e v a n t t o understand H i t l e r ' s frame 
o f mind at the time. His chagrin at Munich has 
already been explained. His plans had been upset, 
he had misjudged the temper of h i s people, and he had 
been forced t o submit t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n . 
He was disgusted w i t h h i s people's clamours f o r peace, 
and more p a i n f u l , was disgusted w i t h h i m s e l f f o r having 
r e t r e a t e d from h i s intended programme. A matter which 
caused him f u r t h e r discomfort was the way i n which 
the German p u b l i c had so genuinely p r a i s e d Chamberlain's 
peaceful e f f o r t s . This had i n e v i t a b l y reduced H i t l e r ' s 
(28) 
p r e s t i g e amongst h i s own people. I t was t h e r e f o r e 
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p o l i t i c to him to have the increase i n B r i t i s h re-
armament interpreted i n such a way as to dispel the 
German impression of B r i t a i n - harmful to him - that 
had been created at Munich. Moreover he did a l l he 
could to diminish Chamberlain's role at Munich, giving 
blessings for i t s achievement rather to Mussolini: 
"Ever since the Munich meeting Herr H i t l e r 
i n a l l h i s public speeches has given to 
Signor Mussolini in the f i r s t place the 
cre d i t for having saved peace. I n h i s 
references to the Duce he invariably terms 
him 'my f r i e n d 1 or 'our only f r i e n d 1 . The 
press, wireless and cinema have taken 
t h e i r cue from Herr H i t l e r and i t has 
become the habit to append the c l i c h e 
•the Puhrer's friend' to every mention 
of Signor Mussolini's name. I t i s also 
an understood thing that at public 
meetings the word 'Mussolini', should be 
greeted with loud applause."(29) 
While the general atmosphere of these t a c t i c s had 
the desirable effect from H i t l e r ' s point of view 
of i n c l i n i n g Germans away from p a c i f i c B r i t a i n and 
back to their, previous regard for the expansive 
aims of the Reich, i t also helped to dispel the 
idea of H i t l e r as a peaceful negotiator, an idea 
with which he was rather a f r a i d of being h o i s t . A 
further aim was that of preparing public opinion i n 
Germany for closer allianoe with I t a l y , a move for 
(30) 
which H i t l e r was now preparing. 
49. 
But a l l these motives do not f u l l y e x p l a i n the 
i n t e n s i t y of h i s a n t i - B r i t i s h speeches and o f the press 
campaign. This was motivated also by another o f h i s 
m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s . I n s i g n i n g so w i l l i n g l y the Anglo-
German d e c l a r a t i o n he had s u f f e r e d a f u r t h e r deception. 
He had presumed t h a t f o l l o w i n g upon the B r i t i s h triumph 
o f the Munich agreement i t would be accepted "by B r i t a i n 
a t i t s face value. He had thought t h a t i t would leave 
Germany i n the happy p o s i t i o n o f being the most power-
(31) 
f u l l y armed country i n Europe. This would have 
l e f t him f r e e t o resume h i s aggressive plans as 
convenient. But t h i s was not t o be. I t turned out 
t h a t B r i t a i n had not only won peace but also time i n 
(32) 
which t o strengthen her m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n . This 
aroused a storm o f resentment i n H i t l e r but i t had the 
co n s o l a t i o n o f presenting him w i t h the i d e a l p l a t f o r m 
from which to resume the c o l d war, and t o disgrace the 
'war-mongering 1 B r i t i s h i n the eyes o f h i s people. 
Despite a l l the o p p o s i t i o n and antagonism from the 
Nazis B r i t a i n was extremely l o a t h t o l e t the l i n k s w i t h 
Germany crumble during these weeks. Leading B r i t i s h 
cabinet m i n i s t e r s made speeches i n which they o f f e r e d 
Germany means by which a c l o s e r Anglo-German under-
standing could be achieved. Chamberlain, Hoare and 5 0. 
Simon amongst others d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y presented 
Germany w i t h requests to produce a programme o f her 
(33) 
demands so t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s might begin. Even 
though the unfavourable events o f the f i r s t t h r e e weeks 
o f October made i t a most inauspicious time f o r such 
overtures to be s t a r t e d , i t was nevertheless thought 
b e t t e r t o continue a c t i v e l y i n t h e i r attempts a t the 
appeasement o f Germany, than t o allow matters to d r i f t 
i n the hope t h a t an i n v i g o r a t e d B r i t i s h defence p o s i t i o n 
might s t i m u l a t e a more agreeable a t t i t u d e to B r i t a i n 
on the p a r t o f the Reich. 
Thus i t w a 3 t h a t the appeasers t r i e d a new l i n e 
o f approach - economic appeasement. The published 
B r i t i s h documents are o f l i t t l e value i n t r a c i n g the 
progress o f t h i s p o l i c y f o r by mid-October Chamberlain's 
ideas were not shared i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e and he was 
concerned t o put as l i t t l e economic business as possible 
through t h i s o f f i c i a l channel f o r f e a r t h a t i t might 
o b s t r u c t h i s plans. This s i t u a t i o n i s made p l a i n i n 
a memorandum t h a t F r i t z Hesse wrote on October 11. I n 
an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Stewart, Chamberlain's press s e c r e t a r y , 
he had been t o l d t h a t : 
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"•••the Prime M i n i s t e r had not received 
assistance or support o f any k i n d from 
the Foreign O f f i c e , which on the c o n t r a r y 
had s t r i v e n during the l a s t 3 days t o 
sabotage h i s plans..." (34) 
and t h a t 
" i n a l l f u t u r e moves i t was important 
t h a t a l l major questions should be 
d e a l t w i t h d i r e c t , thus bypassing the 
Foreign O f f i c e and also S i r Nevile.-. 
Henderson...the Foreign O f f i c e would 
always be brought i n by Henderson, 
and thus there was the r i s k o f causing 
a l l kinds o f o b s t r u c t i o n and undesirable 
p u b l i c i t y . " 
Thus, though i t s u l t i m a t e goal was p o l i t i c a l , 
economic appeasement was t o be channelled through 
the Board o f Trade. 
Chamberlain, confronted w i t h an obtuse and 
damaging p o l i c y by Germany which was a l i e n a t i n g a 
lar g e s e c t i o n o f B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n , needed to 
use such methods i n order t o advance h i s own p o l i c y 
o f appeasing the Nazis w i t h o u t e x c i t i n g harmful 
p u b l i c i t y a t home. This element o f subterfuge i n 
h i s execution o f p o l i c y a t t h i s time, though open 
to c r i t i c i s m , was o f German o r i g i n . He was, i n 
f a c t , p l a y i n g the. German game. S t r u g g l i n g against 
the anti-German t i d e i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e Chamberlain 
i n t i m a t e d t o the Reich h i s idea t o come t o some 
arrangement over c o l o n i e s . This was channelled 
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through Stewart i n the same i n t e r v i e w w i t h Hesse« 
I t was important t h a t 'German c o l o n i a l demands should 
(35) 
not he put forward p u b l i c l y ' f o r t h i s would arouse 
a storm o f c r i t i c i s m i n B r i t a i n and the Dominions 
which would k i l l t h i s avenue o f n e g o t i a t i o n before 
discussions could s t a r t o Germany, however, was not 
to be tempted. State Secretary Weizsacker was 
dubious about passing the suggestion on to Ribbentrop, 
the whole tone o f Hesse's memorandum being incompatible 
w i t h e x i s t i n g German p o l i c y -
" I wonder whether the arguments o f 
Dr. Hesse do not tend too s t r o n g l y 
i n a d i r e c t i o n which, as things 
are now, i s not the same as t h a t 
taken here." (36) 
As nothing came o f the colonies c a r r o t a l t e r n a t i v e 
ideas were pursued by Chamberlain. Hesse had gathered 
from Stewart the impression t h a t Chamberlain had i n 
mind a p l a n f o r some k i n d o f 4 - power d e c l a r a t i o n 
aiming a t an agreed l i m i t to armaments f o r each 
country. The idea was i n p a r t continued i n u n o f f i c i a l 
discussions, the immediate basis f o r co-operation being 
on economic l i n e s . 
On October 17 and 18 a German economic delegation 
was i n London. The main purpose o f the del e g a t i o n 
was a v i s i t to E i r e f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Eitoe 
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government on a trade agreement. But the delegation 
found time t o have c o n f i d e n t i a l and u n o f f i c i a l t a l k s 
i n London, at which S i r Frederick Leith-Ross, the 
government's c h i e f economic adviser expanded the 
idea o f economic co-operation between B r i t a i n , Germany, 
France and I t a l y . He suggested t h a t 'representatives 
of the f o u r Powers should meet i n the very near f u t u r e 
(37) 
f o r a completely u n f e t t e r e d discussion'. While 
making no promises as t o the b e n e f i t s which such 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n might b r i n g t o Germany, Leith-Ross d i d 
suggest t h a t a s o l u t i o n t o Germany's f o r e i g n exchange 
problems could r e s u l t : 
"He had t h e r e f o r e already considered 
whether i t might not be possible f o r 
Great B r i t a i n , France, and Holland to 
a l l o c a t e to Germany a l a r g e r t o t a l o f 
f o r e i g n currency - he mentioned a 
f i g u r e o f 25 per cent more. The 
f o r e i g n currency thus made a v a i l a b l e 
c o u l d then be used by Germany to pay 
f o r her imports from the Balkan 
c o u n t r i e s . " (35) 
Von Dirksen considered t h a t these suggestions were 
'worthy o f s p e c i a l n o t i c e i n view o f the f a c t t h a t 
Leith-Ross exercises a very considerable i n f l u e n c e 
ii 
on B r i t i s h economic p o l i c y ' . Ruter, the leader o f 
the German del e g a t i o n was also i n t e r e s t e d . He reported 
to h i s f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y on October 20 t h a t 'the 
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genuineness and importance 1 o f .Iieith-Ross' proposals 
•ought not to be underrated i n B e r l i n ' , e s p e c i a l l y i f 
'taken i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h Chamberlain's plans aimed 
(39) 
a t the same o b j e c t i v e ' . 
ti 
B e r l i n , however, was not t o be tempted, Ruter had 
b e l i e v e d t h a t Leith-Ross had p u t forward ideas t h a t 
the German M i n i s t r y o f Economics had eagerly awaited, 
but i f such was the case, the t i m i n g was s t i l l i n -
con s i s t e n t w i t h p o l i c y i n B e r l i n . Clodius, Deputy 
d i r e c t o r o f the Economic P o l i c y Department o f the 
Foreign M i n i s t r y explained t h a t the present d i d not 
seem an opportune moment t o support the B r i t i s h proposals 
On top o f t h a t they were too i n d e f i n i t e f o r immediate 
ii 
a c t i o n . Ru'ter h i m s e l f had been perturbed by the way 
i n which t h e B r i t i s h government had handled the whole 
issue. 
" ...one was s t r u c k by the f a c t t h a t the 
Board o f Trade was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s i s t e n t 
t h a t nothing about these t a l k s should 
become known t o the press or to the p u b l i c . " ( 4 1 ) 
Although Chamberlain had found a very l i k e l y t r a i l to 
appeasement i n Germany's need f o r f o r e i g n currency, 
circumstances v/ere against him and had thwarted h i s 
e f f o r t s . The i n t r i g u e s o f the o p p o s i t i o n , d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h the tfcSreign o f f i c e , and the need not 
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t o arouse adverse o p i n i o n i n the dominions had meant 
the use.of somewhat clandestine methods which at a 
d e l i c a t e time i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s , were viewed 
by the Germans w i t h suspicion. By November1 3 i t was 
announced from Germany t h a t no d e c i s i o n had been taken 
on Eeith-Ross 1 suggestions.^. 4 2^ 
This l a c k of response from B e r l i n d i d not mean 
t h a t B r i t a i n stopped applying the s t i m u l u s . I n the 
i n f l u e n t i a l c i r c l e s i t was s t i l l f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t 
economic appeasement was p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s . The 
published memoirs and biographies o f the leading 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s of the time shed l i t t l e l i g h t on 
t h i s element of f o r e i g n p o l i c y but the German Sources 
provide an adequate r e f l e c t i o n o f what was happening. 
Von Dirksen, a t a week-end stay w i t h S i r Samuel Hoare 
towards the end of October, was pumped w i t h p l e n t y o f 
pro-German motives which he could pass on t o h i s 
su p e r i o r s . But nothing could be achieved i n t h a t 
d i r e c t i o n f o r von Dirksen h i m s e l f , u n c e r t a i n o f the 
r e a l i n t e n t i o n s o f the German hi g h command could only 
t r y to 'keep t h i n g s even u n t i l an explanation on a 
broader basis were forthcoming*. ^ 4 3^ Ash.ton-Gwatkiri. . 
head o f the economic department of the f o r e i g n o f f i c e , 
took up the argument on November 6 where Leith-Ross 
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had l e f t o f f . Three days l a t e r von D i r k s e n Informed 
Welzsaoker that Ashton-Gwatkin" d e s i r e d an i n t e r v i e w 
i i 
w i t h Goring, "but again s t r e s s was l a i d on 'the p r i v a t e 
nature of the proposed journey, about which nothing 
(44\ 
should he allowed to leak o u t 1 , v ' Had i t not been f o r 
the e x t e n s i v e a n t i - S e m i t i c a c t i v i t y t h a t was to break 
out i n Germany the following day, t h i s l u r e of appease-
ment might p o s s i b l y have met wi t h g r e a t e r success 
despite the German i n t e n t i o n of 'spinning out matters 
as f a r as p o s s i b l e ' . ( 4 5 ^ But the d i s g u s t i n g news of 
the November pogrom was to put a f u r t h e r o b s t a c l e i n 
i t s way; and i t was an insurmountable one. For i t 
even made the appeasers stop dead i n t h e i r t r a c k s and 
re-a p p r a i s e t h e i r p o l i c y which embodied g i v i n g economic 
a s s i s t a n c e to a country which could so c a l l o u s l y 
i n i t i a t e the basest of r e p r i s a l s a g a i n s t a g u i l t l e s s 
m inority. The c l a r i f i c a t i o n of events that von Dirksen 
awaited had come i n t e r r i b l e form, and economic 
appeasement thereby c o n t r a c t e d a p a r a l y s i s from which 
i t would never recover. 
I n a l l these matters during the weeks s i n c e Munich 
B r i t a i n had shown a maturity and gen e r o s i t y i n dealing 
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w i t h the Nazis which was much to h e r c r e d i t s P o l i c y 
was devoid of the anti-German p r e j u d i c e s which t h r i v e d 
i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e . I t contained no echoes of 
the anti-German p r e j u d i c e s which t h r i v e d i n the f o r e i g n 
o f f i c e . I t contained no echoes of the s p i r i t of the 
V e r s a i l l e s epoch - a change i n a t t i t u d e which H i t l e r 
i i ( 4 6 ) 
had e x p r e s s l y requested a t Saarbrucken, and to 
which H a l i f a x drew a t t e n t i o n i n a speech he made a t 
(47) 
Edinburgh on October 24. (He had i n f a c t pointed t h i s 
(48) 
out p e r s o n a l l y to H i t l e r i n 1937) Hesse made i t 
p l a i n i n h i s memorandum following h i s t a l k s w ith Stewart 
that concerning the Czech c o n f l i c t : 
"•••Chamberlain's a t t i t u d e i n p a r t i c u l a r 
had never been d i c t a t e d by a consciousness 
of m i l i t a r y weakness but e x c l u s i v e l y by 
the r e l i g i o u s idea that Germany must have 
j u s t i c e and t h a t t h e i n j u s t i c e of V e r s a i l l e s 
must be made good." (49) 
By the end of October von Dirksen could r e p o r t t h a t 
t h i s frame of mind was being more and more widely 
taken by the B r i t i s h p u b l i c i n general, who had: 
"already gone so f a r as to recognise 
Germany's t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m to the 
removal of the degrading terms of 
the d i c t a t e d Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . " ( 5 0 ) 
Not only was t h i s unbiased and generous nature 
of Chamberlain's diplomacy app r e c i a t e d i n Germany; 
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so too was the honesty of h i s "belief that he was 
pursuing a p o l i c y e s s e n t i a l to world peace and t h a t 
i n the success of t h i s p o l i c y l a y b e n e f i t s mutually 
to Germany and B r i t a i n both i n d e t a i l and g e n e r a l 
context. O f f i c i a l r e p o r t s from the German embassy 
i n London to B e r l i n l e f t no room f o r Chamberlain's 
genuineness to be doubted, 
"A l a s t i n g rapprochement between the 
two c o u n t r i e s i s regarded by Chamber-
l a i n and the B r i t i s h Cabinet as one of 
the c h i e f aims of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
because world peace can be secured i n 
the most e f f e c t i v e manner by t h i s 
combination. 
. . . i n Chamberlain the B r i t i s h Government 
possesses a statesman f o r whom the 
attainment of an Anglo-German rapproche-
ment was simultaneously d i c t a t e d by the 
head and by the h e a r t . (.51). 
i i 
Leith-Ross i n h i s d e l i b e r a t i o n s with Ruter and 
I I 
Susskind had explained that as economic a d v i s e r to 
the B r i t i s h government he was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
a s s u r i n g t h a t 'no s u i t a b l e chance of f u r t h e r i n g 
co-operation between the nations of Europe should 
(52) 
be l e t s l i p ' . The emphasis of course, was on 
avoiding Anglo-German s l i p s . 
I t was a l s o quite d e f i n i t e that Chamberlain d i d 
not stand alone i n h i s ambitions but t h a t B r i t i s h 
p u b l i c opinion was g e n e r a l l y i n agreement with h i s 
broad p l a n of appeasing the Germans. "The Times' 59. 
can be taken as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of one segment of 
i n f l u e n t i a l opinion i n d e c l a r i n g on October 3 that 
•the p o l i c y of appeasement must of course be pressed 
(53) 
forward'• 
Von D i r k s e n bore witness to t h i s g e n e r a l support 
f o r Chamberlain i n an extensive p o l i t i c a l r e p o r t to 
B e r l i n on October 15 when he s t a t e d t h a t 'any agreements 
which he may e v e n t u a l l y conclude with Germany...are 
assured, even i n the f u t u r e , of the unanimous approval 
of the B r i t i s h people'. There could n e i t h e r be 
any r e a l f e a r s i n Germany f o r Chamberlain's p o l i t i c a l 
p o s i t i o n , or t h a t the 'warmongers' i n the Conservative 
ranks or the opposition would ga i n power. Van D i r k s e n 
b e l i e v e d Chamberlain to be so c e r t a i n of h i s p o l i t i c a l 
p o s i t i o n t h at h i s p o l i c y towards Germany would never be 
s u c c e s s f u l l y opposed even by ' f a n a t i c a l anti-Germans 
(55) 
or p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e r s ' • 
Much of the a n t i - B r i t i s h content i n the German 
pr e s s during these weeks had s e i z e d on B r i t i s h r e -
armament as the s e r i o u s bone of contention between the 
two c o u n t r i e s . The Munich c r i s i s had exposed s e r i o u s 
d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the i s l a n d ' s defences e s p e c i a l l y i n 
a n t i - a i r c r a f t p r e p a r a t i o n s , and a l l the Service-
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departments were p u t t i n g i n claims f o r i n c r e a s e d 
s u p p l i e s • Chamberlain was a l l too conscious of the 
weaknesses that had been re v e a l e d and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e 
on diplomacy. 
"Our past experience has shown us only 
too c l e a r l y t h a t weakness i n armed s t r e n g t h 
means weakness i n diplomacy. One 
good thing a t any r a t e has come out of 
t h i s emergency through which we have 
passed. I t has thrown a v i v i d l i g h t 
upon our preparations f o r defence, on 
t h e i r s t r e n g t h and on t h e i r weakness."(56) 
I t should be emphasised, however, t h a t w h i l e progress 
was being made d a i l y i n improving the country's 
defensive p o s i t i o n i t was considered of the h i g h e s t 
importance not to commit the country to any l a r g e -
s c a l e measures i n rearming which might e i t h e r upset 
the balance of the country's trade or r a i s e "the f u r 
(57) 
on the German back. v ' Chamberlain r e f u s e d to allow 
B r i t i s h rearmament to assume an o f f e n s i v e c h a r a c t e r . 
Within Conservative ranks there was a v o c i f e r o u s 
element demanding 'some scheme of n a t i o n a l r e g i s t r a t i o n 
(58) 
and n a t i o n a l s e r v i c e ' but Chamberlain remained 
unconvinced by t h e i r arguments. Towards the end of 
October j f t o r e ^ B e l i s h a was campaigning f o r the formation 
(59) 
of a M i n i s t r y of Supply. Chamberlain again remained 
unmoved. Such progress as was made concerned the 61. 
e s s e n t i a l s of defence - the improvement of a l l aspects 
of a i r - r a i d precautions, the development and p e r f e c t i o n 
of techniques of enemy de t e c t i o n , and the b A i l d i n g up 
of that s e c t i o n of the a i r f o r c e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
f o i l i n g o f enemy a i r a t t a c k s . ^ 6*^ Speaking i n the 
Commons on November 1 Chamberlain explained t h a t he was 
forming a separate m i n i s t r y of c i v i l i a n defence to 
co-ordinate a l l aspects of the country's defence a g a i n s t 
(61) 
a i r - a t t a c k . I n a d d i t i o n a c a b i n e t committee was s e t 
up 'to go into the p r i o r i t i e s of the three Defence 
( 62) 
Departments,' and the s t a t e of the country's defences 
became the s u b j e c t of frequent and important reviews 
(63) 
by the committee of i m p e r i a l defence. 
The b a s i c defensiveness of t h i s rearmament p o l i c y 
was emphasised by Chamberlain: 
"Our s o l e concern i s to see t h a t t h i s 
country and h e r I m p e r i a l communications 
are s a f e , and that we s h a l l not be so 
weak r e l a t i v e l y w i t h other c o u n t r i e s 
t h a t our diplomacy cannot e n t e r upon 
d i s c u s s i o n s on an equal footing."(64) 
B e r l i n was f u l l y aware of these motives. Apart from 
the e f f e c t of such p u b l i c e l u c i d a t i o n s Hesse and von 
Dirksen were unbiased i n communications to t h e i r s e n i o r s . 
The l a t t e r a c c u r a t e l y reported to Aschmann t h a t 'the 
emphasis i n the rearmament campaign here i s i n the f i e l d 
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of o r g a n i s a t i o n and i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of defensive 
measures 1. Hesse was unequivocal i n h i s remarks 
of October 18: 
"No member of the Government or Government 
p a r t i e s has given the German danger or 
German h o s t i l i t y as the reason f o r r e -
armament. That has been done e x c l u s i v e l y 
by members of the Opposition and Opposition 
newspap e r s • " (66) 
Despite t h i s f u l l awareness of the s t a t e and aims of 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y the a n t i - B r i t i s h a t t a c k s of the German 
press continued a t f u l l force,, 
I t was a matter of f i e r c e disappointment to the 
appeasers that the path of economic appeasement was i n 
no way smoothed by any s i g n from Germany that c l o s e r 
Anglo-German c o l l a b o r a t i o n would be welcomed. This 
b l a t a n t l a c k of response on the p a r t of H i t l e r was the 
main s i n g l e reason f o r the appeasers 1 d e c l i n e i n f a i t h 
i n t h e i r p o l i c y . At a time when they had been a t such 
pains to ensure that Germany was i n p o s s e s s i o n of f u l l 
knowledge of t h e i r genuine aims, and when she had been 
presented w i t h so many i n v i t a t i o n s to put forward her 
requests, i t was the g r e a t e s t discouragement to f i n d 
that H i t l e r ' s only answer was an i n v i g o r a t e d p r e s s 
a t t a c k and, i n November, v i o l e n t p e r s e c u t i o n s of the 
Jews • 
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I t was no f a u l t of Chamberlain and h i s colleagues 
t h a t they we<re swimming i n e p t l y a g a i n s t the German t i d e . 
The high command i n Germany was a f r a i d of being l a b e l l e d 
w i t h peace f o r some time to come and wishing to d i s p e l 
t h i s i l l u s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y amongst the German p u b l i c , 
was concerned to c r e a t e the impression of Germanybeing 
under the t h r e a t of B r i t i s h aggression. Appropriate to 
t h i s aim was Goebbels' speech on October 21 i n which 
he r e j e c t e d the idea that B r i t a i n was prepared to 
r e i n s t a t e Germany i n h e r c o l o n i a l p o s i t i o n . 
"We have r e c e n t l y become so accustomed 
to p o l i t i c a l m i r a c l e s t h a t people a r e 
now beginning to ask "What about the 
colonies?"...No gentlemen, we have 
nothing more to i n h e r i t . The world 
i s a g a i n s t us. The world i s always 
a g a i n s t us. The only question i s 
whether the world can do anything 
a g a i n s t us."(67) 
This p i c t u r e o f persecuted Germany, f r i e n d l e s s and 
needing to f i n d her own way to s a l v a t i o n looked 
even more r e a l when B r i t i s h rearmament was t r a n s l a t e d 
a g g r e s s i v e l y , O g i l v i e - F o r b e s , who r e p l a c e d Henderson 
a t B e r l i n i n the middle of October, considered that 
i t would take a grea t d e a l of propaganda 'to persuade 
the German people that Great B r i t a i n has any r e a l 
(68) 
designs upon them,' but Goebbels and h i s machine 
were working to t h a t end. I n a d d i t i o n to blackening 
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B r i t i s h rearmament the German newspapers c o n t i n u a l l y 
a s s e r t e d the s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n of the Reich's m i l i t a r y 
p o s i t i o n and deprecated the idea that the thought of 
(69) 
war should he banished from the p u b l i c mind. 
The f u t i l i t y of appeasement i n the face of t h i s 
a t t i t u d e i s emphasised by the German d e s i r e to weaken 
the B r i t i s h government's p o s i t i o n . This i n t e n t i o n , 
of which the appeasers were of course, ignorant i s 
expanded i n an o f f i c i a l communique from Aschmann to 
von Dirksen. The method used was the c r e a t i o n of 
t e n s i o n and d i s r u p t i o n i n p u b l i c opinion: . 
" i t i s s t i l l u r g ently d e s i r e d t h a t no chance 
f o r an a t t a c k on Duff Cooper, C h u r c h i l l or 
Eden should be missed, whenever they a f f o r d 
the s l i g h t e s t opening f o r i t . . . I t should 
be pointed out that the propaganda for 
rearmament enamating from t h i s q u a r t e r i s 
s u b v e r s i v e , t h a t i s to say t h a t i t . . . h a s 
as i t s r e a l o b j e c t to c r e a t e i n England 
an.. anti-German war psychosis i n order to 
e x e r c i s e p r e s s u r e on the Government...so 
th a t rearmament...would e n t a i l enormous 
new f i n a n c i a l and t a x a t i o n burdens. The 
aim of the above-named p o l i t i c i a n s means 
i n e f f e c t t h a t t h e i r e f f o r t s are bound to 
r e s u l t i n a l a s t i n g and i n t o l e r a b l e t e n s i o n 
i n Great B r i t a i n , i n c r i s e s and f i n a l l y , 
i n a g e n e r a l catastrophe."(70) 
And Germany s u f f e r e d no d e l u s i o n as to h e r a b i l i t y to 
i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c opinion i n B r i t a i n , both by subversive 
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means and the image she c r e a t e d i n h e r o s t e n s i b l e 
p o l i c y . Stewart had informed Hesse t h a t i n Germany's 
r e a c t i o n to Chamberlain's e f f o r t s to b r i n g about m u l t i -
l a t e r a l disarmament, l a y the power *to s t a b i l i s e or not 
(71) 
to s t a b i l i s e pro-German tendencies i n Great B r i t a i n . ' 
Germany's t a c t i c s and indeed h e r very p o l i c y could 
allow of no rapprochement w i t h Great B r i t a i n . Through-
out the whole of October and the beginning of November 
the B r i t i s h overtures were c o o l l y handled or r e j e c t e d 
w hile complaints i n pr e s s and speeches s t e a d i l y 
continued. At Weimer on November 6 H i t l e r again 
p e r s o n a l l y p u b l i c i s e d (and by so doing glamorised) 
the anti-German element i n England as epitomised by 
(72) 
C h u r c h i l l , and the German p r e s s took f u l l advantage 
(73) 
of the B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n to h i s comments. While 
such comments from Chamberlain's point of view were a 
d i s t i n c t embarrassment to h i s p o l i c y , they d i d not 
j e o p a r d i s e i t . But t h e r e was ominous news towards the 
end of October which s p e l t g r e a t e r t r o u b l e f o r i n i t 
l a y the seeds of a r e v i v e d hatred of Germany on the 
p a r t of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . This concerned the 
i n i t i a t i o n of p e r s e c u t i o n s a g a i n s t the Sudeten Jews 
f o r the German a u t h o r i t i e s i n Sudeten areas were e x p e l l i n g 
the Jews and the Czech government were r e f u s i n g to 
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admit them to Czech t e r r i t o r y . H a l i f a x complained 
that such a c t i o n was 'not only inhumane, but a l s o 
(74) 
c o n t r a r y to the i n t e n t i o n s of the Munich Agreement'. 
The B r i t i s h government could w e l l do without any 
a d d i t i o n a l o b s t r u c t i o n s i n h e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany, 
but on the other hand she could not t u r n a b l i n d eye 
to the deplorable conditions the Sudeten Jews were 
f a c i n g . O g i l v i e - F o r b e s was t h e r e f o r e i n s t r u c t e d to 
contact the German government and 'urge them to r e f r a i n 
u 
from such expulsions'. An urgent appeal to Weizsacker 
despatched on October 27 was r e p l i e d to a week l a t e r 
w i t h the information t h a t 'competent a u t h o r i t i e s had 
been i n s t r u c t e d to make urgent enquiry i n t o the matter'. 
No more of-the matter was heard u n t i l , w i t h the 
i n i t i a t i o n of a n t i - S e m i t i c a c t i v i t i e s i n Germany 
proper, the expulsions were resumed. The d e t a i l s of 
t h i s Jewish question together with i t s souring e f f e c t s 
on B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards Germany w i l l be considered 
(76) 
l a t e r . I t was to c e r t i f y f e a r s f o r the f u t u r e of 
Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s which had become i n c r e a s i n g l y 
s e r i o u s i n the f i r s t s i x weeks a f t e r Munich. The 
Anglo-German D e c l a r a t i o n had c e r t a i n l y not proved to be 
the vanguard of a more comprehensive understanding 
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between the two c o u n t r i e s as had been hoped for i n 
London, The s p i r i t of Munich was decaying f a s t as f a r 
as Germany, the f o c a l p oint of B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe, 
was concerned. 
Events i n c e n t r a l Europe were a l s o proving an 
embarrassment to Chamberlain, This concerned the 
matter of the guarantee to Czechoslovakia, H i t l e r ' s 
defiance of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission and r e s u l t i n g 
gains i n Czechoslovakia have a l r e a d y been noted. By 
t h i s means and a l s o by d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h the 
Czechoslovak S t a t e he had gained c o n t r o l of a ' f a r 
g r e a t e r area than had been envisaged at Munich, Poland 
had a l s o l a i d c l a i m to Czechoslovak t e r r i t o r y and had 
r e c e i v e d f u l l s a t i s f a c t i o n to her d e s i r e s f o r Teschen 
and P r e i s t a d t (October 1 0 ) ^ 7 7 ^ I n the case of both 
German;;and:P,o,lishbdemands the p o s i t i o n of B r i t a i n was 
i l l - d e f i n e d , f o r although she had pledged h e r s e l f to 
guaranteeing the i n t e g r i t y of the Czechoslovak s t a t e , 
such a guarantee could not be o p e r a t i v e u n t i l the . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission had defined the f r o n t i e r s of 
that s t a t e . I r r e g u l a r i t i e s had a l r e a d y occurred i n 
that such d e f i n i t i o n was being made by b i l a t e r a l 
agreements but n e v e r t h e l e s s i t was a process of 
68, 
d e f i n i t i o n and not d e s t r u c t i o n of agreed boundaries* 
A f t e r these German and P o l i s h clouds had been s e t t l e d 
Chamberlain c a r e f u l l y avoided the s u b j e c t of the 
guarantee as being pregnant w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the 
appeasers. However, on October 27 the Hungarians 
eager to improve t h e i r own border w i t h Czechoslovakia 
t r i e d to make good t h e i r claims by force and there 
were c l a s h e s between S l o v a k i a n and Hungarian troops. 
B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n admitted only two a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
E i t h e r t h e four Munich powers would agree to enforce 
the Hungarian claims or e l s e they would disagree among 
themselves. I f the l a t t e r were the case, B r i t a i n 
having committed h e r s e l f i n advance to the guarantee 
would be obliged to come to the a s s i s t a n c e of Czecho-
s l o v a k i a i f she were the s u b j e c t of unprovoked aggression. 
What i n f a c t happened was that B r i t a i n was r e l e a s e d 
from t h i s predicament by the d i c t a t o r powers stepping 
i n and a u t h o r i s i n g Ribbentrop and Ciano to a r b i t r a t e 
(78) 
the i s s u e a t Vienna. Neither B r i t a i n nor Prance 
was consulted and Hungary was awarded a m a j o r i t y of 
h e r claims on November 2. 
Despite the f a c t that B r i t a i n had been so 
obviously ignored, not a murmur of p r o t e s t was heard 
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from Downing S t r e e t , On November 1 w h i l e the matter 
was s t i l l i n the a i r Chamberlain explained t h a t : 
"The p o s i t i o n remains e x a c t l y the same 
and i t cannot be c l e a r e d up u n t i l the 
whole question of m i n o r i t i e s i n 
Czechoslovakia has been s e t t l e d , • • 
Our o r i g i n a l o f f e r was to enter i n t o 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee, but what 
the terms of that guarantee w i l l be, 
and who w i l l be the p a r t a k e r s i n that 
guarantee i s not a question on which 
I can g i v e the House any f u r t h e r 
information today. 
We never guaranteed the f r o n t i e r s as 
they e x i s t e d . What we d i d was to 
guarantee a g a i n s t unprovoked aggression 
- quite a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g . That d i d 
not mean t h a t we gave our s e a l to the 
e x i s t e n c e of f r o n t i e r s as they were 
then or a t any other time. Our 
guarantee was a g a i n s t unprovoked aggression 
and not the c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n of f r o n t i e r s , " ( 7 9 ) 
Such an u n e n t h u s i a s t i c review shows t h a t he p a t e n t l y 
d i d not want to i n t e r p r e t e i t h e r the Hungarian 
c l a i m as unprovoked aggression or the Vienna award 
as a breach of the Munich.Agreement, This disturbance 
i n t h a t far-away corner of Europe could not be permitted 
to o b s t r u c t h i s chosen p o l i c y of appeasement or deter 
him from i t . I n f a c t he s i l e n t l y concurred w i t h 
H i t l e r ' s own opinion as expressed to Francois-Poncet 
that by avoiding a four-power d i s c u s s i o n B r i t a i n and 
France had escaped a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n which might 
(80) 
have proved to be a ' d e f i n i t e danger'. 
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The whole s u b j e c t of the guarantee was apparently 
d i s t a s t e f u l to Chamberlain. Although i t had been a 
v i t a l f a c t o r i n the defence of the Munich Agreement i n 
(81) 
both Houses of Parliament i t had s i n c e proved to 
be an embarrassing t h r e a t to the c o n t i n u a t i o n of h i s 
appeasement p o l i c y . I t was t h e r e f o r e i n h i s i n t e r e s t s 
not to define the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n too c l e a r l y while, 
of course, not r e t r a c t i n g the promise to Czechoslovakia. 
His statement to the Commons on November 1 was 
balanced a c c o r d i n g l y . The one weakness i n t h i s course 
of a c t i o n was t h a t he d i s p l a y e d h i s hand to the N a z i s . 
Two days l a t e r von Dirksen reported to h i s s u p e r i o r s 
t h a t : 
" i t i s noteworthy that Mr, Chamberlain 
r e f r a i n e d from entering i n t o any d e t a i l s 
concerning the c h a r a c t e r of the f i n a l 
guarantee...Furthermore i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g . , 
t h a t he r e f e r r e d s o l e l y to the case of 
unprovoked aggression, but did not speak 
of a guarantee of the f r o n t i e r s i n the 
sense of a guarantee of the sovereign 
t e r r i t o r y of the s t a t e . " (82) 
The i n c i d e n t and r e s u l t of the Hungarian 
c l a i m had thus demonstrated B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n v i s a 
v i s Czechoslovakia and demonstrated to H i t l e r that 
there was l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of any f i e r c e o b j e c t i o n 
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from London I n the event of a f u r t h e r f r o n t i e r c l a i m 
a g a i n s t the rump of Czechoslovakia - knowledge t h a t 
he was to use to h i s own advantage i n j u s t a f o r t n i g h t 
time. 
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REFERENCES 
1. BD, v . I I I , no. 125. 
2. i b i d . 
3. i b i d . 
4. i b i d , no. 128. 
5. i b i d , no. 138. 
6. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, p.169. 
7. GD, v.IV, no. 36."-, 
8. BD, v . I I I , no. 145. 
9* i b i d , no. 157. 
10. i b i d . 
11. i b i d , no. 164. 
12. GD, v.IV, no. 249. 
13. I t i s characteristic of Halifax's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
his role as foreign secretary to avoid awkward 
issues such as t h i s which threatened the cause 
of peace. For a summary of Halifax's a t t i t u d e 
to foreign a f f a i r s , see Birkenhead, L i f e of 
Lord Halifax, pp.417-21. 
14. GD, v.IV, no. 44. 
15. i b i d , no. 16. 
16. i b i d , nos. 81, 152. 
17. F e l l i n g , op. c i t . p.391. 
18. Baynes, H i t l e r ' s Speeches 1922-39, v . I I , p.1536. 
19. i b i d , p.1535. 
20. HCD, v.339, cols. 550-51. For an account of the 
measures taken by the government, see i n f r a , 
pp. 61-62. 
21. BD, v . I I I , no. 188. 
22. i b i d , no. 198. 
23. GD, v.IV, nos. 253, 255. 
24. i b i d , no. 253. 
25. e.g. HCD, v.339, c o l . 50. 
26. Von Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London, p.225. 
27. GD, v.IV, no.253. 
28. Sohmidt, H i t l e r ' s I n t e r p r e t e r , pp 113-4. 
29. BD, v . I I I , no. 190. 
30. GD, v.IV, no.400. With t h i s aim i n mind Ribbentrop 
v i s i t e d Rome between October 27 - 29. See 
Ciano's Diary 1937-38, p.185. 
31. BD, v . I I I , no. 320. 
32. Von Dirksen, op. c i t . p.224. 
33. Gilb e r t and Gott, The Appeasers, p.193. 
34. GD, v.IV, no. 251, enc.2. 
73. 
35. I b i d . 
36. i b i d , no. 254. 
37. i b i d , no. 257. 
38. i b i d . 
39. i b i d , no. 259. 
40. i b i d , note 5. 
41. i b i d , no. 259. 
42. i b i d , no. 261. 
43. DM, v . I I , no. 29. 
44. GD, v.IV, no. 265. 
45. i b i d , no. 267. .  
46* Baynes, op.cit. p.1536. 
47. Halifax, Speeches on Foreign Policy, P.2Q4. 
48. DM, v . I , no. 1, p.24. 
49. GD, v.IV, no. 251, enc. 2. 
50. i b i d , no. 260. 
51. i b i d . 
52. i b i d , no. 257. 
53. For a detailed review of press opinions on appeasemenl 
at t h i s time, see Rock, Appeasement on T r i a l , 
pp.155-58. 
54. GD, v.IV, no. 260. 
55. . i b i d . 
56. HCD, v.339, col.551. 
57. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp.329-30. 
58. HCD, v.339, c o l . 205. 
59. Mihney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, pp.158-604 
60. Simon, Retrospect, pp.249-50. 
61. HCD, v.340, cols. 83-84. 
62. Minney, op.cit. p.160. 
63. Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p.329. 
64. HCD, v.340, col,88. 
65. GD, v.IV, no. 258. 
66. i b i d , no. 256. 
67. BD,'v.III, no. 280, note 1. 
68. i b i d , no. 281. 
69. i b i d . 
70. GD, v.IV, no.264. 
71. i b i d , no. 251, enc..2. 
72. Baynes, op.oit. pp.1546-47. 
73. BD, v . I I I , nos. 290, 296. 
74. i b i d , no. 231. 
75. i b i d , no. 250. 
76. i n f r a , pp.126-30. 
77. BD, v . I I I , no.206. 
74. 
78. i b i d , no. 249. 
79. HCD, v.340, cols. 79-80. 
80. French Yellow Book, no. 18, p.25. 
81. HCD, v.339, cols. 156, 295 - 308. HLD, v.110. 
cols. 1303-07. 
82. Second German White Book, no. 256, p.277. 
75. 
Chapter three 
Appeasement via Rome 
I f relations w i t h Germany were steadily going 
from "bad to worse Chamberlain s t i l l had his second 
s t r i n g , f r i e n d l y relations w i t h Mussolini which might 
draw him away from H i t l e r . As the l i k e l i h o o d of a 
dir e c t appeasement of Germany diminished so the importance 
of the I t a l i a n connection proportionately increased. 
I t was very encouraging to the B r i t i s h government to f i n d 
I t a l y a much more responsive patient to t h e i r i n t e r -
national surgery than Germany was proving to be 0 As 
the days of October slipped "by i t "became more and more 
clear to Chamberlain that I t a l y was the end of the 
axis upon which his policy had by f a r the greater chance 
of success. Immediately upon Munich t h i s state of 
a f f a i r s was not so apparent but nevertheless a great 
deal of B r i t i s h e f f o r t went into regularising and 
improving the atmosphere between London and Rome. 
Mussolini was susceptible to B r i t i s h approaches 
f o r two main reasons: his vanity and his jealousy. 
His vanity demanded the recognition by Great B r i t a i n 
of his African empire. By October 4 there only 
remained two main European powers which had not recognised 
the I t a l i a n empire. These were Russia and B r i t a i n . 
The prestige value of o f f i c i a l European acceptance of 
76. 
his empire was important to Mussolini f o r he d i s l i k e d 
the ever-growing feeling of being the i n f e r i o r partner 
(1) 
i n the Rome-Berlin axis. An empire, which h i s t o r y had 
denied the Germans, did something to o f f s e t t h i s . But 
his specific desires f o r B r i t i s h recognition had deeper 
motives. These concerned I t a l y ' s relations with France. 
Since October 1936, when Chambrun was recalled, Rome had 
not seen a French ambassador, and relations between the 
two capitals had steadily deteriorated. On October 4, 
however, the French government decided to appoint an 
ambassador to Rome and with t h i s decision French 
recognition of the I t a l i a n Empire was an automatic 
implication. 
But t h i s was no solution to the continuing Franco-
I t a l i a n d i f f i c u l t i e s over strategic colonial possessions. 
I n p a r t i c u l a r I t a l y had designs on Tunisia, D j i b u t i , 
Corsica and the Suez Canal f o r the benefit of her trade 
(2) 
and European status. I t was important, however, that 
the r i g h t moment f o r a statement of I t a l i a n claims should 
be taken and c e r t a i n l y should i t not be at a time which 
might jeopardise the r e a l i s a t i o n of the A p r i l Agreement. 
Although Mussolini considered the Agreement had 'lost 
(3) 
much of i t s importance' since i t s b i r t h on A p r i l 16, 
1938, i t was s t i l l s u f f i c i e n t l y desired so that claims 77. 
against Prance should await i t s r e a l i s a t i o n . Once the 
B r i t i s h had s i g n i f i e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to bring the 
Agreement into force the wheels against Prance could 
s t a r t grinding. This p o l i c y i s contained i n a l e t t e r 
Ciano wrote to the I t a l i a n ambassador i n London on 
November 14. After r e f e r r i n g to the ' t r u l y remarkable 
development' i n I t a l i a n h i s t o r y of the imminent r e a l i s a -
t i o n of the Anglo-Italian Agreement he goes on to say: 
"But having reached t h i s point i t i s not... 
the i n t e n t i o n of our Chief to h a l t even 
f o r one minute. There i s another problem 
which immediately presents i t s e l f and 
which we must consider i n the. l i g h t of the 
regime's achievements i n the Empire. 
I speak of our relations with Prance. 
Henceforward i t i s clear that, since 
the p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and even geograph-
i c a l conditions of our country have changed 
substantially, future conversations with 
Prance cannot be resumed on the previous 
basis. The claims which we once kept 
unspoken can now shortly be brought into 
the open." J4) 
Once o f f i c i a l l y announced these claims against 
Prance would be a factor of embarrassment to relations 
with 3 r i t a i n so i t was necessary from the I t a l i a n point 
of view to get the A p r i l Agreement realised at the f i r s t 
opportunity. Action against Prance could then be 
taken. Meanwhile i t was hoped that the e f f o r t of such 
action on B r i t i s h opinion could be minimised. There 
78, 
was, i n any case, no question of a demarche, hut i t 
would i f public opinion could-be so prepared that the 
announcement of I t a l i a n demands on Prance would not 
provoke undue reaction. Grandi, I t a l i a n ambassador 
i n London was given instructions accordingly: 
"Let i t be seen that something of the 
sort i s bound to come. Predispose 
English opinion - i f i t i s impossible 
actu a l l y to prepare i t . " (5) 
The urgency of I t a l y i n the matter of the Agreement 
was very noticeable i n B r i t a i n , but i t was an urgency th a t 
Chamberlain took mainly as f l a t t e r y to his appeasement 
policy. I f Germany was being truculent and unresponsive 
to B r i t i s h overtures I t a l y seemed eager to foster the 
pleasant contacts made at Munich and to s t a b i l i s e Anglo-
I t a l i a n relations by f u l f i l l i n g important requirements 
necessary t o the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Agreement proposed 
i n A p r i l . The fac t that I t a l y was not prepared to carry 
out a l l the conditions o r i g i n a l l y demanded by B r i t a i n 
was a matter which could be played down f o r i t was f e l t 
i n the foreign o f f i c e that to refuse I t a l y now would be 
to damn the Agreement together with future relations w i t h 
I t a l y and would drive Mussolini f u r t h e r into the Nazi 
(6) 
camp. Thus, i r o n i c a l l y , the B r i t i s h p o l i c y was a 
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blessing to Mussolini; i t allov/ed r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
agreement at minimum I t a l i a n s a c r i f i c e and brought no 
obstruction to his deeper motives with reference to Prance. 
The other main reason f o r Mussolini's s u s c e p t i b i l i t y 
to the B r i t i s h p olicy, his jealousy was wi t h reference to 
Germany. Early i n 1938 i t was evident that the Rome-Berlin 
Axis had become the corner-stone of I t a l i a n foreign p o l i c y . 
But even so Mussolini occasionally had moments of grave 
doubt and indecision about his axis p o l i c y , especially 
a f t e r the Nazi conquest of Austria about which he had 
(7) 
never even been given advanced information. B r i t i s h 
p olicy to I t a l y was aimed at preventing the consolidation 
of the axis by seeking to persuade Mussolini to hold back 
from f i n a l l y committing himself to a German all i a n c e . 
Whatever chance of success t h i s p o l i c y had was doomed by 
the means of i t s implementation. The willingness of 
B r i t a i n to meet I t a l i a n conditions was interpreted by 
Mussolini as weakness. Impressed as he was by pov/er, 
She very nature of B r i t i s h approaches drove him i n the 
end to a dir e c t alliance with the Nazis. When the 
I t a l i a n s had to choose between B r i t a i n and Germany there 
was l i t t l e i n t h e i r eyes to recommend the former. Ciano 
wrote scathingly about Chamberlain and Halifax early i n 
1939: 80. 
"German rearmament weighs on them l i k e 
lead, Th'ay would be ready f o r any 
s a c r i f i c e i f they could see the future 
c l e a r l y . This sombre preoccupations of 
theirs has convinced me more and more 
of the necessity f o r the Triple Alliance,"(8) 
After Munich however, the I t a l i a n s were by no means so 
convinced and on several occasions the off-hand way i n 
which they were treated by Germany did not recommend 
closer collaboration. True I t a l i a n policy with 
reference to her t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions was frequently 
subordinated to Axis policy which was, i n e f f e c t , 
(9) 
German po l i c y . On the other hand Mussolini had to 
admit that I t a l i a n aggrandisement depended very largely 
on Germany, Such a dependance was personally distaste-
f u l to him but nothing could a l t e r the fact that the 
western powers stood largely for the maintenance of 
the status quo and that further I t a l i a n achievements 
could only be gained i n association with his powerful 
and aggressive neighbour. At Munich he had looked with 
jealousy at the extent of the new German inroad i n t o 
c e n t r a l Europe, Thus, u n t i l l a t e r i n the year when 
he was more resigned to the a d v i s a b i l i t y of the closest 
cooperation with Germany, he was concerned to gain what 
diplomatic advantage he could through his country's 
( 
independent machinations w i t h Great B r i t a i n and Prance, 
81. 
These began w i t h B r i t a i n on the f i r s t day a f t e r 
Munich. I n his diary f o r October 1 Ciano recorded the 
fac t of his giving a 'hint about a resumption of contact 
i n the near f u t u r e ' , t o the B r i t i s h ambassador i n 
Rome, the Earl of Perth. This h i n t was contained i n 
the c o n f i d e n t i a l information Mussolini had given Chamber-
l a i n at Munich concerning a proposed withdrawal of ten 
thousand I t a l i a n legionaries from Spain. Perth reacted 
to t h i s news wi t h a relevant question - would i t not be 
possible f o r the I t a l i a n government to withdraw a l l t h e i r 
(12) 
forces from Spain? He was l e f t i n l i t t l e doubt that 
such a withdrawal could not possibly be envisaged. Perth 
hoped for a percentage v/ithdrawal more i n keeping with 
the plan of the Non-intervention Committee which would 
enable the Anglo-Italian Agreement to be r a t i f i e d with 
much greater j u s t i f i c a t i o n . This plan, i n e f f e c t , 
demanded about a 4/5 withdrawal. Ciano claimed ten 
thousand to be h a l f the I t a l i a n forces i n Spain. This 
according to a contemporary War Office estimate of 40,000, 
(13) 
was c l e a r l y Inaccurate. v ' (Another estimate put the 
(14) 
figure as high as 100,000 - also inaccurate). Thus 
the immediate problem before the B r i t i s h government was 
whether the proposed withdrawal was on a s u f f i c i e n t l y 
large scale to j u s t i f y bringing the Agreement into force. 82. 
Two days l a t e r Perth was n o t i f i e d that the I t a l i a n 
government had given d e f i n i t e instructions f o r the ten 
(15) 
thousand legionaries to return from Spain. I t was . 
with t h i s news that the B r i t i s h government began to 
f e e l I t a l i a n pressure f o r the r e a l i s a t i o n of the A p r i l 
Agreement. Perth reported Ciano's threats: 
"Signor Mussolini had i n view of the 
great emergency agreed to go to Munich 
and assist at Conference there but 
he must warn me very solemnly that 
Signor Mussolini would not f e e l i t 
possible again to pa r t i c i p a t e i n a 
fu r t h e r Conference w i t h representatives 
of state, however important, which had 
not recognised the Empire....If Agreement 
di d not come in t o force I t a l i a n Govern-
ment would be compelled to adopt a 
d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e and to take certain 
action which up to now they had 
d e f i n i t e l y refused." (16) 
The appeasers f u l l y appreciated the dangers that t h i s 
I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e held f o r them. I t was potent bribery. 
The s i t u a t i o n was considered by Perth to be 'the parting 
(17) 
of the ways'. ' He begged authority from the B r i t i s h 
government to inform Ciano that the Agreement would be 
implemented. He was convinced that unless t h i s 
happened Mussolini would presume that B r i t a i n did not 
desire to bring the Agreement i n t o force. The con-
sequences would be disastrous to Anglo-Italian r e l a t i o n s . 
Ciano's vague threats were: 
83. 
" c e r t a i n l y l i k e l y to mean a formal 
alliance w i th Germany,•••that the 
Anglo-Italian Agreement dies and 
a l l arrangements connected w i t h 
i t w i l l be ended. Signor Musso-
l i n i may also have i n mind the 
withdrawal of I t a l i a n Ambassadors 
from those countries which have 
not recognised the Empire." (18) 
I n a matter of only four days since Munich 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards I t a l y had been forced into a 
t i g h t corner. To f a i l to bring the Agreement into 
force and recognise the I t a l i a n Empire might w e l l 
r e s u l t i n pushing I t a l y closer to Germany probably 
by a d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y alliance. This was j u s t 
what Chamberlain wanted to avoid at a l l costs. The 
future of Anglo-Italian would be jeopardised. On 
the other hand, the r e a l i s a t i o n of the Agreement would 
assist a general European detente - Chamberlain's 
keenest hope. Ciano had c e r t a i n l y suggested as 
(19) 
much, and he had also hinted that another specific 
r e s u l t would be the resumption of negotiations between 
(20) 
Prance and I t a l y . This was a further point that 
greatly a t t r a c t e d Chamberlain and Halifax. Thus the 
B r i t i s h government had been put i n a position which 
admitted of only one r e a l way out. There was much, 
i t seemed, to be gained by granting Mussolini his 
earnest wish; much to be l o s t by refusing i t . 
84. 
There was no serious doubt i n Chamberlain's mind 
as to the efficacy of implementing the A p r i l Agreement 
(21) 
and Halifax was equally o p t i m i s t i c . But where doubt 
did l i e very heavily was as to whether such a policy could 
be pursued safely. I n exact terms would B r i t i s h public 
opinion be i n agreement? A communication from Halifax 
to Perth on October 5 gave expression to these misgivings: 
" I have discussed matter with Prime Minister 
who, l i k e myself, i s personally favourable 
to early action. We fear, however, that 
i t cannot be quite so immediate as I t a l i a n 
Government hope....I am also bound to say 
that , from point of view of public opinion 
here worst possible impression would be 
caused i f suggestion were made that Prime 
Minister had f e l t obliged to take decision 
under pressure..... 
Signor Mussolini should be under no i l l u s i o n 
as to the d i f f i c u l t i e s which we are l i k e l y 
to encounter here i n bringing the Agreement 
into f o r c e . . . . i f , there i s no reduction of 
I t a l i a n a i r forces i n Spain, and i f bombing 
of B r i t i s h ships continues, we s h a l l have 
considerable d i f f i c u l t y i n carrying public 
opinion."(22) 
Reports were p e r s i s t e n t l y a r r i v i n g i n B r i t a i n about the 
bombing of B r i t i s h ships by Franco's forces and t h i s 
n a t u r a l l y turned opinion against I t a l y . Moreover there 
were rumours that planes went d i r e c t l y from I t a l y on 
(23) 
bombing raids* 'and such stories r e a l l y incensed the 
B r i t i s h public. Under such conditions i t might be 
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s u i c i d a l f o r Chamberlain's Government to go to Parliament 
w i t h a motion to r a t i f y the Agreement w i t h the I t a l i a n s 
especially when Mussolini was r e a l l y making only a token 
withdrawal of troops from Spain» Although Chamberlain'3 
p o s i t i o n immediately a f t e r Munich could hardly have been 
more s o l i d , there had already been a ce r t a i n weakening of 
t h i s support i n some important sectors of public opinion* 
"Second thoughts about Munich on the part 
of a large and i n f l u e n t i a l section of the 
public made i t increasingly uncertain 
whether Chamberlain could hold his own to 
the extent of being able to maintain his 
peace policy."(24) 
I t a l y was repeatedly asked to give assurances regarding 
the cessation of bombing B r i t i s h ships and that no fur t h e r 
(25) 
I t a l i a n p i l o t s should be sent to Spain. Emphasis 
was always l a i d on the desirable ef f e c t such assurances 
would have on public opinion i n B r i t a i n , thus f a c i l i t a t i n g 
the implementation of the Agreement, but Mussolini 
(26) 
refused to compromise on these points. The reason 
for his refusal, not communicated to the B r i t i s h Government, 
was that to make such a promise'would do too much to 
(27) 
weaken Franco's pos i t i o n . 
I t might be thought that such an uncooperative 
a t t i t u d e on the part of I t a l y should have been suspect 86. 
to Chamberlain. But the fact i s that i n other areas of 
diplomacy B r i t a i n could acknowledge the best of relations 
w ith I t a l y . I n the early days of the meetings of the 
Int e r n a t i o n a l Commission the B r i t i s h Government enlist e d 
(28) 
the support of I t a l y i n the discussion over disputes, 
and Henderson was able to t e l l Wilson, the American 
Ambassador i n Germany that A t t o l i c o had been 'most 
(29) 
h e l p f u l ' . The desire f o r cooperation and harmony 
between the two countries - outside of the Agreement 
considerations - was moreover not one-3ided, as a b r i e f 
telegraphic communication from Perth to Halifax on 
October 3 c l a r i f i e s : 
" I learn from a r e l i a b l e source that any 
favourable reference Prime Minister may 
fe e l able to make to Signor Mussolini's 
action both before and during Munich 
Conference would be greatly appreciated."(30 ) 
Chamberlain duly made suitable comments i n his speech i n 
(31) 
the House of Commons of the same day, and the following 
(32) 
afternoon Perth was transmitting Mussolini's thanks. 
Similar statements were also made i n the House of Lords on 
(33) 
the 6th. Although such exchanges might seem somewhat 
t r i t e they were of value to B r i t a i n i f they improved 
relations with I t a l y i n the s l i g h t e s t degree, especially 
at a time when the dominant d i c t a t o r power was demonstrating 
i t s truculence and continued obstinacy i n the sessions of 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission. 87. 
The B r i t i s h government had been requested to give 
i t s r e p l y to I t a l y 'at l e a s t i n general t e r m s ! ^ 3 4 ^ a s soon 
as October 6, i n time f o r the meeting o f the I t a l i a n Grand 
Council. Despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t faced the B r i t i s h 
government as a r e s u l t o f the rushed and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 
nature o f the I t a l i a n proposals, H a l i f a x a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n 
w i t h Chamberlain despatched the f o l l o w i n g message t o Rome: 
" I f Signor Mussolini can meet us on the 
p o i n t o f time, and i f he can i n t h e 
i n t e r v a l e f f e c t the withdrawal which 
he now contemplates, Prime M i n i s t e r w i l l 
b r i n g matter before Cabinet a t f i r s t 
o p p o r t u n i t y , and i f they agree, His 
Majesty's Government w i l l a t once l a y 
matter before Parliament on reassembly."(35) 
The Agreement was on the road to r a t i f i c a t i o n , i f not as 
e a r l y as Mussolini r e a l l y wanted. Chamberlain had asked 
f o r a b r e a t h i n g space,. The matter could not i n any case 
be brought up at the present s i t t i n g o f Parliament and 
the e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e time was November 1. But the delay 
was e s s e n t i a l to the Government i n order t o mellow p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n t o i t s i n t e n t i o n s . Ciano appreciated the 
p o s i t i o n i n which Chamberlain had been put: 
"He does not want t o present h i m s e l f to the 
Cabinet and subsequently t o t h e House of 
Commons, w i t h the words: 'Here you are. 
Take i t or leave i t . Mussolini has f i x e d 
the d a t e 1 . At the moment, i n s p i t e of the 
vote o f confidence, h i s p o s i t i o n has been 
88 
shaken, and i n those circumstances i t 
would become untenable."(36) 
I n the three weeks t h a t f o l l o w e d p r i o r t o t h e 
Cabinet d e c i s i o n being taken B r i t i s h p o l i c y t o I t a l y -
went through something o f a metamorphosis. Soon a f t e r 
the 6th. i t was f e l t by the appeasers t h a t B r i t a i n could 
take advantage o f I t a l y ' s urgent desire f o r B r i t i s h 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f her Empire i n s o l i c i t i n g Mussolini's 
support f o r an attempt t o hasten the conclusion o f the 
(37) 
Spanish c o n f l i c t . As France, I t a l y , Germany and 
Russia were a l l a c t i v e l y concerned i n the Spanish C i v i l 
War, i t Jmas c o n t i n u a l l y a major t h r e a t t o general European 
peace. To do anything to b r i n g t h i s storm-centre to a 
conclusion would, o f i t s e l f , be o f great value. But to 
be able to announce t h a t Mussolini had i n some way been 
in s t r u m e n t a l i n e f f e c t i n g i t would g r e a t l y strengthen 
the government's p o s i t i o n i n suggesting a speedy 
r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the Agreement w i t h the I t a l i a n s . ^ 3 8 ^ So 
the I t a l i a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r was o f f i c i a l l y informed 
t h a t Hemming, Secretary o f the Non-Intervention Committee, 
was going to Burgos t o discuss w i t h Franco's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
a B r i t i s h scheme f o r the withdrawal o f a l l f o r e i g n 
combatants i n Spain. I t was hoped t h a t : 
89. 
" I t a l i a n Government would support h i s 
mission and use t h e i r i n f l u e n c e w i t h 
General Franco f o r examination o f 
Non-intervention p l a n t o which both 
I t a l i a n Government and His Majesty's 
Government were pledged,"(39) 
But B r i t a i n met w i t h the same c o l d r e f u s a l as she continued 
to meet over the matters o f I t a l i a n p i l o t s and the "bombing 
of B r i t i s h ships. 
Perth informed H a l i f a x o f Mussolini's r e a c t i o n 
on the 14th: 
"Neither, I fe a r , w i l l t he I t l i a n Government 
consent t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any appeal t o 
General Franco f o r an a r m i s t i c e . (40) 
He continued h i s communique "by r e l a t i n g h i s fears t h a t 
A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s were i n a deadlock which would not 
be removed u n t i l the r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the Agreement. This 
was the beginning o f the change i n the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e 
to I t a l y from one o f optimism i n the value o f the 
Agreement's r a t i f i c a t i o n as a bargaining counter to 
one o f urgency t h a t the Agreement must be brought i n t o 
force so t h a t p o l i c y w i t h I t a l y could proceed. Perth 
was q u i t e d e f i n i t e i n h i s advice: 
" I am convinced, t o put i t b l u n t l y t h a t 
i t i s useless f o r us t o expect I t a l i a n 
cooperation f o r any f u r t h e r measures connected 
w i t h the cessation o f the Spanish war.... 
u n t i l the Agreement has come i n t o face. 
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Once t h a t has taken place I p e r s o n a l l y 
b e l i e v e t h a t we s h a l l f i n d Signor Musso- • 
l i n i h e l p f u l , not averse t o a Pour Power 
meeting about Spain, i f t h i s were desired, 
and anxious g e n e r a l l y to help towards a 
European detente." (41) 
B r i t a i n continued to press f o r concessions from I t a l y "but 
by October 27 i t was f u l l y r e a l i s e d t h a t everything hung on 
the Agreement. H a l i f a x , i n enlarging t o Washington on the 
Cabinet d e c i s i o n o f the 26th. t o b r i n g the Agreement i n t o 
force stated, t h a t i t : 
"may be expected t o r e s t o r e to Signor 
.Mussolini some o f the l i b e r t y o f 
a c t i o n he now lacks i n deciding h i s 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " (42) 
I t was also f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t o f a i l to take what would 
probably be the l a s t chance of b r i n g i n g the Agreement i n t o 
force would strengthen the Rome-Berlin Axis. There was 
also danger i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i n prolonging the o f f i c i a l 
business o f r a t i f i c a t i o n more than necessary, 
"the longer the Agreement remains 
i n o p e r a t i v e the more c l o s e l y Rome 
becomes bound t o B e r l i n , a3 recent 
events have shown." (43) 
There had, indeed, been signs over the past f o r t n i g h t 
o f increased Italo-German sympathy. The genuineness o f 
these signs can be questioned but from the B r i t i s h p o i n t 
o f view they were d i s t u r b i n g p o r t e n t s . I n the previous 
(44) 
chapter i t ' h a s been mentioned how H i t l e r i n a l l h i s 
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p u b l i c speeches concerning Munich glamorised the p a r t t h a t 
Mussolini had played. The I t a l i a n connection was being 
r e g u l a r l y plugged. Henderson reported on October 12 
how t h i s propaganda was aimed at the German people: 
"The advantages o f the I t a l i a n connexion 
were being more widely recognised and 
soon the German people would become 
accustomed and r e c o n c i l e d t o an I t a l o -
German a l l i a n c e . " (45) 
The I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e t o the German connection seemed l i t t l e 
less f i x e d . On October 13 came the news t h a t I t a l y had 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y approved of the substance and form o f 
(46) 
H i t l e r ' s Saarbrucken speech, and t h a t I t a l i a n o p i n i o n 
was t h a t the Italo-Gerraan bloc o f 125 m i l l i o n men was 
much stronger than i t s opponents who were t a l k i n g o f a 
preventive war. Such notions served t o strengthen 
Chamberlain's o p i n i o n t h a t more c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s should 
be e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h I t a l y by r a t i f y i n g the Agreement a t 
the e a r l i e s t p ossible moment. 
U n t i l t h i s f i n a l l y occurred on November 16 Anglo-
I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s were i n a s t a t e o f suspension. The 
I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e had made i t q u i t e p l a i n t h a t B r i t i s h 
approaches would only be considered once the Agreement 
were brought i n t o e f f e c t . I f a c t i v e p o l i c y towards 
I t a l y had t o be postponed f o r a w h i l e , Chamberlain 
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nevertheless s t i l l had the I t a l i a n angle on appeasement 
I n the f o r e f r o n t o f h i s mind. The "behaviour o f the 
Germans was making him i n c r e a s i n g l y aware o f the 
necessity f o r preserving a good atmosphere w i t h I t a l y . 
" I f e e l t h a t Rome a t the moment i s the 
end o f the Axis on which i t i s easiest 
to make an impression." (47) 
Yet I t a l y as f a r as h i s p o l i c y o f appeasement 
was concerned could never be an end i n i t s e l f . He 
understood H i t l e r as being the r e a l t h r e a t to peace i n 
Europe and knew t h a t h i s p o l i c y could only succeed by 
achieving-a permanent understanding w i t h the Nazis. 
As Germany was not responding to h i s c a l l s he hoped 
t h a t i n I t a l y he might f i n d an a l t e r n a t i v e path to 
H i t l e r ' s h e a r t . 
"An hour o r two t e t e a t e t e w i t h 
M u s s o l i n i might be e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y 
valuable i n making plans f o r t a l k s 
w i t h Germany." (48) 
Chamberlain wanted t o go to Rome to resume the personal 
contacts which had been made a t Munich. He b e l i e v e d 
the implementation o f the A p r i l Agreement would 'obviously 
(49) 
c o n t r i b u t e to general appeasement 1 and so help 
g r e a t l y to page the way f o r such a meeting. As e a r l y as 
October 31 o f f i c i a l documents between the f o r e i g n o f f i c e 
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and the British.embassy i n Rome were mentioning the 
(50) 
hope o f a v i s i t by the prime m i n i s t e r to I t a l y . But 
i t was not proposed to broach the idea w i t h the I t a l i a n s 
u n t i l November 16 a f t e r the d e c l a r a t i o n b r i n g i n g the 
(51) 
agreement i n t o f o r c e had been signed* 
On November 2 the House o f Commons approved the 
* 
government's i n t e n t i o n to b r i n g the A n g l o - I t a l i a n agreement 
(52) 
i n t o force by 345 to 138 votes. This d e c i s i o n appears 
to have been the cause f o r an immediate s o f t e n i n g i n 
I t a l y ' s a t t i t u d e towards B r i t a i n . Grandi, the I t a l i a n 
ambassador saw H a l i f a x on November 4 to convey Mussolini's 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the e f f o r t s taken by the B r i t i s h govern-
ment. I n a shor t general conversation Grandi expressed 
h i s hopes f o r the f u t u r e o f A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s . 
"He was q u i t e c e r t a i n t h a t i n any time 
o f d i f f i c u l t y i n f u t u r e Great B r i t a i n 
and I t a l y would be able t o a c t together 
i n t h e i r n a t u r a l r o l e o f h o l d i n g the 
balance i n Europe. He hoped t h a t we 
should now get back to a reg u l a r prac-
t i c e o f c o n s u l t a t i o n together on a l l 
important p o i n t s as they arose." (53) 
This augered w e l l f o r e a r l y A n g l o - I t a l i a n conversations 
on which, i n view o f the hardening a t t i t u d e o f Germany, 
Chamberlain put such c r u c i a l importance. When the 
idea was o f f i c i a l l y mooted to I t a l y i t was 'welcomed' 
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by Mussolini who agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e proposed 
(54) 
date o f the second week i n January would be a l r i g h t . 
I n a l l her dealings w i t h I t a l y i n these s i x or 
seven weeks since Munich the B r i t i s h government were 
very concerned t h a t no excuse f o r umbrage or sus p i c i o n 
should be given t o Germany. There were two s p e c i f i c 
dangers which had to be avoided; t h a t o f l e t t i n g Germany 
t h i n k t h a t B r i t a i n was t r y i n g to take advantage o f c e r t a i n 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Italo-German r e l a t i o n s , and secondly, 
t h a t o f l e t t i n g Germany t h i n k B r i t a i n was i n any way 
attempting to undermine the Rome-Berlin Axis. C o n f l i c t 
had a r i s e n between Germany and I t a l y regarding Hungary's 
(55) 
claims.against Czechoslovakia. I t a l y was i n c l i n e d to 
support Hungary, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r r e c e i v i n g an appeal f o r 
a r b i t r a t i o n from Budapest. Germany appe ared to side more 
and more w i t h Prague, Munich had provided t h a t i n the 
event o f no s a t i s f a c t o r y understanding being reached 
between Prague and Budapest c o n s u l t a t i o n should take 
place between the f o u r s i g n a t o r y powers. I t a l y eagerly 
de s i r e d t h a t the Czech-Hungarian dispute should be 
s e t t l e d by Axis a r b i t r a t i o n , an idea o f which she was 
hard-pressed to convince Germany. 
The p o s i t i o n o f B r i t a i n i n a l l t h i s was manifested 
when the Czechoslovak M i n i s t e r , Masaryk, contacted 
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H a l i f a x on October 26. B r i t a i n saw 'no o b j e c t i o n ' t o 
the matter being c l e a r e d up 'by means o f a r b i t r a t i o n ? 
by the two Axis Powers' - to which Germany was opposed -
but 'would be ready to j o i n i n any discussion' i f the 
(56) 
problem were r e f e r r e d t o t h e f o u r Munich powers'! 
I n supporting the plan o f a c t i o n desired by I t a l y 
and spurned, a t the time, by Germany, H a l i f a x was 
concerned t h a t no u l t e r i o r motives should be suspected. 
"You w i l l , o f course, appreciate t h a t 
His Majesty's Government do not wish t o 
give the impression o f t r y i n g to p r o f i t 
by any Italo-German disagreement over 
the f u t u r e of. Ruthenia." (57) 
Germany must not be allowed t o t h i n k t h a t B r i t a i n was 
championing I t a l y ' s course o f a c t i o n simply because i t 
would aggravate a source of dissension between the two 
d i c t a t o r powers. 
Likewise i n the matters concerning the r a t i f i c a t i o n 
o f the A n g l o - I t a l i a n Agreement and Chamberlain's p r o j e c t e d 
v i s i t to Rome no suggestion o f wooing I t a l y a t the 
expense o f Germany should be given. As regards the 
former matter the B r i t i s h Government was not so w o r r i e d 
about p o s s i b l e adverse impressions:-
"Our b r i n g i n g i n t o force o f the Agreement 
i s not l i k e l y t o be viewed as an attempt 
to undermine the Rome-Berlin Axis, since 
i t i s Signor Mussolini h i m s e l f who has 
taken the i n i t i a t i v e by h i s u n i l a t e r a l 
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withdrawal of I t a l i a n troops from Spain 
and i s claiming that t h i s gesture should 
enable the Agreement to come into force; 
as to Germany, whatever her inner feelings 
on the subject may be, she has never out-
wardly condemned the Agreement."(58) 
In Chamberlain's v i s i t to Rome, however, there was a r e a l 
danger of misinterpretation. Perth warned Halifax to 
take care that the p u b l i c i t y of t h i s news should be 
suitably diplomatic: 
" I t would of course be of the utmost 
importance that the press at home 
should i n no way represent suggested 
v i s i t as an attempt to weaken the 
Rome-Berlin Axis. Such a l i n e as 
you w i l l appreciate would be 
disastrous. (59) 
November 16, with the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Anglo-
I t a l i a n Agreement and the s e t t l i n g except for 
formalities, of Anglo-Italian conversations for the 
second week i n January, marked the end of the f i r s t 
phase of relations between the two countries a f t e r 
Munich. Chamberlain could be tolerably pleased. A 
sensible atmosphere had been created between London 
and Rome and the stage was set for an extension to t h i s 
good-will. Mussolini might have driven a s t i f f bargain 
but i t was well worthwhile, so i t seemed, for the benefits 
to European peace that would now accrue. A note of 
confidence i s perhaps contained i n the following entry 
i n Chamberlain's diary for November 6: 
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" i n the past, I have o f t e n f e l t a 
sense of hel p l e s s exaspei'ation a t 
the way things have been allowed 
to d r i f t i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , b ut 
now I am i n a p o s i t i o n to keep them 
on the move, and while I am P.M. I 
don't mean to go to sleep," (60) 
I f he could have heard the conversation t h a t had gone on 
between Ribbentrop and Mussolini a t the Palazzo Venezia 
(61) 
on the afternoon o f October 28 i n which war was 
accepted as i n e v i t a b l e w i t h i n the next few years 
between the Axis, Prance and England, he would have 
been less o p t i m i s t i c . 
For the time being Chamberlain continued i n h i s 
hallowed cause o f European peace. Another way i n which 
he could 'keep things going' was w i t h reference to France. 
B r i t a i n might be anxious to make f r i e n d s w i t h Germany 
and I t a l y but she d i d not f o r g e t her o l d a l l i e s . And 
t h i s o l d a l l y r e q u i r e d help as w e l l as thought. 
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Chapter f o u r 
Franoe and Rearmament 
As events i n Europe during October and November 
gr a d u a l l y revealed the mirage o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y 
t h a t Munich had been, Chamberlain was t o put i n c r e a s i n g l y 
g reater emphasis on close contact w i t h Prance. I n the 
weeks before Munich B r i t a i n had been t e n t a t i v e about 
(1) 
c o l l a b o r a t i n g too c l o s e l y w i t h Prance. The s i t u a t i o n 
was not t o change r a d i c a l l y immediately a f t e r Munich 
despite the message which Chamberlain sent t o Deladier, 
expressing the wish f o r 'renewed and continuous co-
(2) 
o p e r a t i o n ' . Closer contact w i t h Prance was to come 
but r a t h e r because things were going badly f o r Chamberlain 
w i t h the d i c t a t o r powers than because he saw Prance as an 
e s s e n t i a l p i l l a r o f B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . So f o r the 
f i r s t few weeks a f t e r Munich B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards 
Prance savours o f mere f o r m a l i t y and patronage r a t h e r 
than i n t e r e s t . 
To France, even more than B r i t a i n , Munich had been 
an experience from which a lesson had t o be learned 
about defence precautions. The p i t h o f t h i s lesson 
was t h a t France was f a r too weak. The purpose o f 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y t o Prance over the ensuing months was 
to r a i s e her from an i n s i d i o u s depression which was 
e f f e c t i n g her m i l i t a r i l y , f i n a n c i a l l y and mor a l l y . 
B u l l i t t , the American ambassador i n P a r i s , summed up 
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the s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g Prance i n the f o l l o w i n g resume of a 
conversation he had w i t h Deladier: 
"Deladier sees the s i t u a t i o n e n t i r e l y , 
c l e a r l y , r e a l i s e s f u l l y t h a t the meeting 
i n Munich was an immense diplomatic 
defeat f o r Prance and England and recog-
nises t h a t unless Prance can recover a 
u n i t e d n a t i o n a l s p i r i t t o c o n f r o n t the 
f u t u r e a f a t a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l a r i s e w i t h i n 
the next year." (3) 
S i r Maurice Hankey, a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l o f the Suez 
Canal Company, examined the problem more c l o s e l y f i n d i n g 
t h a t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s s o l u t i o n l a y p a r t l y w i t h 
B r i t a i n . He emphasised the need: 
" f o r the B r i t i s h Government to exercise 
e a r l y and continuous pressure on M. 
Deladier to set the French defences 
i n order." (4) 
Aware o f t h e i r d e f i c i e n c i e s and o f the t h r e a t s t h a t 
s t i l l e x i s t e d i n Europe n e a r l y a l l sections o f French 
o p i n i o n were 'united i n d e c l a r i n g t h a t the c l o s e s t 
\ (5) 
Anglo-French co-operation i s e s s e n t i a l ' . 
Phipps, i n forwarding Hankey's memorandum to H a l i f a x , 
echoed the need f o r B r i t a i n t o i n f l u e n c e and a s s i s t 
France i n the matter o f her defensive p o s i t i o n and 
requested some message from the prime m i n i s t e r to the 
e f f e c t t h a t B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e on these l i n e s would soon 
(6) 
be forthcoming. 
Although Chamberlain had expressed a desire t o 
Deladier f o r more s t i m u l a t e d Anglo-French contact, h i s 102. 
approaoh.es i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the Quai d'Orsay were 
reserved. Such reservations were, no doubt, p a r t l y 
i n f l u e n c e d by h i s a s p i r a t i o n s w i t h reference to I t a l y . 
F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s were s t i l l a t a very low ebb 
and the re-establishment o f normal diplomatic exchanges 
between the two countries by the r e t u r n o f a French 
ambassador t o Rome d i d l i t t l e genuinely t o improve the 
s i t u a t i o n . I t was a s i g n i f i c a n t gesture on the p a r t o f 
France but the news o f the appointment was received 
c o l d l y by I t a l y . Ciano wrote at the time: 
"The news leaves us more or less 
i n d i f f e r e n t . I t i s good t h a t 
the French have c a p i t u l a t e d but 
we don't want c e r t a i n I t a l i a n s 
t o get e x c i t e d and e n t h u s i a s t i c 
about i t . " (7) 
Later i n the month French enquiries regarding the possible 
re-appointment o f an I t a l i a n ambassador t o Paris were 
(8) 
brushed aside by Ciano. The as yet unspoken t e r r i t o r i a l 
demands on French possessions could not be allowed t o be 
embarrassed by any outward signs o f warmth from I t a l y ! ' 
The general s t a t e o f F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s 
was w e l l known i n the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n o f f i c e . On the 
a c t u a l day o f the announcement o f the appointment o f a 
French ambassador t o Rome, Giano spoke b i t t e r l y to Perth 
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o f the a t t i t u d e the French press was t a k i n g over Mussolini's 
(9) 
p a r t a t Munich. While f r i c t i o n between Rome and Paris 
continued B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y would only be aggravated 
by advancing too q u i c k l y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f conversations 
w i t h Prance. I n the f i r s t place Mussolini might w e l l 
become s c e p t i c a l o f B r i t i s h motives i n proposing t o 
implement the A p r i l Agreement i f , a t the same time, there 
took place a c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f the Anglo-French p o s i t i o n . 
Secondly, although i t was important f o r Chamberlain's 
p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n t o o b t a i n French agreement t o h i s 
I t a l i a n p o l i c y , t h i s very p o l i c y might w e l l become • 
awkwardly embarrassed i f the Quai d'Orsay were given 
too much room t o voice opinions. The French d i d , i n 
f a c t , consider B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n s over the I t a l i a n 
Agreement a ' d e l i c a t e ' question. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g 
t h e r e f o r e , to f i n d t h a t they were given l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y 
t o r a i s e o f f i c i a l o b j e c t i o n s . 
I n the absence o f any d e f i n i t e signs from the 
B r i t i s h Government o f e a r l y o f f i c i a l exchanges w i t h the 
French Government, Phipps again brought H a l i f a x ' s n o t i c e 
t o the s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n France, on October 12. I n a 
telegram o f t h a t date he r e i t e r a t e d h i s e a r l i e r observation 
t h a t the general mood i n Paris was t h a t of 'search f o r a 
(11) 
strong hand to lead France out o f her t r o u b l e s ' . 
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I n h i s conclusion he emphasised, the r o l e t h a t he and 
the m a j o r i t y of o p i n i o n i n Prance "believed B r i t a i n 
should be p l a y i n g : 
"..cthe country now desires u n i t y and a 
strong government and recognises the need, 
f o r a f u r t h e r armaments e f f o r t , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the a i r . But there are undercurrents 
of defeatism which f e e l t h a t Prance's 
f u t u r e as a Great Pov/er i s dangerously 
compromised,.o.Meanwhile at a moment o f such 
u n c e r t a i n t y and depression French o p i n i o n 
and not l e a s t i n f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s i s lean-
ing h e a v i l y on Great B r i t a i n f o r leadership 
and guidance," (12) 
Despite such appeals the B r i t i s h government. 
continued i n i t s r e s t r a i n e d p o l i c y towards France, I t 
was not, i n f a c t , u n t i l October 28 t h a t H a l i f a x r e p l i e d 
to Phipps 1 o r i g i n a l communication o f the 4 t h . Although 
i t was B r i t a i n ' s earnest desire t o have France strong 
and-healthy, i t was f e l t i m p o l i t i c f o r B r i t a i n to 
exercise too d i r e c t an i n f l u e n c e . 
" . . . i t must obviously be r a t h e r a d e l i c a t e 
matter f o r us t o p r o f f e r advice on such 
matters, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f such advice takes 
too o f f i c i a l a form. For t h a t reason, I 
do not a l t o g e t h e r l i k e your suggestion 
o f a message from the Prime M i n i s t e r , " (13) 
However the idea o f a v i s i t t o Paris by Chamberlain 
and Halifaxvhad now been mooted and i t was thought 
t h a t such an occasion o f i n f o r m a l t a l k s would be the 
(14) 
best way o f b r i n g i n g i n f l u e n c e t o bear on France. 
105 
As time drew on and the l i k e l i h o o d o f a r e a l agreement 
w i t h Germany diminished, the prospect o f t a l k s w i t h Prance 
was viewed w i t h g r e a t e r eagerness. And there was a 
f u r t h e r f a c t o r which made the appeasers more concerned 
about the French connection. This was the f a c t t h a t 
w h i l e Germany was o b s t i n a t e l y i g n o r i n g B r i t i s h overtures 
she was i n t h e process o f coming t o a l i m i t e d agreement 
w i t h France» The fear t h a t such a c t i o n i n e v i t a b l y 
r a i s e d i n the B r i t i s h mind was t h a t H i t l e r was t r y i n g t o 
s p l i t Paris and Eondon, B r i t a i n had t o admit the very 
s l i g h t p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i n her depressed s t a t e France 
might decide t o c o n t r a c t out o f Europe a l t o g e t h e r by 
accepting a d i r e c t non-aggression pact w i t h Germany, 
Such an idea had been placed on evidence as ea r l y as 
October 4 i n Phipps 1 communique t o H a l i f a x : 
" I have heard fears expressed, i n c e r t a i n , 
but not numerous, quarters l e s t Great 
B r i t a i n and France should d r i f t a part,•• 
owing t o German i n t r i g u e . , . " ( 1 5 ) 
While H a l i f a x admitted t h a t there was no more reason 
f o r B r i t a i n t o be suspicious o f any d i r e c t Franco-
German discussions which might improve the European 
atmosphere than there was f o r France t o o b j e c t t o 
s i m i l a r Anglo-German discussions, which took place 
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a t Munich, he f u l l y r e a l i s e d the dangers o f the s i t u a t i o n . 
R e f e r r i n g e a r l y i n November t o the poss i b l e (though 
h i g h l y improbable) non-aggression pact between Germany 
and Prance he p o i n t e d out the obvious and dangerous 
consequences o f B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n and Germany being 
(17) 
able t o dominate Europe. v ' The tone o f B r i t a i n 
towards Prance now begins t o change. Events during the 
f i r s t f o u r weeks a f t e r Munich had awakened Chamberlain 
and H a l i f a x t o the dangers proceeding from a weak and 
demoralised Prance. H a l i f a x now e x h i b i t s t h a t concern 
over improving French defences t h a t Phipps had shown 
e a r l i e r : 
"Hence the great importance which I 
a t t a c h to our using every o p p o r t u n i t y 
o f encouraging her by precept and 
example t o rearm as soon as possible."(18) 
B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e l y i n g as i t d i d ao much on 
p r e s t i g e and p o t e n t i a l s t r e n g t h r e s t e d h e a v i l y on the 
French c o l l a b o r a t i o n . 
B r i t a i n was now t o f o s t e r the a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h 
France more v i g o r o u s l y . Speaking a t the G u i l d h a l l 
on November 9 Chamberlain took the o p p o r t u n i t y o f 
emphasising t h a t i f he were a 'go-getter 1 f o r peace 
t h i s d i d not mean t h a t h i s contacts w i t h France were 
any the less valuable. 
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"Our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Prance are too long 
standing, too i n t i m a t e , too h i g h l y 
p r i z e d by both o f us t o allow such 
suspicions t o be e n t e r t a i n e d f o r one 
moment,"(19) 
H a l i f a x explained i n h i s l e t t e r to Phipps o f November 1 
th a t even though the French p o s i t i o n i n c e n t r a l Europe 
had been s h a t t e r e d a t Munich, receding before German 
predominance, the u n i t e d p o s i t i o n of France and B r i t a i n 
i n western Europe must be r e t a i n e d at a l l costs. The 
essence o f t h i s was strong defences: 
"...Great B r i t a i n and France have to 
uphold t h e i r predominant p o s i t i o n i n 
Western Europe by the maintenance 
of such armed s t r e n g t h as would 
render any a t t a c k upon them hazardous."(20) 
At the time o f w r i t i n g these opinions the B r i t i s h 
had learned o f a proposal f o r an agreement between France 
and Germany on s i m i l a r l i n e s t o the Anglo-German p r o t o c o l 
which had been signed a t Munich, and understood t h a t 
t h i s proposal was a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y idea as f a r as France 
(21) 
was concerned. By t h i s time the B r i t i s h press had 
given much spait?e t o the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s i n t e n t i o n o f 
b r i n g i n g forward proposals f o r a general settlement 
between the f o u r great powers o f Europe - an idea to 
which M u s s o l i n i , i n the middle o f the month, had given 
(22) 
vague assurances o f support. I n view o f t h e attempts 
to b r i n g about t h i s Franco-German agreement, France was 
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concerned t o be kept informed about these B r i t i s h 
(23) 
e f f o r t s f o r a general c o l l a b o r a t i o n . At the same 
time Prance gave o f f i c i a l support to the B r i t i s h 
i n t e n t i o n to b r i n g the A n g l o - I t a l i a n Agreement i n t o 
(24) 
f o r c e . This was support which B r i t a i n had eagerly 
d e s i r e d and was glad t o o b t a i n . For, apart from i t 
being i n harmony w i t h the p o l i c y o f Anglo-French co-
o r d i n a t i o n , i t was hoped t h a t the de c i s i o n to implement 
t h i s agreement might be ' h e l p f u l i n a s s i s t i n g the 
(25) 
improvement o f F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s ' . 
While there was a s l i g h t element of apprehension 
i n the B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n to the present course o f Franco-
German r e l a t i o n s t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the predominant 
r e a c t i o n t o the proposed pact between France and Germany 
was one o f pleasure at a rapprochement which would 
subscribe t o gre a t e r understanding between the 
democracies and the d i c t a t o r s h i p s . For the conclusion 
o f such an agreement would be an inv a l u a b l e f i l l i p to 
Chamberlain's p o l i c y o f achieving a four-power Europe, 
B r i t a i n and Germany had c l e a r l y agreed to conduct t h e i r 
f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s w i t h European peace as t h e i r goal; a 
basis f o r A n g l o - I t a l i a n understanding was soon to be 
l a i d i n the r e a l i s a t i o n o f the A p r i l Agreement; now 
France and Germany seemed l i k e l y t o come-vto some broad 
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agreement which would c l e a r the a i r i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . 
A l l t h a t remained f o r t h a t 'general sense o f s t a b i l i t y 
(26) 
and s e c u r i t y ' ' t h a t Chamberlain was seeking, to be 
achieved, was f o r Prance and I t a l y t o be able to conclude 
a s i m i l a r agreement, f o r then the way would be c l e a r l y 
glazed f o r a general rapprochement between a l l f o u r 
powers. Even i f t h i s hope was never t o be r e a l i s e d 
the f a c t t h a t H i t l e r was now prepared t o come t o some 
form of understanding w i t h Prance was, from the B r i t i s h 
p o i n t o f view welcome i n d i c a t i o n o f a po s s i b l e improvement 
(27) 
i n the European atmosphere. 
By November 7 Germany had supp l i e d Prance w i t h an 
i n i t i a l d r a f t o f t h e agreement, and on the f o l l o w i n g day 
(28) 
H a l i f a x was acquainted w i t h i t s terms. B r i e f l y i t 
expressed the w i l l i n g n e s s o f the two powers to maintain 
peaceful r e l a t i o n s and t o th a t end i t agreed t h a t there 
were no longer any t e r r i t o r i a l questions which d i v i d e d 
them. I t also acknowledged t h a t a l l f u t u r e disputes 
should be s e t t l e d by c o n s u l t a t i o n . The B r i t i s h f o r e i g n 
o f f i c e was r e l i e v e d t h a t the d r a f t contained no i n t e n t i o n 
to l a y down any r e c i p r o c a l non-aggression undertakings, 
(29) 
so t h a t the worst fears were d i s p e l l e d . Two days 
l a t e r Prance was informed t h a t B r i t a i n would welcome the 110. 
conclusion o f an agreement on the l i n e s contained i n 
(30) 
the d r a f t . 
With the f i e r c e a n t i - S e m i t i c outburst i n Germany 
which occurred a t t h i s time, aggravating s t i l l f u r t h e r 
the atmosphere between London and B e r l i n , the need f o r 
ever c l o s e r contact w i t h the p r i n c i p a l a l l y was emphasised. 
(31) 
The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s v i s i t t o Paris was due on the 24th 
and the series o f conversations which took place at the 
Quai d'Orsay f u r t h e r cemented r e l a t i o n s between the 
two c o u n t r i e s . At the time of the v i s i t Chamberlain 
described t h i s meeting as 'a means.for renewing and 
(32) 
strengthening mutual confidence' and i n t h i s respect 
i t achieved i t s purpose. 
The f i r s t matter to be discussed i n these con-
versations was the Franco-German D e c l a r a t i o n which was 
now ready f o r s i g n a t u r e . The B r i t i s h government had 
s p e c i f i c a l l y requested t h a t p u b l i c a t i o n o f the t e x t o f 
the d e c l a r a t i o n should not, i f p o s s i b l e , precede these 
(33) 
conversations. As t h i s request had been made only 
the day before (the 25th) the French government had 
agreed to defer p u b l i c a t i o n so t h a t p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n 
could take place. Bonnet read the complete t e x t o f the 
d e c l a r a t i o n to. the B r i t i s h p a r t y and Chamberlain s i n c e r e l y 
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s rapprochement ' c o n s t i t u t e d another 
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(34) 
step towards appeasement i n Europe•« Apart from the 
professions o f g o o d - w i l l which had been contained i n the 
i n i t i a l d r a f t the d e c l a r a t i o n also observed: 
" t h a t peaceful and good neighbourly 
r e l a t i o n s between Germany and Prance 
are one o f the most e s s e n t i a l elements 
o f the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f the European 
s i t u a t i o n and o f the maintenance o f 
general peace," (35) 
The agreement was to be signed the f o l l o w i n g week and 
although i t s general content was ak i n t o t h a t o f the 
Anglo-German D e c l a r a t i o n which H i t l e r had since disgraced, 
i t d i d seem to put r e l a t i o n s between Paris and B e r l i n 
on an even k e e l and pave the way f o r an improvement i n 
the F r a n c o - I t a l i a n atmosphere which was s t i l l one o f 
the bi g g e s t obstacles i n the way o f a general European. 
settlement. 
Defence, i n e v i t a b l y , occupied a major p a r t o f the 
morning session, Deladier was under no i l l u s i o n about 
the necessity f o r France r a d i c a l l y to improve her 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f defence e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t of the 
new d e c l a r a t i o n w i t h Germany, 
" i n present circumstances, i f one wished 
the Franco-German d e c l a r a t i o n to have 
a r e a l value, i t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t 
France should not slacken her e f f o r t s i n 
the matter o f def ence, " (36) 
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He continued by a s s e r t i n g the need i n t h i s matter f o r 
co-operation w i t h B r i t a i n ' i n a l l possible ways', 
ChamberlaiEB f i r s t i n t e n t i o n i n t h i s v i t a l area o f 
discussion was t o have Prance's p o s i t i o n c l a r i f i e d 
w i t h reference t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a German at t a c k on 
B r i t a i n , 
"the present a t t i t u d e of Germany had 
brought before His Majesty's Govern-
ment the p o s s i b i l i t y of a q u a r r e l 
between Great B r i t a i n and Germany r a t h e r 
than between Prance and Germany, and the 
f i r s t blow might w e l l , t h e r e f o r e , be 
st r u c k against Great B r i t a i n r a t h e r than 
Prance." (37) 
I n such an e v e n t u a l i t y would B r i t a i n be able t o count 
on French aid? Deladier's r e p l y was unreserved: 
"The present French Government f e l t s t i l l 
more s t r o n g l y t h a t , i f Great B r i t a i n were 
attached by Germany, France would be bound 
to go to her assistance." (38) 
I n the l i g h t o f previous qualms as t o the s t a t e o f the 
French morale, t h i s assurance together w i t h the improved 
tenor o f Franco-German r e l a t i o n s , was a matter of great 
comfort to the B r i t i s h government . D e t a i l s o f 
adviseable increments i n a l l regions o f both French and 
B r i t i s h defence were f u l l y discussed. The need f o r 
u n i t y of a c t i o n i n t h i s respect was w e l l appreciated 
and e a r l y s t a f f conversations between the two cou n t r i e s 
were approved, 
113. 
Throughout t h i s extensive and d e t a i l e d discussion 
on defence the s a l i e n t f e a t u r e was the frankness w i t h 
which the p o s s i b i l i t y of German aggression against the 
democracies i s accepted. Six months p r e v i o u s l y r e -
armament i n B r i t a i n had been the c r y o f al a r m i s t s and the 
war-monger c l i q u e ; now i t had been f i r m l y accepted, as 
a r e s u l t o f the September c r i s i s and subsequent events 
as o f f i c i a l government p o l i c y . Chamberlain's p o l i c y 
o f appeasement was now, at one and the same time, supported 
and denied by rearmament. H a l i f a x had p u b l i c l y explained 
t h i s apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n a speech at Edinburgh 
towards the end o f October: 
"But i f t h i s country i s t o play i t s f u l l 
p a r t w i t h others i n securing peace, i t 
must be able t o speak w i t h equal weight. 
One-sided armament and one-sided d i s -
armament are both impossible and give 
no help to peace. And t h e r e f o r e we must 
take a l l measures - already taken months 
ago by c o n t i n e n t a l countries - t h a t are 
e s s e n t i a l t o our s t r e n g t h and safety."(39) 
Immediately a f t e r Munich much e f f o r t had been put, 
(40) 
s u c c e s s f u l l y , i n t o improving B r i t a i n ' s c i v i l defences.. 
Since then the balance o f e f f o r t had gone i n t o p u t t i n g 
m i l i t a r y defences i n order, the emphasis being on a n t i -
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a i r c r a f t defences. The B r i t i s h government 'now impressed 
by the necessity f o r p e r f e c t i n g t h e i r a i r defence 1 - the 
aim being t o increase output and capacity - were 
"devoting themselves f i r s t t o the equipment 
o f a n t i - a i r c r a f t defence, i n c l u d i n g guns, 
and t o the produc t i o n o f bombing planes, 
(which would destroy aerodromes and 
f a c t o r i e s ) , and f i g h t i n g planes ( t o encounter 
enemy bombing squadrons). '(41) 
I n mid-November i t was announced i n the Commons t h a t the 
a i r estimates f o r the f o l l o w i n g year would be i n the 
region o f £200 m i l l i o n s (an increase o f £80 m i l l i o n s on 
the current year) and t h a t by March i t was expected to 
complete the programme f o r the product o f 1750 f i r s t 
(42) 
l i n e a i r c r a f t . 
P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n was being p a i d to a n t i - a i r c r a f t 
gun f a c t o r i e s . New f a c t o r i e s were being b u i l t and o l d 
f a c t o r i e s being extended and re-equipped. Chamberlain 
gave t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n to Deladier together w i t h the f a c t 
t h a t output i n the B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t i n d u s t r y was inc r e a s i n g . 
350 machines had been produced i n the l a s t month and the 
f i g u r e was r i s i n g s t e a d i l y . 
I f the statement made by the m i n i s t e r f o r the 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f defence ( S i r Thomas I n s k i p ) on October 26 
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was somewhat exaggerated when he r e f e r r e d t o B r i t a i n being 
i n possession o f 'a f l o o d o f the armaments and equipment 
(43) 
which we need to complete our defences, 1 the country 
was c e r t a i n l y i n a much h e a l t h i e r p o s i t i o n to r e s i s t 
a t t a c k than she had been a t the time o f Munich. 
I n f a c t there was more now behind the B r i t i s h 
rearmament programme than simple defence, as was 
revealed i n the conversations w i t h Prance. 
The above reasoning by H a l i f a x was e s s e n t i a l to p u b l i c 
r e l a t i o n s so t h a t H i t l e r might have as l i t t l e excuse 
as poss i b l e f o r accusing B r i t a i n o f lack o f confidence-. 
But w h i l e B r i t a i n genuinely hoped t h a t a strong defence 
p o s i t i o n might add weight t o her arguments f o r peace, a 
weather eye was being r e a l i s t i c a l l y kept open t o the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of war and the need t o prepare accordingly: 
"tho'ughl.His Majesty's Government had 
not s a i d so, they were i n f a c t 
i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r bombing for c e i n 
the same measure as t h e i r f i g h t i n g 
f o r c e . Indeed, i t was p o s s i b l e 
t h a t they might p r e s e n t l y increase 
the emphasis on the bombing side 
o f t h e i r programme."(44) 
A change o f s p i r i t was g r a d u a l l y t a k i n g place; 
rearmament as a safeguard f o r peace was being s l o w l y 
converted i n t o rearmament i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r war. 
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The dual nature o f B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y at t h i s 
time was epitomised by these conversations. There were 
frequent references to and discussions about the way 
i n which i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s could be improved, 
but on the other hand, the subject o f mutual defence 
was predominant. There was a general alignment o f 
p o l i c i e s w i t h reference t o c e n t r a l Europe and the Near 
and Par East, but the most d e f i n i t e achievement was a 
de c i s i o n f o r some j o i n t planning f o r a i r defence. The 
i n t e n t i o n o f B r i t a i n to encourage Prance i n rega i n i n g 
l o s t confidence was achieved. There could now be no 
doubt i n French minds t h a t B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y of f r i e n d -
ship towards the d i c t a t o r s d i d not mean a lessening o f 
f a i t h i n her a l l i e s . On the co n t r a r y Chamberlain had 
manifested considerable i n t e r e s t i n strengthening Anglo-
French t i e s . 
On the other hand these conversations had contained 
no mention of any f o r m u l a t i o n of a j o i n t p o l i c y towards 
the d i c t a t o r s . One o f the outstanding features o f the 
t a l k s was, w i t h t h e exception o f the d e l i b e r a t i o n s on 
defence, t h e i r vagueness. While g e n e r a l l y s t r e n g t h -
ening Anglo-French c o l l a b o r a t i o n they had done l i t t l e 
i n d e f i n i n g any s p e c i f i c programmes. Chamberlain, i t 
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seems, had not yet completely abandoned the wariness, 
even contempt, w i t h which he regarded the French, His 
opi n i o n , as expressed i n January 1938, s t i l l l a r g e l y 
h e l d : 
"France's weakness i s a p u b l i c danger j u s t 
when she ought t o be a source of s t r e n g t h 
and confidence, and as a f r i e n d she has 
two f a u l t s which destroy h a l f her value. 
She; never can keep a secret f o r more than 
h a l f an hour, nor a government f o r more 
than nine months 1 w (45) 
Only a matter o f a couple o f weeks before h i s meeting 
i n Paris he had w r i t t e n o f the forthcoming t a l k s w i t h 
h i s customary patronage: 
" I f e l t i t t o be the r i g h t t h i n g f o r many 
reasons/-to give French people an opportun-
i t y o f pouring out t h e i r pent-up f e e l i n g s 
o f g r a t i t u d e and a f f e c t i o n , to strengthen 
Deladier and encourage him t o do something 
at l a s t t o put h i s country's defences i n 
order, and to p u l l h i s people i n t o 
g r eater u n i t y . (46) 
Perhaps one o f h i s main i n t e r e s t s i n the French 
t a l k s was t h a t i t would 'make i t pos s i b l e f o r me to 
go to Rome, i n January'. Chamberlain was s t i l l 
c l i n g i n g t i g h t l y to h i s appeasement p o l i c y and Rome 
was an e s s e n t i a l l i n k i n the chain to Germany. Any 
too d e f i n i t e a p o l i c y pursued i n d i r e c t combination 
w i t h France might cause suspicion i n Rome and B e r l i n 
and p r e j u d i c e h i s plans. The o f f i c i a l communique 
issued a f t e r the conversations s t a t e d t h a t : 
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"there has emerged once again complete 
i d e n t i t y of ideas on the genera l o r i e n t a t i o n 
of the p o l i c y of the two c o u n t r i e s i n s p i r e d 
by the same care f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n and 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n of peace." (47) 
I f events s i n c e Munich had s t r o n g l y recommended t h i s 
•general o r i e n t a t i o n 1 between Prance and B r i t a i n 
Chamberlain d i d not want to r i s k h i s personal p o l i c y 
being encumbered by France. F o r the time being he 
would pre s s on by h i m s e l f . 
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Chapter f i v e 
Appeasement Checked 
I f October had brought f r u s t r a t i o n to the 
appeasers' attempts to promote a l a s t i n g rapprochement 
with the Nazis, November was to b r i n g an e x p l i c i t 
German antagonism towards B r i t a i n which r e s u l t e d i n a 
marked l u l l i n the e f f o r t s a t d i r e c t appeasement. I n 
October, before events had gone t h i s f a r , the l a c k of 
r e c i p r o c i t y on the part of Germany had alre a d y deterred 
Chamberlain from h i s p o l i c y towards H i t l e r , and had 
made him hope f o r g r e a t e r success i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of Rome. One of the c h i e f purposes of the French 
conversations was, to Chamberlain's mind, to pave the 
way to Rome by s t a b i l i s i n g Anglo-French p o l i c y towards 
(1) 
I t a l y . But the f a c t t h at Chamberlain was by the 
beginning o f November putting such emphasis on the 
I t a l i a n connection does not e x p l a i n why d i r e c t B r i t i s h 
overtures towards Germany were, f o r the time being, 
being r e l a x e d . For, on the face of i t , Chamberlain 
could c e r t a i n l y have approached H i t l e r w i t h d e f i n i t e 
proposals f o r four-power co-operation, despite the 
discouraging Nazi a t t i t u d e . One might even say 
that such an e f f o r t was d e s i r a b l e before the 
atmosphere d e t e r i o r a t e d f u r t h e r . 
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The reasore why Chamberlain temporarily r e l a x e d 
the German angle of appeasement are s t i l l not c l e a r l y 
d i s c e r n i b l e , but a few d e f i n i t e i n f l u e n c e s can be 
s u b s t a n t i a t e d . R e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany were of a 
very d e l i c a t e nature and Chamberlain was l o a t h to 
take any p r e c i p i t a t e a c t i o n which might d r i v e Germany 
out of reach. Keen on the p r i n c i p l e of pe r s o n a l 
diplomacy he would r a t h e r await the improvement i n 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere t h a t he expected would 
follow h i s forthcoming t a l k s i n Rome, than p o s s i b l y 
p r e j u d i c e h i s whole p o l i c y by some q u i c k l y conceived 
(2) 
approach to Germany. This , of course, i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of h i s stubborness, and v i s i o n of h i m s e l f as the 
(3) 
supreme peacemaker. Also, on the t e c h n i c a l l e v e l , 
he could h a r d l y have i n i t i a t e d any d i r e c t dealings 
w.ith Germany before h i s conversations w i t h Prance 
at the end of November, fo r the topic of r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Germany was to be an important item on the 
agenda. 
There were tv/o other main reasons. F i r s t the 
f a c t of German's r e a c t i o n to date to Chamberlain's 
a c t i v e peace p o l i c y . This c o n s i s t e d of rude speeches 
by H i t l e r , an aggressive a n t i - B r i t i s h p r e s s campaign, 
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and the i n i t i a t i o n of severe a n t i - S e m i t i c a c t i v i t y . 
These were formidable o b s t a c l e s i n the way of r e a l i s i n g 
the s p i r i t of the Anglo-German D e c l a r a t i o n , and 
thwarted Chamberlain's proposals f o r the development of 
mutual r e l a t i o n s . I n view of t h i s s o r t of behaviour 
on the p a r t of Germany Chamberlain would need to 
e x e r c i s e a c e r t a i n amount of r e s e r v e i n order not to 
give h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents too easy a chance to 
(4) 
a t t a c k him. There were ple n t y of s i g n s that though: 
the country's h e a r t was g e n e r a l l y as s e t on peace as 
he h i m s e l f was there was a 'constant..body of opinion, 
and a v o c a l one, which saw appeasement as a l t o g e t h e r 
i n v a l i d and dangerous', as the means whereby i t should 
(5) 
be sought. A new s e s s i o n of Parliament opened e a r l y 
i n November when the opposition s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d the 
government's handling of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s s i n c e Munich. 
There was plenty of evidence of disgust a t what was 
termed the ' s p i r i t of g i v i n g i n to armed for c e and i t s 
demands' and of 'putting a s i d e a l l . . . s t a n d a r d s of 
(6) 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e and m o r a l i t y ' . The press too 
gave l i t t l e encouragement to Chamberlain. Comments 
on the r e a l i s a t i o n of the A n g l o - I t a l i a n Agreement were 
mocked by t h e i r g e n e r a l l a c k of enthusiasm, as were 
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those e a r l y i n December on a f u r t h e r diplomatic move 
which i n s p i r e d the appeasers' hopes, the s i g n i n g of 
(7) 
the Franco-German D e c l a r a t i o n . The t r u c u l e n t mood 
of the Commons continued i n t o December so that Chamber-
l a i n even began to have doubts as to whether he would 
be able to maintain h i s p o l i c y i n t h i s 'uneasy and 
(8) 
d i s g r u n t l e d House'* without r e s o r t i n g to a genera l 
e l e c t i o n . But even i f he had s e r i o u s l y considered 
taking such a c t i o n the r e s u l t s of s e v e r a l post-Munich 
b y - e l e c t i o n s suggested that a campaign fought from the 
stand of appeasement might b r i n g anything but a vote 
of confidence from the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . Between Munich 
and mid-December one Labour and s i x Conservative s e a t s 
were contested. While labour h e l d t h e i r s ( a t 
Doncaster), w i t h an i n c r e a s e d m a j o r i t y , the conserva-
t i v e s h e l d four with decreased m a j o r i t i e s and l o s t the 
other two, one of which, fought p r i m a r i l y over f o r e i g n 
(9) 
p o l i c y saw an i n c r e a s e of 12,000 i n the labour v o t e s . 
Lack of any r e a l success w i t h Germany together 
w i t h the adverse e f f e c t t h i s had on opinion i n B r i t a i n 
was then a p r a c t i c a l reason f o r delay i n the German 
angle of appeasement, but even t h i s does not f u l l y 
e x p l a i n the postponement of any p o s i t i v e a c t i o n f o r an 
i n d e f i n i t e time. This brings i n the other main 125. 
reason which was the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the Jewish 
p e r s e c u t i o n e a r l y i n November. 
Nazi a c t i o n against the Sudeten Jews was v i c i o u s l y 
stepped up i n the second week of that month and was 
extended to cover German Jews i n g e n e r a l . The murder 
of E r n s t von Rath, t h i r d s e c r e t a r y at the German 
embassy i n P a r i s , by an unbalanced P o l i s h Jew c a l l e d 
H e r s c h e l l Grynspan was used as the excuse f o r the 
v i o l e n t persecutions t h a t now began. On November 9 
two days a f t e r the i n c i d e n t , H a l i f a x r e c e i v e d information 
from Dr. Weizmann, p r e s i d e n t of the World Z i o n i s t 
o r g a n i s a t i o n , to the e f f e c t that the s i t u a t i o n of the 
German Jews had 'changed most dangerously during the 
(10) 
l a s t twenty-four hours *• Pogroms were a n t i c i p a t e d 
and some t a c t f u l i n t e r v e n t i o n by B r i t a i n was requested. 
H a l i f a x , however, was very dubious of the suggestion 
t h a t a prominent non-Jewish Englishman should make 
(11) 
t r a c k s f o r B e r l i n to t r y and save the s i t u a t i o n . 
Ogilvie-Porbes r e i t e r a t e d H a l i f a x ' s doubts b e l i e v i n g 
that f o r B r i t a i n to i n v o l v e h e r s e l f p u b l i c l y i n a 
matter which Germany considered to be purely i n t e r n a l 
would be 'to poke our f i n g e r s i n a wasp's nest.', 
e s p e c i a l l y i n view of H i t l e r ' s p r e v a i l i n g 'aggressive 
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(12) and a n t i - B r i t i s h mood1. The argument f o r non-
i n t e r v e n t i o n by B r i t a i n was strong, f o r on the previous 
day the German press had attempted to make c a p i t a l out 
of the murder of von Rath on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene 
"by suggesting to i t s readers t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s 
were i m p l i c a t e d . 
"The Jewish murder-urchin Grynsban, a l s o 
assumed the post of world improver and 
avenger. Thereby he took the same 
l i n e as i s pursued by Messrs. C h u r c h i l l , 
Eden, Duff Cooper and t h e i r a s s o c i a t e s , 
i n d e f a t i g a b l y and i n the most v a r i e d 
fashion, i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l of Jews and Freemasons.." (13) 
Also, one German paper had published p i c t u r e s of the 
* above B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s under the heading 'The 
Jewish murderer and h i s i n c i t e r s . ' 
I n o f f i c i a l l y o b j e c t i n g to these ' s c u r r i l o u s 
a t t a c k s ' the f o r e i g n o f f i c e i n s t r u c t e d O g i l v i e -
Forbes r a t h e r p a t h e t i c a l l y , to inform Ribbentrop or 
Weizsacker t h a t such suggestions were not ' i n harmony 
...with the i n t e n t i o n of the D e c l a r a t i o n which the 
Prime M i n i s t e r and C h a n c e l l o r signed i n Munich.' (14) 
' Both Ribbentrop and Weizsacker were ' i n d e f i n i t e l y 
absent' from B e r l i n and the only o f f i c i a l statement 
that Ogilvie-Forbes could get was a copy of a d e n i a l 
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by Goebbels, the M i n i s t e r f o r Propaganda, of any 
(15) 
knowledge of the matter. This d e n i a l was obtained 
second-hand and had been p r i n t e d i n the Sunday Times 
the day before J 
Goring and s e v e r a l s e n i o r m i n i s t e r s decided the 
measures to be put i n t o f o r c e a g a i n s t the Jews of 
(16) 
Germany on the 13th. They amounted to economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s t r a n g u l a t i o n and included a 
general f i n e of one m i l l i a r d , marks as punishment 
fo r the P a r i s murder. The b a r b a r i t y of these d e c i s i o n s 
was conveyed to London i n impassioned terms by 
O g i l vie-Porbes. He could: 
" f i n d no words strong enough i n condemna-
t i o n of the d i s g u s t i n g treatment of so 
many innocent people and the c i v i l i s e d 
world i s faced w i t h a p p a l l i n g sight.-, of 
500,000 people about to r o t away i n 
s t a r v a t i o n . . (17) 
Three days l a t e r i t was l e a r n e d t h a t the expulsion 
of Jews from the Sudetenland had been resumed and 
H a l i f a x was recognising the u s e l e s s n e s s of a g e n e r a l 
(18) 
p r o t e s t to the German government. On the other 
hand he was 'anxious to do everything....where good 
(19) 
grounds f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n e x i s t ' . I t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see how he imagined such grounds might present 
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themselves, Goebbels had a l r e a d y announced t h a t 
any a t t a c k on the German government by i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Jewry or t h e i r a l l e g e d a s s o c i a t e s would be v i s i t e d on 
(20) 
the Jews i n Germany. B r i t a i n had already been 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the murderers of von Rath, so any 
i n t e r v e n t i o n by her would l o g i c a l l y only r e s u l t i n 
a worsening of the t r a g i c p o s i t i o n the Jews a l r e a d y 
faced. 
This tense s i t u a t i o n was a d i r e c t burden to Anglo? 
German diplomacy, but B r i t i s h p o l i c y to Germany faced 
a f u r t h e r embarrassment. This concerned the r e a c t i o n 
of B r i t i s h p u b l i c opinion s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Jewish 
pogroms and the consequent d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t i n the 
German l e a d e r s : 
"...nothing co n t r i b u t e d more e f f e c t i v e l y 
to the general r e a l i s a t i o n of the chara-
c t e r of the men w i t h whom we had to deal 
than the orgy of t e r r o r i s m and economic 
d e s t r u c t i o n with which i n November H i t l e r 
v i s i t e d the hapless Jews of Germany."(21) 
The anti-German f e e l i n g was g r e a t l y extended. So 
deep was the i n d i g n a t i o n of B r i t i s h people a t the 
a t t r o c i t i e s being committed i n the name of the Reich 
that a p r o t e s t meeting was h e l d i n the Al b e r t H a l l . 
Nor was t h i s i s o l a t e d r e a c t i o n f o r the Nazis had 
v i r t u a l l y turned the whole of world opinion a g a i n s t 
themselves. 
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I n view of t h i s f e e l i n g i n B r i t a i n Chamberlain 
could h a r d l y have proposed any d e f i n i t e p l e a s f o r the 
appeasement of Germany a t t h i s stage, f o r such a 
p o l i c y would have run d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t the g r a i n 
of p u b l i c opinion. Von Dirksen saw the s i t u a t i o n 
c l e a r l y enough: 
"As long as t h i s mood p r e v a i l s , i t 
w i l l be impossible f o r Chamberlain 
to co n s i d e r c a r r y i n g out h i s p l a n 
of attempting a settlement w i t h 
Germany on a broad b a s i s . " ( 2 2 ) 
On November 27 the Observer t r i e d to r a t i o n a l i s e t h a t 
l o g i c a l l y the German maltreatment of the Jews has 
no bearing upon the p o l i c y of appeasement 1 but the 
whole i s s u e had, i n f a c t , r e s u l t e d i n a very grave 
set-back i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . Within the 
next few days a f t e r the i n i t i a t i o n of persecutions 
the f o r e i g n o f f i c e was to r e c e i v e more t a n g i b l e proof 
of the :decay .that had s e t i n . 
Information was r e l e a s e d on November 18 of a 
p r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w which H i t l e r had given to s e v e r a l 
s e l e c t German j o u r n a l i s t s a few days p r e v i o u s l y and 
i n which he had r e v e a l e d h i s opinion of B r i t a i n 
O g i l v i e - F o r b e s reported that H i t l e r : 
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"no longer l a i d any value on f r i e n d s h i p 
w i t h Great B r i t a i n . • . H e had come to the 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t f r i e n d s h i p w i t h B r i t a i n 
was not a p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n as Prime 
M i n i s t e r had r e p l i e d to Munich d e c l a r a -
t i o n with rearmament...Great B r i t a i n 
was therefore no longer to be t r e a t e d 
w i t h c o n s i d e r a t i o n by German p r e s s . " ( 2 3 ) 
As f a r as German pre s s p o l i c y was concerned t h i s was 
nothing new f o r B r i t a i n had been under severe a t t a c k 
f o r s e v e r a l weeks, but i t was unwelcome confirmation 
of the Fuhrer's a t t i t u d e to B r i t a i n . I n support 
of t h i s a t t i t u d e Ogilvie-Porbes a l s o reported i n the 
same communication the rumour t h a t H i t l e r was intending 
to c l a i m h i s f u l l r i g h t s under the Anglo-German Naval 
(247 
Agreement of 1935 f o r a considerable i n c r e a s e i n 
h i s tonnage of submarines. T h i s was a rumour which, 
when t r a n s l a t e d to r e a l i t y i n the middle of December, 
was to be g r e a t l y r e g r e t t e d by the B r i t i s h government 
owing l a r g e l y to the a d d i t i o n a l t e n s i o n i t p l a c e d on 
(25) 
the p o s i t i o n of appeasement v i s a v i s p u b l i c opinion. 
Even more i n d i c a t i v e of H i t l e r ' s frame of mind a t 
t h i s time was the news, r e c e i v e d by H a l i f a x the day 
(26) 
before, of a f r e s h German demand on the Czechoslovaks. 
This demand, amounting v i r t u a l l y to an ultimatum, was 
f o r y et f u r t h e r extensions to the German inroad on 
Czechoslovakia. How contrary to Munich was t h i s 131. 
l a t e s t German demand can be seen from the f a c t t h a t 
the a r e a now coveted by the Reich contained l i t t l e 
more than 10% German population. Had the Czechoslovak 
government not been s u b j e c t e d to such p r e s s u r e by 
(27) 
Germany that 'there was no a l t e r n a t i v e but to s i g n ' 
away the t e r r i t o r y concerned, B r i t a i n would have been 
put i n a r a t h e r t r i c k y p o s i t i o n . For, i f the f o r e i g n 
o f f i c e had objected to the proposed capture, Germany 
would have regarded such a c t i o n as hampering the chances 
of Anglo-German rapprochement. On the other hand, * 
f o r B r i t a i n to have remained s i l e n t would have been to 
condone an a c t i o n d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y to the terms of 
the Munich Agreement. As i t was the matter was 
q u i c k l y s e t t l e d between Germany and Czechoslovakia 
and a l l t h a t remained to be done was f o r the 
(28) 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission to s a n c t i o n the settlement. 
I t a l l o t t e d Germany an area c o n t a i n i n g 6,000 Germans 
and 30,000 Czechoslovaks. 
I t i s reasonable to a s s e r t that with the d i s t u r b i n g 
circumstances which had a r i s e n by mid-November the 
chances of a d i r e c t appeasement of Germany had almost 
vanished. C e r t a i n l y , the u n f r i e n d l i n e s s , even v e i l e d 
h o s t i l i t y of Germany, had c r e a t e d an atmosphere between 
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the two c o u n t r i e s which n e c e s s a r i l y obviated a c t i o n 
i n the appeasers' p o l i c y towards the Reich. Von 
Dirksen, i a a survey of h i s London ambassadorship, 
r e f e r r e d to the past few weeks i n Anglo-German 
r e l a t i o n s as a time when ' a l l v o i c e s of reason and 
a l l promptings toward mutual c l a r i f i c a t i o n were 
(29) 
s t i l l e d ' . Appeasement had been checked. 
I t should be borne i n mind t h a t i t had taken no 
more than seven weeks a f t e r Munich f o r the German 
a t t i t u d e i n Europe to have d e t e r i o r a t e d so d r a s t i c a l l y . 
This f a c t should s u r e l y have put grave doubts i n 
Chamberlain's mind as to H i t l e r ' s s i n c e r i t y a t Munich. 
But he s t i l l c r e d i t e d the Puhrer w i t h g r e a t e r good-will 
to B r i t a i n than he deserved, and there was t o be no 
change i n the conception of h i s p o l i c y which y e t 
envisaged a Germany, p a c i f i e d by B r i t i s h diplomacy, and 
co-operating to remove a l l sources of f r i c t i o n from 
Europe. Perhaps Chamberlain argued w i t h h i m s e l f t h a t 
H i t l e r was a man of moods and that the s p e c i a l press 
i n t e r v i e w had caught him i n a r a t h e r i n t o l e r a n t frame 
of mind; that the suggestion about i n c r e a s i n g h i s 
submarine tonnage was, a f t e r a l l , only rumour. Such 
generous thoughts, however, could f i n d no ambiguity i n 
the German demand on Czechoslovakia, and the t r u t h i s 
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t h a t Chamberlain was, a t t h i s time, more i n f l u e n c e d by 
the general s i t u a t i o n i n Europe than by s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Germany. He eagerly awaited the Anglo-French 
conversations which would a s s i s t h i s way t o Rome, w i t h 
which c a p i t a l r e l a t i o n s had r e c e n t l y improved by the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the A n g l o - I t a l i a n Agreement. At t h i s 
time, t o o , a l i m i t e d D e c l a r a t i o n between France and 
Germany seemed assured, and t h i s seemed a d e f i n i t e 
step towards general European p a c i f i c a t i o n . I n f a c t 
as has already been seen, Chamberlain could view 
w i t h c e r t a i n s a t i s f a c t i o n a Europe which, on paper, 
had progressed three quarters o f the way to h i s idea 
of f o u r power cooperation. He was, nevertheless, to 
become more depressed as signs from Germany worsened 
during dismal December. 
By the beginning o f t h a t month B r i t a i n was r e -
cognising the advanced German diplomatic p o s i t i o n i n 
Europe and the f a c t t h a t ' a l l questions a r i s i n g out o f 
the Munich Agreement have been and w i l l be decided a t 
(31) 
German Nazi d i c t a t i o n . . . ' 
This was. a sad r e f l e c t i o n on the f a i l u r e o f the long-
term i n t e n t i o n s o f Munich, and also on the f a i l u r e o f 
B r i t i s h attempts to r e a l i s e these i n t e n t i o n s . 
134. 
" I t i s p a t h e t i c t o see the t r o u b l e taken 
by members o f the Foreign O f f i c e i n t h e i r 
correspondence w i t h i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s on 
questions o f f r o n t i e r s , economics, and 
options, a l l i n vain,"(32) 
Nevertheless B r i t a i n refused t o abandon i t s p o s i t i o n w i t h 
reference to the questions o f Munich s t i l l to be s e t t l e d , 
and would not give way to the German demands f o r the 
(33) 
d i s s o l u t i o n o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission, 
The next f o r t n i g h t brought g r e a t l y increased 
tens i o n to Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . The primary cause 
o f t h i s was contained i n a note l e f t v/ith Cadogan by 
von Dirksen on December 12, The note o f f i c i a l l y 
informed the B r i t i s h government t h a t Germany intended 
to increase i t s submarine tonnage and armament of 
(34) 
c r u i s e r s under c o n s t r u c t i o n . The b r i e f l y expressed 
reason which the German government gave f o r such a c t i o n 
was t h a t developments i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene over 
the past few months had necessitated t h e i r 'paying 
increased a t t e n t i o n to the p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e i r maritime 
(35) 
communications i n the event o f w a r l i k e complications,' 
This d e c i s i o n was received very gravely by B r i t a i n , 
I t was not only a f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n o f Germany's 
r e f u s a l to f u l f i l l the s p i r i t o f the Anglo-German 
d e c l a r a t i o n but also (as H a l i f a x i n s t r u c t e d O g i l v i e -135. 
Forbes to ex p l a i n to the German government) i t 
c o n s t i t u t e d a f u r t h e r cause f o r the a l i e n a t i o n o f 
$36) 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n from Germany, The a c t i v e 
response by the B r i t i s h government was to request the 
h o l d i n g o f f r i e n d l y discussions on the d e c i s i o n before 
the German r i g h t should be exercised, as provided f o r 
by the 1935 Naval Agreement. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t t h i s German demarche 
came a t a time when B r i t a i n was proposing t o the 
Reich Government an a d d i t i o n a l p r o t o c o l to the London 
Naval t r e a t y o f 1936 and to the b i l a t e r a l naval 
(37) 
agreement concluded by the B r i t i s h Government. 
According t o t h i s proposal, the proviso f o r t h e mutual 
exchange o f i n f o r m a t i o n on naval c o n s t r u c t i o n would be 
extended to apply t o a l l sea powers bound to Great 
B r i t a i n by t r e a t y , whereas at the present o n l y B r i t a i n , 
the United States, Prance and I t a l y exchanged r e c i p r o c a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n . Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland 
only exchanged b i l a t e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n , on 
the basis o f t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l agreements w i t h her. 
The B r i t i s h proposal t h e r e f o r e meant a c o l l e c t i v e agree 
ment between a l l the above mentioned sea powers. 
Despite the f a c t t h a t such suggestions from B r i t a i n 
were doomed by Germany's general o b j e c t i o n to c o l l e c t i v e 
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agreements and to any f r e s h t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
the Soviet Union i n p a r t i c u l a r , the newly revealed 
German desire f o r e x e r c i s i n g f u l l r i g h t s under s p e c i f i c 
Anglo-German naval t r e a t i e s was l i t t l e encouragement 
to B r i t i s h a s p i r a t i o n s ] And, moreover, t h i s grave 
matter was t o occupy B r i t i s h a t t e n t i o n i n naval t o p i c s 
t i l l the end of the month. On December 20th H a l i f a x 
learned t h a t the German Government had agreed t o 
discuss t h e i r naval d e c i s i o n w i t h B r i t a i n and the 
date f o r the discussions was soon f i x e d as December 
(38) 
30. 
The term ' i n the event of w a r l i k e complications', 
contained i n von Dirksen's l e t t e r t o H a l i f a x had an 
ominous r i n g about i t when viewed i n the l i g h t o f a 
communication received from Ogilvie-Forbes on the 8th. 
I n : t h i s , the B r i t i s h Embassador sent word t h a t i t was 
a matter o f genuine c o n v i c t i o n among prominent c i r c l e s 
i n Germany, t h a t H i t l e r was ready f o r the expansion 
o f h i s country beyond i t s r i g h t f u l boundaries© 
" i t i s the general c o n v i c t i o n i n Germany 
today t h a t Herr H i t l e r i s now about to 
embark on the t h i r d stage o f h i s pro-
gramme, namely, expansion beyond the 
boundaries of the t e r r i t o r i e s i n h a b i t e d 
by Germans.... 
One t h i n g i s c e r t a i n : Nazi aims are on 
a grandiose scale, and there i s no l i m i t 
to t h e i r u l t i m a t e ambitions." (39) 
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L i t t l e s i g n o f the i n i t i a l d i r e c t i o n such a programme 
would take could "be suggested, f o r t h i s was a matter 
o f much sp e c u l a t i o n i n Germany. But the ambassador 
repor t e d the views o f one school o f thought which 
maintained t h a t f o r H i t l e r to progress unhindered i n 
the east he would need t o ensure t h a t he would not be 
attacked on h i s western f l a n k . Were t h i s the case 
h i s f i r s t task would be 'to l i q u i d a t e Prance and 
England, before B r i t i s h rearmament i s ready.' ^ 4 0^ 
While such thoughts were f a r from r e a l i t y they 
provided a d i s t u r b i n g undercurrent to r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
the Nazis. That such undercurrents were, moreover, 
f a r from being disregarded by the B r i t i s h government 
can be seen from the r e a c t i o n to f u r t h e r unconfirmed 
rumour. This concerned S i r Ivone K i r k p a t r i c k who 
u n t i l December 15 was head o f chancery a t the B r i t i s h 
embassy i n B e r l i n . A few days before h i s r e t u r n to 
England K i r k p a t r i c k was informed by 'a r e t i r e d Secretary 
of S t a t e ' , i n somewhat clandestine circumstances, t h a t 
H i t l e r had 'ordered preparations t o be made f o r an a i r 
(41) 
a t t a c k on London i n peace-time'. The informant 
claimed h i s news as being f i r s t - h a n d from the German 
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war o f f i c e and a i r m i n i s t r y and the r e a c t i o n o f the 
B r i t i s h cabinet was t o b r i n g the a i r c r a f t regiment 
from L i c h f i e l d and park the guns i n W e l l i n g t o n barracks 
where they could be seen from the German embassy, 
K i r k p a t r i c k h i m s e l f considered the whole episode to be 
•rather l u n a t i c 1 and i t does seem to demote Anglo-
German r e l a t i o n s t o the plane o f comic opera, but i t 
i s s i g n i f i c a n t as a measure o f the i n c r e a s i n g 
s e n s i t i v i t y w i t h which B r i t a i n was regarding Nazi 
Germany. I t has been noted above t h a t by the end of 
November serious e f f o r t s were being made to prepare 
against the p o s s i b i l i t y of a German in v a s i o n of B r i t a i n . 
By the middle of December the appeasers were accepting 
the p r o b a b i l i t y o f H i t l e r making some d i s t u r b i n g move 
i n the near f u t u r e . H a l i f a x admitted as much to the 
French ambassador on the 16th: 
" I s a i d t h a t we had a good deal o f 
i n f o r m a t i o n I n the same sense and 
t h a t i t a l l appeared t o p o i n t t o the 
conclusion t h a t Herr H i t l e r would 
c e r t a i n l y not be l i k e l y to l e t many 
weeks or months pass w i t h o u t making 
some d i s t u r b i n g move....I d i d n o t . . . 
exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s t a k i n g 
some a c t i o n against t h i s country o r 
France...." (43) 
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Talks, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, between 
H a l i f a x and von Dirksen on the evening o f the 14th 
r e v e a l the c l e f t s t i c k nature o f the p o s i t i o n B r i t a i n 
had been put i n by the events o f the past few weeks. 
H a l i f a x recorded h i s disappointment i n the d e t e r i o r a t i o n 
o f the s i t u a t i o n since Munich and asked the German f o r 
any observations which might give 'more ground f o r 
hope'. Von Dirksen refused to discuss the 'un-
f o r t u n a t e ' past and turned a t t e n t i o n tov/ards the one 
element i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s which o f f e r e d any 
c o n s o l a t i o n to the B r i t i s h - the economic. He was, 
i t should be stressed, genuinely e n t h u s i a s t i c about 
the irole economic co-operation might play i n a wider 
improvement i n r e l a t i o n s , f o r he b e l i e v e d Germany 
could get what she wanted by economic means: 
" . . . i n the middle o f December I began 
to l a y i n c r e a s i n g stress i n my t a l k s 
w i t h i n f l u e n t i a l Englishmen'-on the 
idea t h a t the way to r e l i e v e the 
tension must be sought i n the economic 
f i e l d ; there were p l e n t y o f causes 
o f p o l i t i c a l f r i c t k n , but economic 
i n t e r e s t s were common and they were 
capable o f being developed.... 1 1 (45) 
I f , up t o a p o i n t , here was d i r e c t i o n f o r some k i n d o f 
mutual c o l l a b o r a t i o n being given by Germany, the 
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appeasers i n B r i t a i n had t o temper t h e i r r e a c t i o n to 
the climate o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . With the i n i t i a t i o n 
o f the Jewish pogroms e a r l y i n November the B r i t i s h 
a t t i t u d e t o economic appeasement had n e c e s s a r i l y 
hardened f o r the B r i t i s h p u b l i c would not have 
t o l e r a t e d any outstretched-arms dealings w i t h the 
Nazis a t the time, Leith-Ross had made the B r i t i s h 
p o s i t i o n c l e a r to Ruter, head o f the German economic 
mission, on November 10: 
" . • • o f f i c i a l conferences on economic 
p a c i f i c a t i o n could not stand on t h e i r 
ov/n but must be included i n the l a r g e r 
framework o f a general p o l i t i c a l 
p a c i f i c a t i o n , . . . " (46) 
The idea o f economic appeasement had been present 
i n pre-Munich days as u l t i m a t e l y an important move, 
and i t was now being accepted by the appeasers as 
the v i t a l l i n k w i t h Germany which could shape the 
f u t u r e . I t was f o r t u n a t e t h a t discussions o f a 
f r i e n d l y nature w i t h the Reich on economic questions 
could be promoted w i t h o u t too much p u b l i c i t y . Thus,: 
i n mid- December, Dr. Schacht, President o f the 
Reichsbank, was i n England f o r three days as the guest 
o f the Governor of the Bank o f England. He had 
conversations w i t h Leith-Ross, Stanley (President o f 
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the Board o f Trade);, Chamberlain and several l e a d i n g 
c i t y f i n a n c i e r s . Von Dirksen b e l i e v e d t h a t Schacht: 
"met the greatest readiness on the p a r t o f 
those a t t e n d i n g the discussion f o r com-
mer c i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s on the broadest 
basis w i t h Germany,"(47) 
and considered t h a t these u n o f f i c i a l , discussions had 
r e s u l t e d i n 'an improvement i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s 
on an economic b a s i s ' . Prom the B r i t i s h p o i n t o f 
view one t h i n g was q u i t e p l a i n : Germany was not 
going to allow economic discussions t o permeate the 
p o l i t i c a l world. An i n v i t a t i o n to Schacht f o r t a l k s 
w i t h H a l i f a x was f i r m l y declined. Schacht 'was 
anxious to avoid a l l appearance o f l e a v i n g the sphere 
(48)-
o f p u r e l y economic t a l k s ' and so t h e basic B r i t i s h 
aims were f r u s t r a t e d . But the v i s i t was not e n t i r e l y 
f r u i t l e s s from the B r i t i s h angle. I t was something 
to have conducted amicable conversations on economic 
subjects deemed s u i t a b l e f o r n e g o t i a t i o n . Here perhaps 
was the e s s e n t i a l l i n k w i t h the Germans t h a t could be 
forged i n t o shape i n t h e f u t u r e . Stanley h i n t e d t h a t 
he would be prepared to v i s i t B e r l i n l a t e r on f o r a 
(49) 
f u r t h e r 'exchange o f views'. 
I f some measure of Anglo-German co-operation had 
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thus been achieved on a s p e c i f i c l e v e l behind the 
scenes, outward signs pointed to a hardening o f the 
B r i t i s h government's a t t i t u d e . I n several speeches 
Chamberlain had r e c e n t l y been showing t h a t when r e q u i r e d 
he could p l a y the strong man v i s a v i s Germany. Ster n 
l i n e s had been taken over the Menel question and at a 
luncheon a t the House of Commons i n honour o f Schacht 
Chamberlain issued a warning note t o Germany as t o the 
f i n a n c i a l resources of Great B r i t a i n i n the event o f 
(50) 
war w i t h Germany. I n a d d i t i o n a f i r m e r a t t i t u d e 
(51) 
to defence was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent, and 
a pronouncement by Chamberlain on December 13 assured 
(52) 
the doubters o f B r i t a i n ' s s o l i d a r i t y w i t h Prance. 
On the f o l l o w i n g day Bonnet assured Great B r i t a i n o f 
Prance's m i l i t a r y support i n t h e event o f an unprovoked 
aggression against her, a statement which Chamberlain 
(53) 
was g r a t i f i e d t o repeat to the House f i v e days l a t e r . 
I t seems t h a t such s t e r n e r tones on the p a r t o f 
Chamberlain were more by way o f a sop t o the constant 
(54) 
stream o f c r i t i c i s m he was f a c i n g than serving as 
any r e a l evidence o f a weakening i n h i s appeasement 
p o l i c y . For i f p u b l i c o p i n i o n hampered him i n t a k i n g 
any d i r e c t a c t i o n towards the p o l i t i c a l appeasement o f 
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H i t l e r , he was s t i l l concerned t o make sure t h a t 
H i t l e r was not allowed t o f o r g e t t h a t B r i t i s h f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y aimed a t genuine f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Germany. On 
December 19 (during a severe censure debate on the 
government's p o l i c y i n E urope) he addressed an 
eloquent appeal t o the German n a t i o n . R e g r e t t i n g t h a t 
the treatment o f the Germans i n the post-war p e r i o d 
had been n e i t h e r generous nor wise he continued: 
"With the passage o f time has come t o 
us a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e i r great 
q u a l i t i e s , and a strong d e s i r e to see 
them co-operating f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n 
o f European c i v i l i s a t i o n . There i s 
no s p i r i t o f v i n d i c t i v e n e s s here. There 
i s no des i r e t o hamper t h e i r development 
or cramp t h e i r tremendous v i t a l i t y as a 
nation. 1' (55) 
Here was t h e open hand o f f r i e n d s h i p w a i t i n g to be 
shaken. But the lack o f response to appeasement was 
beginning t o depress Chamberlain. He r a t h e r p a t h e t i c a l l y 
complained: 
" i t takes two t o make an agreement.••.1 am 
s t i l l w a i t i n g f o r a s i g n from those who 
speak f o r the German people,•..that they 
are prepared t o make t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to the peace t h a t would help them as much 
as i t would help u s , , . , I t would be a t r a g i c 
blunder to mistake our love of peace and 
our f a c u l t y f o r compromise, f o r weakness," (56) 
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Even though the path of appeasement had so f a r l e d 
l i t t l e way to s u c c e s s ^ Chamberlain saw no reason to 
admit even the s l i g h t e s t f a l l a c y i n appeasement. 
What he wanted was time, and b e s i d e s , the manifest 
d e s i r e s of the B r i t i s h people urged him to continue. 
" i f t h a t p o l i c y , having had a f u l l ohance 
of s u c c e s s , were n e v e r t h e l e s s t o f a i l , I 
myself would be the f i r s t to agree t h a t 
something e l s e must be put i n i t s p l a c e . 
But I have been g e t t i n g a great number of 
l e t t e r s which convince me that the country 
does not want the p o l i c y to f a i l and, 
whatever views may be expressed i n t h i s 
House, I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t the general 
p u b l i c d e s i r e i s to continue the e f f o r t s 
we have made."(57) 
Such sentiments demonstrate the confusion appease-
ment was i n at the end of December, the mixture of 
hope, f a i t h , c h a r i t y - and depression. And a 
problem which was to i n c r e a s e the l a t t e r was that of the 
worsening s i g n s about Czechoslovakia and the Munich 
guarantee w i t h reference to t h a t s t a t e . The idea of 
t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee a l r e a d y seemed to have 
faded away. Since Munich Germany had f r e q u e n t l y 
d e f i e d the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission and had squeezed 
f u r t h e r l a n d from Czechoslovakia without l e t or 
hindrance. Poland and Hungary had a l s o presented 
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claims t o Czechoslovakia!! t e r r i t o r y and these had been 
s e t t l e d , i n the case o f Hungary, by an 'award 1 made 
by Ribbentrop and Ciano at Vienna on November 2. • Not 
long a f t e r t h a t came the news o f German plans f o r the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an Autobahn by Germany across the country, 
an i n t e n t i o n which Newton (the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n 
Prague) considered'a f u r t h e r n a i l i n the c o f f i n o f the 
(58) 
independence which Czechoslovakia l o s t a t Munich' 
and a matter a l t e r i n g the basis on which the guarantee 
was founded. 
Aware t h a t the s i t u a t i o n had got out of c o n t r o l 
the B r i t i s h during the November conversations w i t h 
Prance, had watered down the guarantee arguing t h a t 
i t .would be ope r a t i v e only i f three o f the f o u r Munich 
(59) 
powers were i n agreement. Subsequently the B r i t i s h 
m i n i s t e r i n Prague was i n s t r u c t e d t o approach the 
Czechoslovak government w i t h t h i s idea, but he found 
(61) 
a reluctance to discuss the matter. On December 21 
H a l i f a x i n s t r u c t e d Phipps to contact the French govern-
ment again on the subject o f the guarantee i n the 
(62) 
hope t h a t the p o s i t i o n might be q u i c k l y r e g u l a r i s e d . 
The French were slow to respond and the whole a f f a i r 
received great embarrassment from the news O g i l v i e -
Forbes relayed on the 22nd. t o the e f f e c t t h a t the 
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impression he had gained o f German-Czechoslovak 
r e l a t i o n s was t h a t the German government was now regard-
(63) 
ing Czechoslovakia as t h e i r own preserve. The whole 
. a f f a i r was thus put even deeper i n t o the b o i l i n g pot 
and the lac k o f success at t h i s stage i n achieving a 
d e f i n i t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t i t u d e t o the guarantee was 
l a t e r to have serious r e s u l t s when Germany resents 
(64) 
any mention o f the guarantee. 
At the end o f December, j u s t p r i o r to the t a l k s 
between B r i t a i n and Germany on the l a t t e r ' s proposed 
naval b u i l d - u p , the bogey o f the German press a t t i t u d e 
to B r i t a i n again reared i t s u g l y head. I n t h i s 
instance the'Reich had chosen to a t t a c k B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
i n P a l e s t i n e r e p o r t i n g supposed a t t r o c i t i e s by B r i t i s h 
( P>KI\ 
troops on Arabs. ' The German Government refused 
to be h e l d responsible f o r the p u b l i c a t i o n o f such 
r e p o r t s , so Ogilvie-Porbes determined to b r i n g the 
whole matter o f press r e l a t i o n s up w i t h the Head o f 
(66) 
the German Press Department owing to i t s destruc-
t i v e i n f l u e n c e on the atmosphere between the two 
co u n t r i e s . The i n t e r v i e w , three days before the 
B e r l i n t a l k s was an unproductive as might have been 
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expected. Aschmannrepeated t h a t the Reich could not 
be h e l d responsible f o r the i n s e r t i o n o f items o f 
(67) 
f o r e i g n news which i t 'did not c o n t r o l ' . 
The f i n a l dealings of B r i t a i n w i t h Germany i n 1938 
were no more successful. Prom the outset o f the 
discussions on the German naval increases i t was p l a i n 
t h a t there was no p o s s i b i l i t y o f Germany reconsidering 
(68) 
her d e c i s i o n . Thus much o f the business centered 
around the way i n which the d e c i s i o n should be p u b l i c i s e d . 
This matter was of great concern t o the B r i t i s h 
r epresentatives who were very s e n s i t i v e o f the e f f e c t 
the news would have upon B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n . 
Attempting to disuade the Germans from t h e i r chosen 
course o f a c t i o n Admiral Cunningham pointed out t h a t 
there could be no r e s u l t other than having 'an adverse 
e f f e c t on Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s ' and t h a t : 
"His Majesty's Government....greatly feared 
t h a t an unfavourable impression v/ould be 
created, and not only i n England, when the 
i n t e n t i o n t o do so became p u b l i c l y known 
as i t i n e v i t a b l y must."(70) 
The l e a s t t h a t the B r i t i s h could hope f o r was t h a t the 
German Government might agree to achieve an increase 
i n submarine tonnage by annual stages. By doing thus 
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'the e f f e c t on p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n a l l countries would be 
l e s s ' , but the German delegation would not agree to such 
a course, but s t a t e d t h a t they wjuld communicate t h e i r 
f i n a l views on the subject a t a l a t e r date* The B r i t i s h 
d e l e gation returned t o London empty-handed, an un-
p r o f i t a b l e f i n a l e t o a depressing December. 
Thus the f i n a l year of peace before the outbreak 
o f war went out w i t h Germany i n a n t a g o n i s t i c mood 
towards B r i t a i n , and d r a m a t i c a l l y enduring the ' c r u i s e r 
h o l i d a y ' . Two days before New Year's Eve, H a l i f a x had 
received an ominous sounding memorandum on the m i l i t a r y 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f Germany i n 1939. I t s author, Colonel 
Mason-Macfarlane issued serious warning to the appeasers: 
"There are many l o g i c a l arguments against 
the p r o b a b i l i t y o f Herr H i t l e r provoking 
h o s t i l i t i e s against England a t an e a r l y 
date. But however improbable i t may' 
seem, there i s a s u f f i c i e n c y o f v a l i d 
argument and of f a c t t o warrant our 
t a k i n g such a p o s s i b i l i t y very s e r i o u s l y . 
I t i s a p o s s i b i l i t y which we cannot under 
any circumstances a f f o r d to exclude."(71) 
149. 
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Chapter s i x 
Prance Mated. 
The s o r r y s t a t e o f r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and 
Germany during the w i n t e r o f 1938 tended to overshadow 
B r i t a i n ' s dealings w i t h the other d i c t a t o r s t a t e . 
I t has already "been seen t h a t Chamberlain's desires 
f o r A n g l o - I t a l i a n conversations i n Rome i n e a r l y 
January had been t e n t a t i v e l y accepted by Mussolini 
upon the r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the 1938 Agreement between 
the two countries on November 16. The idea had 
been mutually agreed i n p r i n c i p l e but was s t i l l a 
matter o f diplomatic secrecy. An immediate problem 
presented i t s e l f . I n a Europe c o n s i s t i n g o f f r a g i l e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , matters o f i n i t i a t i v e i n diplomacy 
could be a r e a l source o f d i f f i c u l t y . The problem 
was t h i s : i n the o f f i c i a l p u b l i c announcement o f the 
intended conversations, which country should appear 
to have taken the i n i t i a t i v e ? On November 16 the 
E a r l o f Perth wrote t o H a l i f a x t h a t he hoped H h i s 
question o f i n i t i a t i v e w i l l not cause any t r o u b l e ' 
f o r he recognised t h a t i t might "be d i f f i c u l t f o r the 
I t a l i a n Government to make the f i r s t formal move. 
The B r i t i s h Government, however, was not t o 
c a p i t u l a t e i t s p o s i t i o n i n t h i s matter, despite 
Chamberlain's a n x i e t y t o safeguard the forthcoming 
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t a l k s . A f t e r a l l B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s I t a l y 
had "been g r e a t l y strengthened w i t h the implimentation 
of the A p r i l Agreement. Mussolini himself had w r i t t e n 
to Chamberlain a l e t t e r which gave proof of t h i s : 
"At the moment of the e n t r y i n t o f o r c e 
of the Agreements o f A p r i l 16, which 
place on a f i r m and d e s i r a b l e basis 
the r e l a t i o n s o f f r i e n d s h i p and 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n between our two countries 
I desire t o renew to you the expression 
o f my s a t i s f a c t i o n and t h a t o f the 
F a s c i s t Government, and t o send you 
p e r s o n a l l y the assurance o f my f r i e n d l y 
and c o r d i a l sympathy." (2) 
H a l i f a x explained B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n w i t h reference 
to t h i s question o f i n i t i a t i v e i n a l e t t e r t o Perth 
on November 24: 
"...the I t a l i a n s would be the hosts 
and we the. guests, and i t would 
t h e r e f o r e be more n a t u r a l f o r them 
to issue the i n v i t a t i o n . We here, 
too, should have our d i f f i c u l t i e s ; 
about making the f i r s t move, and 
we should much p r e f e r t h a t the 
I t a l i a n Government should simply 
issue an i n v i t a t i o n . . . . " (3) 
I n the event o f I t a l y r e f u s i n g t o take t h i s course 
o f a c t i o n , B r i t a i n was prepared to compromise, and 
H a l i f a x had a second suggestion which v i s u a l i s e d 
an announcement t o the e f f e c t that a t Munich Mussolini 
had informed Chamberlain t h a t he would look forward 
t o steeing him at Rome and t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r had 
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(4) 
now i n d i c a t e d that a c e r t a i n date would be s u i t a b l e * 
As i t was, t h i s problem was s h o r t - l i v e d . On 
November 26 there appeared i n the American press a 
r e p o r t t h a t Chamberlain was i n t e n d i n g t o v i s i t Rome i n 
(5) 
January 1939. The r e p o r t was repeated i n the B r i t i s h 
press on November 28. This n e c e s s a r i l y obviated the 
need f o r i n i t i a t i v e from e i t h e r I t a l y or B r i t a i n , and 
i n the end i t was decided t h a t both governments should 
simply o u b l i s h an announcement i n the press on December 
(6) 
4 g i v i n g the dates of the proposed v i s i t . By t h i s 
time emphasis was being put on the character t h a t the 
v i s i t should assume. The B r i t i s h view was t h a t i t 
should be: 
"...less an A n g l o - I t a l i a n conference than 
a v i s i t o f courtesy and g o o d w i l l w i t h 
the o b j e c t o f e s t a b l i s h i n g personal 
contacts." (7) 
As such there would be no need f o r a f i x e d agenda, 
something which might arouse suspicion i n the I t a l i a n 
mind as t o the i n t e n t i o n o f the v i s i t . Moreover, the 
absence o f a f i x e d agenda would be convenient t o 
Chamberlain i n the p u r s u i t o f h i s personal diplomacy 
i n t h a t he would be able t o f o l l o w such l i n e s o f 
approach t o the I t a l i a n s as would seem to him t o be 
appropriate at the time. . 
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The press leakage over the Rome v i s i t was a s l i g h t 
embarrassment t o B r i t a i n where France was concerned. 
The B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n had made no mention o f the 
intended v i s i t a t the Anglo-French conversations j u s t 
h e l d a t the Quai d'Qrsay. H a l i f a x t h e r e f o r e h u r r i e d l y 
telephoned Phipps at Paris i n s t r u c t i n g him t o contact 
the French government immediately to the e f f e c t t h a t 
the idea o f Chamberlain's going to Rome had been 
under discussion w i t h the I t a l i a n s but t h a t the f a c t 
was not mentioned at the recent t a l k s because no f i n a l 
(8) 
d e c i s i o n on t h e matter had been reached. I t was 
possible t h a t the French government might have c e r t a i n 
qualms about t h i s B r i t i s h proposal i n view of the harsh 
treatment France was r e c e i v i n g a t the hands o f the 
I t a l i a n press b u t , on the other hand, i t could always 
be asserted t h a t any improvement i n A n g l o - I t a l i a n 
r e l a t i o n s e n t e r t a i n e d the prospect o f promoting a 
detente between Rome and Pa r i s , a hope already h e l d i n 
(9) 
France. The absence o f any evidence i n the published 
documents o f any serious o b j e c t i o n from France to the 
proposed v i s i t suggests t h a t Paris h e l d t o the l a t t e r 
view. 155. 
The matter o f F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s was soon 
to assume much greater proportions i n the sphere o f 
European diplomacy and was t o have serious repercussions 
on B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y towards I t a l y . I n the middle o f 
November France and I t a l y had seemed t o move s l i g h t l y 
i n the d i r e c t i o n o f f r i e n d s h i p . France had r e -
appointed an ambassador to Rome (thereby recognising 
I t a l y ' s empire) and I t a l y had arranged f o r the r e t u r n 
o f ten thousand volunteers from Spain - a favourable 
circumstance i n view o f the i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s 
between Paris and London. I t was unfortunate t h a t 
the new French ambassador, Francois-Poneet, a r r i v e d i n 
Rome on the very day t h a t von Rath was murdered i n 
P a r i s , and i t was also a bad omen. Mussolini gave 
h i s approval to the a n t i - s e m i t i c p o l i c y being a c t i v a t e d 
by H i t l e r and Francois-Poneetfs f i r s t - i n t e r v i e w w i t h 
Ciano was d i s t i n g u i s h e d only by the lack o f headway 
(10) 
made. Despite France's w i l l i n g n e s s t o respect the 
axis and t o promote a rapprochement i n the most 
u s e f u l ways I t a l y could merely p o i n t t o Spain and 
complain t h a t no progress was pos s i b l e u n t i l t h a t 
b o i l i n g pot had cooled down. I t was the same s t o r y 
when Francois-Poneet saw Mussolini and Ciano on the 
29th. 
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"...the Ambassador found...that i t 
was not l i k e l y t h a t I t a l y would be 
ready t o discuss any other questions 
u n t i l a s o l u t i o n o f the Spanish 
problem had been found." (11) 
(12) 
The t r u t h , as has already been noted, was t h a t 
I t a l y was awai t i n g the r i g h t moment t o b r i n g i n t o 
the open a series o f claims against French t e r r i t o r i a l 
possessions. Well might Mussolini t e l l Francois-
(13) 
Poncet t h a t 'events must be awaited'. 
The bomb b u r s t the very next day. I t .was detonated 
by Ciano i n a speech he d e l i v e r e d t h a t afternoon i n 
the N a t i o n a l Assembly. Speaking o f I t a l y ' s desires 
to c o n s o l i d a t e , he s a i d : 
"This c o n s o l i d a t i o n i s the highest goal 
of our p o l i c y , and we w i l l move towards 
i t w i t h t e n a c i t y and realism, not un-
accompanied by t h a t circumspection which 
i s indispensable when one aims at safe-
guarding w i t h . i n f l e x i b l e firmness the 
i n t e r e s t s and n a t u r a l a s p i r a t i o n s o f the 
I t a l i a n people."(14) 
This was immediately greeted w i t h shouts of 'Tunis', 
' D j i b u t i ' , 'Corsica' - a suspicious demonstration i n 
a s t a t e subject to t o t a l i t a r i a n d i s c i p l i n e - and the 
campaign against France had been launched. Throughout 
December the atmosphere between Rome and Paris 
worsened, and was the one f a c t o r which n e a r l y 
jeopardised the Rome v i s i t . 
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Presumably i n the hope t h a t t h i s i n c i d e n t d u r i n g 
Ciano's speech would not have any serious repercussions, 
Perth made l i g h t o f i t i n h i s r e p o r t to H a l i f a x 
c l a i m i n g t h a t the shouts 'were not d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e • 
(15) 
from the Diplomatic Gallery 1. This wa3 p l a i n l y 
(16) 
not the case, and the press was f u l l o f the s t o r y 
on the f o l l o w i n g day m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t the demonstra-
t i o n had been d e l i b e r a t e l y planned, H a l i f a x demanded 
(17) 
f u r t h e r observations on the matter from Perth 
who was s t i l l able to d i m i n i s h i t s importance, 
f o r fear o f i t s e f f e c t s on A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s . 
He claimed t h a t the i n t e n t i o n o f the demonstration 
was to strengthen I t a l y ' s bargaining p o s i t i o n v i s 
a v i s France and t h a t i t had been prolonged because 
most of the deputies thought Ciano had f i n i s h e d h i s 
(18) 
speech. For t h e f i r s t couple o f days France, i n 
f a c t , was not too upset about the demonstration. 
Phipps reported t h a t the French m i n i s t e r f o r f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s d i d 'not take too t r a g i c a l l y the unfortunate 
(19) 
demonstration i n the I t a l i a n Chamber'. 
Greater a n x i e t y was shown, however, a f t e r Francois-
Poncet had conferred w i t h Ciano on the evening o f the 
2nd. Ciano states t h a t during the i n t e r v i e w 
•Poncet was anxious to give the conversation a 
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c o r d i a l note and t o exclude from h i s demarche anything 
(20) 
i n t h e nature o f a p r o t e s t 1 . By the time he l e f t and 
Ciano had made i t c l e a r how t h i n g s stood, Poncet 'was 
(21) 
as w h i t e as a sheet' v ' f o r he had v i r t u a l l y been 
t o l d t h a t I t a l y was renouncing the Mussolini-Laval 
agreement o f 1935 which had defined the i n t e r e s t s 
o f the two countries i n A f r i c a , On the same evening, 
the French ambassador i n London c a l l e d a t the B r i t i s h 
f o r e i g n o f f i c e w i t h the i n f o r m a t i o n that France con-
sidered t h a t 'such a demonstration i n the presence o f 
a French Ambassador aimed against the i n t e g r i t y o f 
France was a serious i n c i d e n t 1 and t h a t 'Count Ciano's 
f a i l u r e to i n d i c a t e disapproval or to disavour i t . 
(22) 
made i t a l l t h e more serious'. ' 
I n view of t h i s French a t t i t u d e B r i t a i n could not 
pass by on the other side. On the f o l l o w i n g day 
i n s t r u c t i o n s were sent t o Perth to communicate to Ciano, 
w i t h reference t o the demonstration: 
"the f e a r of His Majesty's Government t h a t 
events of t h i s k i n d , i f the I t a l i a n Govern-
ment take no step t o c o r r e c t the impression 
created by them, are bound t o have a most 
d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on the prospect of 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n between the four Munich powers."(23) 
This change i n the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
marked by the d i f f e r e n t stands adopted by Perth i n 
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conversation w i t h Ciano on two occasions on the 3rd. 
I n the morning i n t e r v i e w (before the above orders from 
the f o r e i g n o f f i c e had been received) Perth ' r e f r a i n e d 
from commenting' on a statement made by the I t a l i a n 
f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t the demonstration 
(24) 
had not been organised. I n the evening, however, 
when Perth d e l i v e r e d the B r i t i s h government's o f f i c i a l 
view the demonstration had now become a f a c t o r i n 
(25) 
A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s . 
The f a c t t h a t the I t a l i a n government took no 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y whatever f o r the demonstration d i d 
nothing to a l l e v i a t e the s i t u a t i o n f o r i n a t o t a l i t a r i a n 
s t a t e such manifestations o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n could 
e a s i l y be squashed i f they ran c o n t r a r y to government 
opinion. The whole issue might have blown over had 
i t not been f o l l o w e d by a campaign i n the Fa s c i s t 
press which went f a r t o confirm the misgivings 
aroused by the i n c i d e n t . There was l i t t l e chance 
o f success f o r Perth's continued p o l i c y o f p l a y i n g 
down the demonstration: 
" I f e e l the French are i n c l i n e d to over-
dramatise t h e whole a f f a i r and t h a t i t 
would be much wiser on t h e i r p a r t and 
on ours now t o l e t i t sleep."(26) 
The I t a l i a n s had no i n t e n t i o n o f l e t t i n g the matter 
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drop f o r they were 'keeping the controversy a l i v e 
(27) 
d e l i b e r a t e l y ' . This i n e v i t a b l y heightened Prance's 
fears which i n t u r n l e d to a s t i f f e n i n g o f the B r i t i s h 
a t t i t u d e . 
The extent o f French r e a c t i o n was revealed t o 
Perth by Francois-Poncet on December 4. The French 
ambassador's t h e s i s contained two main p o i n t s . 
F i r s t l y t h a t on November 30 the I t a l i a n government 
had ' f i n a l l y unmasked t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t i o n s ' and 
secondly, t h a t i n so doing they had hoped to create 
f r i c t i o n i n the Anglo-French entente: 
"He thought t h a t the I t a l i a n s hoped t h a t 
Great B r i t a i n might a t t a c h more impor-
tance to A n g l o - I t a l i a n f r i e n d s h i p than 
t o her entente w i t h France, and t h a t 
Tunis would be used as a t e s t case."(28) 
(29) 
Perth considered t h i s 'an a l a r m i s t view' but 
nevertheless B r i t a i n was faced w i t h a request from 
France to a s s i s t i n preventing t h i s I t a l i a n game by 
showing: 
"...very c l e a r l y at an e a r l y stage t h a t 
she stood a b s o l u t e l y by France, and 
t h a t she was not prepared to see any 
a l t e r a t i o n i n the Mediterranean status 
quo." (30) 
This request was received i n London on 
December 12 and on the f o l l o w i n g day i t was repeated 
(31) 
t h i s time coming from f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r Bonnet. 
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Chamberlain h i m s e l f had l a r g e l y p r e c i p i t a t e d t h i s 
second request, f o r i n the Commons on December 12 
he had, i n r e p l y to a question, given a col d f a c t u a l 
assessment of B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h France: 
"There i s no t r e a t y or pact w i t h France 
which contains any s p e c i f i c requirement 
t h a t Great B r i t a i n 3hould render m i l i -
t a r y assistance to her should " I t a l y 
embark on w a r - l i k e operations against 
France or her possessions."(32) 
While Bonnet could not r e f u t e t h i s s i t u a t i o n he 
was w o r r i e d t h a t such an announcement a t t h i s time 
of 'unreasonable State o f I t a l i a n f e e l i n g 1 might 
encourage extremist a c t i v i t y i n I t a l y against France. 
Chamberlain was due to speak on the evening o f ..the 13th 
t o the f o r e i g n press a s s o c i a t i o n and i t was there 
•that Bonnet hoped Chamberlain would 'make some 
s u i t a b l e reference t o the Status quo clause i n the 
(33) 
A n g l o - I t a l i a n Agreement'. 
Chamberlain demured from t a k i n g so d e f i n i t e a 
(34) 
l i n e w i t h I t a l y i n p u b l i c • He d i d , however, q u i c k l y 
amend h i s speech t o minimise the e f f e c t s o f h i s 
previous statement on I t a l y . B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h France, he maintained, passed beyond mere 
l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s , since they were founded on 
i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r e s t . ^ 3 5 ^ 
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This appeasement-minded compromise which went a 
good way to meeting Bonnet's request w h i l e not p u b l i c l y 
embarrassing A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s , was s a t i s f a c t o r y 
to the French. On the next day Bonnet took advantage 
of t h i s B r i t i s h expression by announcing i n the Chamber 
t h a t B r i t a i n could r e l y on French m i l i t a r y support i n 
the event o f her being the subject o f unprovoked 
(36) 
aggression. 
B r i t i s h diplomacy was s t i l l faced w i t h the task 
o f t a k i n g o f f i c i a l a c t i o n on Francois-Poneet's o r i g i n a l 
request dated December 5. Since t h a t date the a n t i -
French character o f the I t a l i a n press had continued 
a t f u l l b l a s t , being answered i n k i n d by France. 
Demonstrations i n each country against the other were 
(37) 
becoming more frequent. Genuine cause f o r un-
easiness was being given to the B r i t i s h by the s i t u a t i o n 
because o f the r e f l e c t i o n i t threw upon the r e c e n t l y 
(38) 
r a t i f i e d agreement w i t h I t a l y . One o f the foremost 
o f i t s p r o v i s i o n s was t h a t I t a l y renounced any i n t e n t i o n 
o f d i s t u r b i n g the s t a t u s quo i n Mediterranean 
countries.* While Ciano could reasonably s t a t e t h a t 
no p a r t o f h i s November speech could be i n t e r p r e t e d 
as gibing.* s p e c i f i c a l l y against t h i s p r o v i s i o n the 163 
general r e a c t i o n i n I t a l y and the i n a c t i v i t y o f the 
I t a l i a n government i n the face o f t h i s r e a c t i o n , 
c e r t a i n l y suggested as much. Hence the B r i t i s h had 
n o t only to consider t h e i r p o s i t i o n w i t h reference 
to Prance i n phrasing a demarche to I t a l y , but also 
to take i n t o account the e f f e c t which had been made 
by the events o f these t e n days on A n g l o - I t a l i a n 
r e l a t i o n s separately. 
The o f f i c i a l l i n e adopted w i t h I t a l y was 
contained i n a l e t t e r from S i r A r t h u r Cadogan t o the 
E a r l o f Perth on December 12, g i v i n g Chamberlain's 
(39) 
d e c i s i o n on the s u b j e c t . The l e t t e r i t s e l f was 
s t r o n g l y worded but as i t was up to Perth t o convey 
the 3ense o f i t r a t h e r than the content, the I t a l i a n s 
(40) 
d i d not f e e l i t s f u l l f o r c e . Chamberlain had taken 
i n t o f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n the e f f e c t t h a t the recent 
anti-Prench p o l i c y o f I t a l y had had on B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y on those sceptics who had 
l a i d no value on the A p r i l Agreement. His p r o j e c t e d 
v i s i t t o Rome was, as a r e s u l t , viewed w i t h g r e a t e r 
apprehension and he now f e l t 'considerable d i f f i c u l t y " 
about the idea. The f i n a l paragraph o f the l e t t e r 
contained a sombre warning amounting t o l i t t l e less 
than an ultimatum: 164. 
" i f t h i n g s do not improve, i t w i l l be 
very d i f f i c u l t f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r 
t o come to Rome: i f they get worse, 
i t w i l l probably be impossible f o r 
him to do so." (41) 
Such a l i n e was des i r a b l e f o r two main reasons. 
F i r s t l y , t o emphasise to I t a l y t h a t B r i t i s h desires 
f o r f r i e n d l y discussions were no s i g n o f weakness; 
t h a t the entente w i t h France was the backbone o f 
B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y as much as the axis was t o I t a l y ' s , 
and t h a t i t would never be put i n jeopardy. Secondly, 
to make the French f e e l happier. The e f f e c t o f the 
I t a l i a n campaign on French p u b l i c o p i n i o n had been 
deep and throughout the country there were expressions 
o f determination not t o y i e l d an inch o f French 
(42) 
t e r r i t o r y . This i n e v i t a b l y turned F r e n c h - a t t e n t i o n 
towards B r i t a i n , f o r the fea r t h a t I t a l y was t r y i n g to 
d i v i d e t he entente was keenly f e l t , there being no 
counterpart i n France t o ^ t h e A n g l o - I t a l i a n Agreement. 
With France i n such a frame o f mind the p r o j e c t e d 
A n g l o - I t a l i a n t a l k s were viewed w i t h understandable 
(43) 
s u s p i c i o n , making the immediate and earnest aim o f 
Chamberlain's p o l i c y a po s s i b l e bone o f cont e n t i o n 
w i t h h i s c l o s e s t a l l y . A s i g n o f s t r e n g t h from 
B r i t a i n and s o l i d a r i t y w i t h France was thus supplied 
as an e f f e c t i v e remedy t o these two i l l s . 
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As f a r as the broad l i n e s o f Chamberlain's p o l i c y 
f o r Europe were concerned i t was i r o n i c a l t h a t a t the 
time when Prance and Germany had l a i d a f i r m foundation 
to t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p by the s i g n i n g o f the Franco-
German d e c l a r a t i o n on December 6 d i s r u p t i o n s should 
occur between Paris and Rome. A d i f f i c u l t European 
s i t u a t i o n had now evolved i n t h a t while A n g l o - I t a l i a n 
and Franco-German r e l a t i o n s h e l d reasonable hope f o r 
the f u t u r e , these advantages were being counter-
balanced by embarrassment i n F r a n c o - I t a l i a n and Anglo-
German diplomacy. I n these circumstances Chamberlain's 
co n c e n t r a t i o n on Rome, i f attended w i t h undue specu-
l a t i o n , was c e r t a i n l y l o g i c a l . Enough has already 
been s a i d about h i s way to Germany being routed v i a 
I t a l y , But such a p o l i c y might also r e s u l t i n an 
am e l i o r a t i o n o f the I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e t o France 
e s p e c i a l l y as the s o l i d a r i t y o f the entente had been 
emphasised* 
For the time being i t was necessary to n u r t u r e 
the proposed Rome v i s i t w i t h a l l the care i t m erited 
and to keep France as contented as possible about i t , 
This was not going t o be easy f o r the French, as Phipps 
to&d H a l i f a x i n a review o f t h e i r a t t i t u d e to I t a l y , 
(44) 
had a p a r t i c u l a r l y low op i n i o n o f t h e i r L a t i n s i s t e r . 
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And the s i t u a t i o n was t o get even worse when, on 
December 17, the I t a l i a n government informed Prance 
t h a t they no longer regarded the F r a n c o - I t a l i a n 
Agreements o f 1935 concerning t h e i r mutual i n t e r e s t s 
(45) 
i n A f r i c a as being i n f o r c e . Ciano had i n t i m a t e d 
as much to Prancois-Poncet a f o r t n i g h t e a r l i e r but now 
i t was o f f i c i a l I t a l i a n p o l i c y . The French r e p l y to 
t h i s a c t i o n consisted s o l e l y i n acknowledging r e c e i p t 
o f the I t a l i a n note and r e f u t i n g i t s contentions; so 
deep was France's resentment a t I t a l y ' s recent behaviour 
t h a t no suggestion f o r the r e v i s i o n o f the Agreements 
(46) 
was included* 
With Chamberlain's journey to Rome now only two 
weeks o f f , B r i t a i n began to f e e l more keenly the 
apprehensions t h a t France h e l d . On the evening o f the 
26th. Bonnet recounted t o Phipps France's a n x i e t y 
over the I t a l i a n demeanour. He stressed how e s s e n t i a l 
i t was t h a t B r i t a i n , i n her dealings w i t h I t a l y should 
i n no way 'encourage Signor Mussolini t o hope f o r any 
concessions from France even o f a n o n - t e r r i t o r i a l 
(47) 
n a t u r e 1 . He also made i t c l e a r t h a t ' i n the 
poisoned atmosphere o f shameless b l a c k m a i l created by 
I t a l y ' , i t would be 1dangerous 0•.even to h i n t a t the 
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p o s s i b i l i t y o f some v o l u n t a r y concessions by Prance', 
The p o s i t i o n t h a t such requests put Chamberlain i n 
w i t h reference to the I t a l i a n v i s i t was extremely 
d i f f i c u l t y There were two d i s t i n c t dangers which the 
French understood only too w e l l . One was t h a t 
Chamberlain, i n p l a y i n g down t h e F r a n c o - I t a l i a n dispute, 
might give Mussolini t h e impression t h a t B r i t a i n was 
almost d i s i n t e r e s t e d . T he other was the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t Mussolini might t h r e a t e n immediate h o s t i l i t i e s 
against France unless the B r i t i s h government intervened 
to b r i n g pressure on France t o make t i m e l y concessions 
(43) 
t o t he I t a l i a n a p p e t i t e . I n view o f the d e l i c a t e 
nature o f the s i t u a t i o n Bonnet was concerned to maintain 
the c l o s e s t c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n up to January 11, 
and i t was only sensible f o r Chamberlain t o a l l e v i a t e 
French p e r t u r b a t i o n by pandering to such wishes, 
December g e n e r a l l y had witnessed a much cl o s e r 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n between London and Paris than had 
e x i s t e d before the conversations o f l a t e November, 
C hamberlain was concerned t h a t t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f 
Anglo-French dealings i n Europe should be maintained, 
but i t seems t h a t he wanted t o ju g g l e w i t h i t s 
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appearance as i t s u i t e d h i s p o l i c y e He had c l e a r l y 
r e f r a i n e d from c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the French over h i s 
proposed v i s i t u n t i l he had been forced to do so. 
This i s contrasted "by the w i l l i n g n e s s o f Paris to 
inform London of each step towards the Franco-German 
De c l a r a t i o n . Also at the time o f Ribbentrop's 
v i s i t to France t o sign the agreement the B r i t i s h 
f o r e i g n o f f i c e was i n r e c e i p t o f d a i l y records o f the 
s i g n i f i c a n t Franco-German conversations. The essence 
of t h i s Anglo-French "behaviour l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t 
both p a r t i e s were r e a c t i n g to each other e x a c t l y i n 
accordance w i t h t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p at the time. France, threatened by 
aggressive signs from I t a l y wanted to strengthen her 
p o s i t i o n by promoting c l o s e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s w i t h her own. B r i t a i n , on t h e other hand, 
dubious o f the i n f l u e n c e such close contact might have 
on her immediate r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h I t a l y and u l t i m a t e 
success w i t h Germany was wary o f responding too 
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y t o the French i n i t i a t i v e . There can 
be no doubt t h a t Chamberlain's s e n s i t i v i t y over the 
Rome v i s i t i n view of the F r a n c o - I t a l i a n dispute 
allowed him to take f u l l advantage o f B r i t a i n ' s 
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dominant r o l e i n the Anglo-French f r i e n d s h i p . I t 
was to "be several weeks before increased t e n s i o n i n 
the European drama brought a more welcoming a t t i t u d e 
from B r i t a i n towards her neighbour. For the time 
being appearances were maintained towards France 
w h i l e r e l a t i o n s w i t h I t a l y were dependent upon the 
outcome o f the January t a l k s . 
As 1938 closed p u b l i c support f o r Chamberlain 
at home was s t i l l running f a i r l y h i g h and he s t i l l 
b e l i e v e d he alone could p r e v a i l w i t h H i t l e r . That 
h i s own confidence i n the Tightness of h i s p o l i c y 
had not s u f f e r e d any relapse i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
f a c t t h a t the Christmas cards he and Mrs. Chamberlain 
sent out c a r r i e d a p i c t u r e o f h i s plane f l y i n g over 
(49) 
a cloud bank on the way to Munich. At the end o f 
December Lloyd's were l a y i n g odds o f 32-1 against 
B r i t a i n becoming in v o l v e d i n war before December 
(50) 
1939, a p r i c e which seems to r e f l e c t the t r u s t 
i n which Chamberlain was g e n e r a l l y h e l d by. h i s people. 
I t also r e f l e c t s , however, the f a c t t h a t war was s t i l l 
i n t h a t people's minds. I f t h i s was the legacy o f 
the f i r s t three months a f t e r Munich the next three were 
g r e a t l y t o increase t h i s spectre o f war. 
170. 
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Chapter seven 
New Year and New Fear 
The new year came i n w i t h o p t i m i s t i c tones f o r 
European diplomacy i n 1939 from both London and B e r l i n . 
H i t l e r i n h i s proclamation to the German people, 
having stressed h i s b e l i e f i n the axis as 'a c l e a r 
and i n v i o l a b l e ' element i n German f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
expressed a desire f o r the maintenance o f general 
peace: 
"For the r e s t , we have always one wish, 
t h a t i n the coming year, too, we may 
succeed i n c o n t r i b u t i n g to the general 
p a c i f i c a t i o n o f the world." (1) 
While H i t l e r t r i e d t o persuade Europe t h a t h i s ide a l s 
were h a p p i l y b e t r o t h e d t o the B r i t i s h p o l i c y o f 
appeasement, Chamberlain was t r y i n g t o convince 
Europe t h a t t h i s p o l i c y had already made commendable 
progress. He s t a t e d i n h i s new year's message that.: 
"No one would have dared to prophecy t h a t 
the f o u r great European nations would 
have advanced so f a r along the road to 
c o n c i l i a t i o n . " ( 2 ) 
Neither statement r e f l e c t e d the s t a t e o f a f f a i r s 
i n Europe very acc u r a t e l y . H i t l e r was planning the 
absorption o f the remainder of Czechoslovakia i n t o 
(3) 
the Reich and Chamberlain's p o l i c y had f a i l e d so 
f a r t o b r i n g any r e a l s e c u r i t y to Europe. One can 
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only say t h a t Chamberlain b e l i e v e d , however 
mistakenly, what he was saying, w h i l e H i t l e r was 
d e l i b e r a t e l y deceiving h i s l i s t e n e r s . 
Tension i n F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s had not 
diminished the prospect i n Chamberlain's eyes o f 
success through the Rome conversations and he seemed 
undaunted by the f a c t t h a t he would be t r y i n g t o 
s t a b i l i s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the power t h a t was openly 
t h r e a t e n i n g h i s c l o s e s t a l l y . The Rome v i s i t , 
only a week and a h a l f away, now dominated B r i t i s h 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . These days were marked by frequent 
exchanges between the B r i t i s h and French governments 
on the a t t i t u d e Chamberlain and H a l i f a x should adopt 
towards Mussolini concerning, e s p e c i a l l y , Franco-
(4) 
I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s . B r i e f , i n f o r m a l t a l k s between 
the heads o f the two governments, on the request o f 
(5) 
the B r i t i s h , were held i n Paris on the 10th. and 
these seem t o have a l l a y e d any French fears over 
the B r i t i s h mission. Such a degree o f c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
was no doubt valuable f o r B r i t a i n i n assessing the 
exact mood o f France, but the honesty o f Chamberlain 
towards France can be put i n question. I t seems t h a t 
he was more concerned to p a c i f y and reassure h i s a l l y 
than genuinely make preparations f o r presenting a 
174. 
u n i t e d f r o n t t o M u s s o l i n i . Chamberlain's demeanour 
at the I t a l i a n t a l k s c e r t a i n l y bears t h i s out. 
The main concern o f the B r i t i s h representatives 
at Rome was t o improve the A n g l o - I t a l i a n s i t u a t i o n 
i n the l i g h t o f the German o f f e n s i v e atmosphere as 
revealed over the past weeks. I n t h i s Chamberlain 
b e l i e v e d he met w i t h success. A f t e r r e t u r n i n g t o 
London he wrote: 
" I may say a t once t h a t I consider I have 
achieved a l l I expected t o get, and more, 
and t h a t I am s a t i s f i e d t h a t the journey 
has d e f i n i t e l y strengthened the chances 
of peace." (6) 
Amery, a constant c r i t i c o f appeasement thought t h a t 
the v i s i t f a r ' from being successful, was d i s a s t r o u s , 
and h i s v e r d i c t on the t a l k s i s nearer the t r u t h than 
Chamberlain's: 
"Their v i s i t c e r t a i n l y marked, so f a r as 
Mussolini was concerned, the q u i e t 
\ m r i a l o f t h a t attempt t o win him over 
to which Chamberlain had devoted the 
l a s t two years."(7) 
Chamberlain's glowing v e r d i c t on the t a l k s was f u r t h e r 
expression o f t h a t f a l s e optimism t o v/hich he was 
"becoming prone. I t i s possible t h a t he was unduly 
i n f l u e n c e d by the e n t h u s i a s t i c welcome he received 
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from the I t a l i a n people who, suspicious o f t h e i r 
leader's i n c r e a s i n g i n c l i n a t i o n towards B e r l i n , were 
gla d o f the o p p o r t u n i t y to demonstrate t h e i r desire 
f o r peace. Such a welcome no doubt confirmed 
Chamberlain i n h i s b e l i e f t h a t the f e e l i n g s o f the 
peoples i n the d i c t a t o r states was a peace p o t e n t i a l 
a s s i s t i n g him i n h i s search f o r appeasement. 
I t was no i n t e n t i o n of Mussolini t h a t the B r i t i s h 
r epresentatives should be warmly received. Ciano 
recorded t h a t Chamberlain should be given 'a not too 
(8) 
e n t h u s i a s t i c welcome'. The I t a l i a n leaders were 
i n f a c t , almost contemptuous o f 'the o l d man w i t h t h e 
(9) 
u m b r e l l a 1 . Mussolini h i m s e l f s t a t e d * 
"These men are not made o f the same 
s t u f f as the Francis Drakes and the 
other magnificent adventurers who 
created the empire. These, a f t e r 
a l l , are the t i r e d sons o f a long 
l i n e o f r i c h men, and they w i l l lose 
t h e i r empire."(10) 
I t has even been suggested t h a t M u s s o l i n i was so 
devoid o f i n t e r e s t i n the B r i t i s h v i s i t t h a t on the 
f i n a l day he went s k i i n g r a t h e r than f u l f i l l h i s 
( I D 
duties as host at the f a r e w e l l banquet. 
The above scathing judgement by Mussolini was 
conditioned, i r o n i c a l l y enough, by the readiness 
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shown by the B r i t i s h to make s a c r i f i c e s i n the name 
of peace. This willingness to compromise, a basic 
element i n Chamberlain's policy, was, i n the Duce's 
©yes, proof of weakness, Ciano was convinced that 
(12) 
B r i t a i n would 'never go to war*. The I t a l i a n 
leaders respected strength and despised weakness. 
I f they had been holding back from any committment 
to a direct a l l i a n c e with the Germans, the fainthearted-
ness of the B r i t i s h at these talk s l e f t them i n no 
doubt that hesi t a t i o n had been unnecessary: 
"German rearmament weighs on them l i k e 
lead. They would be ready for any 
s a c r i f i c e i f they oould see the future 
c l e a r l y . This sombre preoccupation 
of theirs has convinced me more and 
more of the necessity for the Triple 
Alliance. "(13) 
There was more hope for the r e a l i s a t i o n of I t a l y ' s 
ambitions i n a l l i a n c e with a strong Germany than i n 
i n c l i n i n g towards the p o l i c i e s of a seemingly timid B r i t a i n . 
The emphasis of B r i t a i n on peace and goodwill had had the 
eff e c t of driving the I t a l i a n s deeper into the German 
camp. Chamberlain's v e i l e d attempt to detach I t a l y 
from Germany had accelerated the very process i t had 
t r i e d to h a l t . I n t h i s respect then, the talk s 
were a dismal f a i l u r e . As Ciano wrote 'Effective 
oontact has not been made': 'the whole 
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(15) 
v i s i t was 'a "big lemonade 1. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see where Chamberlain thought 
he had triumphed. I t has been shown t h a t no progress 
was made i n A n g l o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s . Because the 
v i s i t was a f a i l u r e i n t h a t respect i t was t h e r e f o r e 
also unsuccessful i n f i n d i n g an aporoach t o H i t l e r , 
(16) 
a hope which Chamberlain had dearly cherished. He 
had now had h i s 'hour or two t e t e a t e t e w i t h Musso' 
and i t had s i g n a l l y f a i l e d to b r i n g London and B e r l i n 
any c l o s e r together. The t a l k s had i n f a c t been 
l i t t l e more than a depressing resume o f a deplorable 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , and so many suspicions and 
grievances were expressed, so many v e i l e d and uncommitted 
answers given, t h a t they had served only t o increase 
I t a l i a n contempt f o r B r i t a i n and t o lead Europe f u r t h e r 
from the goa l of e v e r - l a s t i n g peace. 
The one small scrap o f hope i n which Chamberlain 
presumably invested so much importance was Mussolini's 
assurance t h a t he intended to stand by I t a l y ' s 
agreement w i t h Great B r i t a i n and t h a t he wanted peace 
(17) 
and would use h i s i n f l u e n c e t o get i t . Mussolini 
also expressed h i s confidence i n H i t l e r ' s p a c i f i c 
i n t e n t i o n s and i n the s i n c e r i t y w i t h which he professed 
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to d e sire the annexation only o f pure l y German 
t e r r i t o r i e s . However, from the outset Mussolini 
made i t c l e a r t h a t there was no crack i n the Axis -
he s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t 'the Berlin-Rome Axis 
(18) 
was an e s s e n t i a l p o i n t of I t a l i a n p o l i c y ' . - but i t 
seemed t h a t I t a l y would stand n e u t r a l i n any Anglo-
German disagreement. The I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e t o Prance, 
however, was s t i l l i c y and u n y i e l d i n g : 
"The great b a r r i e r between Prance and I t a l y 
was the Spanish question, on which they 
took opposite Views, and u n t i l t h a t was 
out o f the way, no n e g o t i a t i o n s would be 
pos s i b l e . " (19) 
and Mussolini declared t h a t he r e q u i r e d no mediation 
or i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h reference t o I t a l y ' s r e l a t i o n s 
i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . 
Evident sources o f c o n f l i c t were avoided, Tunis, 
Nice, D j i b o u t i and the Suez Canal b e i n g ' l e f t unmentioned. 
The B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n Prance was v e i l e d and no 
suggestion o f the stand B r i t a i n might take i n the event 
of s t e r n e r a c t i o n from I t a l y was given: 
"The B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n w i t h regard t o 
Prance was j u s t l i k e t h a t which . 
e x i s t e d between I t a l y and Germany."(20) 
This statement seems t o c o n t a i n some k i n d o f "bargaining 
counter: t h a t B r i t a i n ' s closeness to and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f i n t e r e s t s w i t h Prance would resemble the degree o f 
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c o l l a b o r a t i o n "between I t a l y and Germany, so t h a t i f 
I t a l y wanted to make d e f i n i t e claims against France 
wi t h o u t having to reckon w i t h B r i t a i n she should 
h e r s e l f be less concerned i n the Nazi arena. Such a 
cau t i o n was f u t i l e w i t h Mussolini and Chamberlain 
would have done f a r b e t t e r t o have made i t c l e a r t h a t 
B r i t a i n stood f i r m l y by the side o f France. Bais 
might have made Mussolini t h i n k . A s i g n o f s t r e n g t h 
from B r i t a i n would c e r t a i n l y have impressed him more. 
An important t o p i c broached by Chamberlain was t h a t 
of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee to Czechoslovakia. 
Since the Hungarian and German awards o f November 
t h i s problem had not brought any r e a l t e n s i o n to 
European diplomacy. On November 28 Chamberlain 
assured the Commons t h a t the German plans f o r the 
Vienna-Breslau Autobahn would not a l t e r the Government's 
(21) 
a t t i t u d e t o the Guarantee. Such a statement 
disguised the discomfort which the guarantee was now 
(22) 
causing. Moreover, as has been noted the B r i t i s h 
concept o f the guarantee had changed since i t s i n c e p t i o n , 
and by e a r l y December H a l i f a x had been sounding opini o n 
(23) 
i n several c a p i t a l s . By then Newton was adv i s i n g 
London t h a t Czechoslovakia had: 180. 
"so f a r l o s t her independence t h a t a new 
s i t u a t i o n has a r i s e n which a l t e r s the 
whole basis on which His Majesty's 
Government made t h e i r statement."(24) 
I n any case, he argued, Germany was the only Munich 
power who was p h y s i c a l l y capable of guaranteeing 
Czechoslovakia. On December 21 Weizsackar suggested 
to the Prench ambassador t h a t the whole idea o f a 
four-power guarantee might be f o r g o t t e n and t h a t 
(25) 
the guarantee o f the Reich would alone be s u f f i c i e n t . 
Under these circumstances i t was necessary f o r 
B r i t a i n to e l i c i t Rome's views. At the conversations 
i n January Chamberlain ascertained t h a t Mussolini 
would be prepared t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n a guarantee, but 
on conditions which c l e a r l y ran cont r a r y t o Munich; 
that he was s a t i s f i e d w i t h Czechoslovakia's complete 
n e u t r a l i t y , and t h a t i t possessed a c o n s t i t u t i o n 
(26) 
favourable to h i s views. Such a view could e a s i l y 
be i n t e r p r e t e d as reluctance t o o b s t r u c t the German 
plan to denude Czechoslovakia of a l l semblance o f 
independence and sovereignty. 
Having determined the I t a l i a n p o s i t i o n , B r i t a i n , 
(27) 
unaware o f the nature o f the in t e r v i e w s which had 
taken place between H i t l e r and Chvalkovsky (Czechoslovak 
f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r ) , decided t o approach Germany f o r her 
ideas on the nature the guarantee should, take. H a l i f a x 181 
was e v i d e n t l y not unduly concerned about the matter f o r 
i t was not u n t i l a f o r t n i g h t a f t e r the meeting w i t h 
Mussolini t h a t a d r a f t communication to the German 
government was drawn up and France informed o f the 
• (28) 
B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n . The idea was t h a t B r i t a i n and 
France should make a j o i n t demarche i n B e r l i n . 
Further p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n occurred and i t was not u n t i l 
February 8, nearly f o u r weeks a f t e r the Rome t a l k s , t h a t 
(29) 
p o s i t i v e a c t i o n was a t l a s t taken. I n the meantime 
Troutbeck ( B r i t i s h charge d ' a f f a i r e s i n Prague), had 
received i n f o r m a t i o n from a ' r e l i a b l e ' source t h a t 
Chvalkovsky had probably been subjected t o considerable 
(30) 
pressure during h i s meeting v/ i t h H i t l e r on January 21. 
Such news was c e r t a i n l y i n d i c a t i v e o f Germany wishing 
to regard Czechoslovakia as her own preserve and gave 
l i t t l e hope f o r a s a t i s f a c t o r y German response t o the 
j o i n t Anglo-French demarche. I t was, however, t o be 
nearly another f o u r weeks (March 2) u n t i l Germany 
c l a r i f i e d her p o s i t i o n i n a strongly-worded and 
(31) 
unequivocal r e p l y . 
This B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e t o Germany over the 
guarantee had been the f i r s t (excluding economic dealings) 
t h a t London had taken i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n since the a n t i -
Semitic o u t b u r s t i n Germany e a r l y i n November, 182. 
The l u l l i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s had continued 
through January when suapiciona o f f u r t h e r aggressive 
i n t e n t i o n s on the p a r t o f H i t l e r were heightened. 
Hardly a day passed w i t h o u t o f f i c i a l reference being 
made i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e to the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
German m i l i t a r y a c t i o n being planned f o r an e a r l y 
date, and i t was t o t h i s idea t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y was 
becoming geared. Progress was undoubtedly being made 
i n the Reich's p o l i c y t o create i n England the a n t i -
(32) 
German war psychosis p r e v i o u s l y mentioned. 
Reviewing the p o s i t i o n i n Germany at the beginning 
of January, Ogilvie-Porbes asserted t h a t a c t i o n o f 
some k i n d on the p a r t o f H i t l e r was now c o n f i d e n t l y 
a n t i c i p a t e d : 
"...what can d e f i n i t e l y be sa i d i s t h a t 
there i s i n t h i s country a general 
atmosphere o f apprehension th a t some-
t h i n g grave, i f not disas t r o u s , must 
event u a l l y occur,"(33) ; 
I n e v i t a b l y , , speculations as t o when, and i n what 
d i r e c t i o n t h i s a c t i o n was to be taken, soon began 
to predominate i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e . O g i l v i e -
Porbes could give no s a t i s f a c t o r y i n d i c a t i o n b ut 
thought t h a t H i t l e r , handicapped by the s t r a i n which 
h i s successes t o date had imposed on Germany's 
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economic resources, would "be l i k e l y to make a move 
i n the East, against Roumania or the Ukraine where 
he could 'with comparative ease.,.possess h i m s e l f o f 
(34) 
many of the raw m a t e r i a l s l a c k i n g t o Germany1. 
This r e p o r t contained the sombre r e f l e c t i o n t h a t 
B r i t a i n was pov/erless to prevent H i t l e r from doing 
j u s t as he l i k e d , t h a t B r i t a i n could no longer 'hope 
to be the policeman o f Europe'. I t was also O g i l v i e -
Porbes' considered o p i n i o n t h a t any attempt on t h e p a r t 
of B r i t a i n to r e s t r a i n German a c t i o n i n c e n t r a l Europe 
would only f u r t h e r upset r e l a t i o n s between the two 
c o u n t r i e s . B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y now, he claimed, should 
be d i r e c t e d at keeping h e r s e l f out of any war t h a t 
might be sparked o f f i n the East. The extremity o f 
Ogilvie-Forbes* appeasement i s f u l l y revealed i n t h i s 
document. . Most o f the suggestions he made w i t h 
reference to B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y at t h i s time were 
of a negative nature. I n f a c t , f a r from advising any 
p o s i t i v e a c t i o n t o preserve peace i n Europe he was now 
mainly concerned t o see t h a t C hamberlain kept B r i t a i n 
out o f war 'by f a c i n g the issue c l e a r l y and i n good 
time t h a t we cannot guarantee the status quo i n Central 
and Eastern Europe 1. His sole p o s i t i v e suggestion 
184. 
f o r B r i t i s h p o l i c y (aimed a t avoiding any involvement 
i n war) was t h a t a l l e f f o r t should be exerted: 
" . . . t o c u l t i v a t e and maintain good r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h F i e l d Marshall Gdring and the moderate 
Nazis w i t h a view t o t h e i r e x e r c i s i n g a 
r e s t r a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e on the ex t r e m i s t s . • • 
who at present have the ear o f H i t l e r . " ( 3 5 ) 
Such was the enticement t o Chamberlain e a r l y i n the 
new year t o r e v i v e h i s p o l i c y of appeasing Germany. 
Towards the end o f January the more dangerous 
a l t e r n a t i v e of H i t l e r ' s became the centre o f a t t e n t i o n ; 
t h a t he might provoke t r o u b l e i n the West. Frequent 
rumours and re p o r t s seemed t o give substance to t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y . A- minute by Strang on the 17th contained 
the suggestion derived from P o l i s h sources, t h a t 
H a l i f a x was i n s t r u c t i n g Bland, B r i t i s h Ambassador i n 
the Hague, t o determine the a t t i t u d e o f the Netherlands 
government to the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a German invas i o n o f 
(37) 
Holland, a f u r t h e r idea t h a t had been put forward. 
The same day brought news from Ogilvie-Forbes which 
he described as 'sensational' t o the e f f e c t t h a t a 
B r i t i s h member o f the Anglo-German Fellowship had 
received c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n from a r e l i a b l e 
source t h a t i n March H i t l e r was i n t e n d i n g t o break out 
Westwards through the Low Countries and Switzerland i f 
(38) 
I t a l y had not received s a t i s f a c t i o n from France. 185. 
Just three days a f t e r t h i s r e p o r t , Seeds, B r i t i s h 
Ambassador i n Moscow communicated a f u r t h e r rumour 
to the f o r e i g n o f f i c e m a intaining t h a t t he Memel 
t e r r i t o r y was H i t l e r ' s immediate t a r g e t and t h a t 
(39) 
March 15 was the date* ( I f the l o c a t i o n was wrong, 
the date was s u r p r i s i n g l y accurate). 
I t i s not suggested t h a t such a q u a n t i t y o f 
u n v e r i f i a b l e rumours was met by the B r i t i s h government 
w i t h unmitigated alarm. Par. from i t . The great 
v a r i e t y of suggestions t h a t had been made together 
w i t h the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s t h e r e i n contained n e c e s s a r i l y 
proved th a t most, i f not a l l , must be i l l - f o u n d e d . 
What d i d give r e a l food f o r thought, however, was the 
f a c t t h a t a l l these reports agreed i n f o r e c a s t i n g some 
e a r l y m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y on the p a r t o f H i t l e r . 
" . . . i t i s remarkable t h a t there i s one general 
tendency running through a l l the r e p o r t s , 
and i t i s impossible t o ignore them."(40) 
Such was H a l i f a x ' s conclusion and he was t h e r e f o r e 
concerned to keep an open mind about these rumours. 
"We cannot vouch f o r the r e l i a b i l i t y o f 
any o f these r e p o r t s , but a number of 
them...have l a t e l y begun to come i n , so 
t h a t i t would not be safe t o ignore them 
and His Majesty's Government are c a r e f u l l y 
considering the p o s i t ion."(41) 
186.. 
A d d i t i o n a l credence was given t o the general 
purport o f these rumours by the promotion t o h i g h 
p o s i t i o n i n Germany o f men who s t r o n g l y supported 
H i t l e r , The removal o f moderates such as Schacht 
and Wiedermann t o make way f o r ex t r e m i s t s , was taken 
i n London as symptomatic o f the Puhrer's p r e v a i l i n g . 
(42) 
mood, despite the f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n German sources 
(43) 
t r i e d t o di m i n i s h the importance o f such moves. 
Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e no doubt was the promotion 
of Ribbentrop to the p o s i t i o n o f Reich f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r 
(44) 
on February 4, More i n d i c a t i v e , however, were 
reports on the German m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , H a l i f a x 
received a memorandum on January 21 respecting Germany's 
a i r s u p e r i o r i t y and the p o s s i b i l i t y o f her s t r i k i n g a 
(45) 
blow against the Western powers. During the f o l l o w i n g 
week there came a f u r t h e r r e p o r t from the M i l i t a r y 
Attache c l a i m i n g t h a t the German army was working a t 
(46) 
highest pressure, and Ogilvie-Forbes b e l i e v e d i t 
was ' d e f i n i t e l y preparing f o r p o s s i b l e a c t i o n on a 
(47) 
larg e scale'. On the 31st, the a t t e n t i o n o f the 
f o r e i g n o f f i c e was drawn t o a Czechoslovak o f f i c i a l ' s 
o p i n i o n t h a t Germany was making speedy arrangements 
187. 
f o r a major war and t h a t German orders f o r armaments 
from Skoda were e i t h e r being considered or had already 
(48) 
been placed. There were also ominous reports t o 
the e f f e c t t h a t I t a l y had a l e r t e d approximately 
60,000 s p e c i a l i s t r e s e r v i s t s f o r duty as from February 
(49) 
1 , w h i l e German troop movements had been observed 
(50) 
throughout Czechoslovakia. Added to a l l these 
d i s t u r b i n g signs were c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t Germany 
was i n process o f concluding an agreement w i t h I t a l y 
and Japan which would convert the Anti-Comitern Pact 
(51) 
i n t o a T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . The clouds had c e r t a i n l y 
begun to lower over EuropeJ 
The hypothesis t h a t German a c t i o n would be d i r e c t e d 
westwards increased p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y to the idea t h a t 
H i t l e r d i d not appear t o i n t e n d any d r a s t i c move against 
Danzig or Slovakia, previous t e n s i o n areas. While i t 
was apparent t h a t he was regarding Czechoslovakia more 
and more as a German preserve, h i s methods were those 
(52) 
o f propaganda and i n f i l t r a t i o n and v/ere proving 
successful enough t o obviate the use of f o r c e . S i m i l a r 
l y Danzig d i d not seem t o be t h e t a r g e t f o r m i l i t a r y 
a c t i o n since: 
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"Colonel Beck had received very d e f i n i t e 
assurances from Herr H i t l e r t h a t Germany 
had no i n t e n t i o n o f c o n f r o n t i n g Poland 
w i t h a f a i t accompli."(53) 
This was made known to H a l i f a x on January 25. Pour 
days e a r l i e r the N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t Party organ, the 
Danziger Verposten, had c a r r i e d an a r t i c l e c l a i m i n g 
t h a t the Danzig slogan 'Zuruck zum Reich 1, could not 
(54) 
f o r t h e present he regarded as p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s . 
Thus there were, a l l i n a l l , strong i n d i c a t i o n s 
t h a t Nazi a c t i o n would he aimed Westward. As f a r 
as B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y was concerned t h i s necessi-
t a t e d a r e g u l a r i s a t i o n o f B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n v i s a 
v i s Holland and Switzerland i n the event o f t h e i r 
being attacked by Germany. The less rumoured 
p o s s i b i l i t y , t h a t o f aggression against Switzerland, 
was not o f f i c i a l l y acted upon by the B r i t i s h 
government during January, though H a l i f a x ' s personal 
o p i n i o n , as expressed to M. Corbin, French Ambassador 
(55) 
i n London, was i n d i c a t i v e o f th e o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e 
B r i t a i n was to adopt e a r l y i n February: 
" . . . i f such a German a t t a c k was made on 
Switzerland, i t ought t o be regarded 
as not less o f a d i r e c t challenge t o 
the Western Powers than would be an 
at t a c k on Holland."(56) 
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I t was w i t h reference t o Holland t h a t B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y was mainly concerned and the government gave 
c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the s i t u a t i o n i n the l i g h t 
o f the reports t h a t had come i n . I t bore i n mind two 
main p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; f i r s t l y , t h a t Germany might merely 
p i c k some q u a r r e l w i t h Holland and secondly t h a t she 
might a c t u a l l y invade. I n the event o f t h e former 
contingency a r i s i n g i t was thought t h a t i t would be 
necessary to attempt a quick r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between 
the two p a r t i e s by means o f : 
"a proposal to both Governments f o r 
the s e l e c t i o n by n e u t r a l Governments 
o f a board o f three a r b i t r a t o r s . " ( 5 7 ) 
H a l i f a x had l i t t l e f a i t h i n the l i k e l y e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f 
such a proposal' but the very f a c t o f i t s r e j e c t i o n by 
Germany would c l a r i f y B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n and give her 
•locus s t a n d i f o r appropriate a c t i o n ' . 
The a l t e r n a t i v e prospect o f an unprovoked German 
in v a s i o n o f Holland was viewed by B r i t a i n as a matter 
o f very serious importance. 
"...the s t r a t e g i c a l importance o f Holland 
and her colonies i s so great t h a t i n the 
view o f His Majesty's Government a German 
att a c k on Holland must be regarded as a 
d i r e c t t h r e a t to the s e c u r i t y o f the 
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Western Powers. F a i l u r e t o take up 
such a challenge would place Germany 
i n a p o s i t i o n o f overwhelming predomi-
nance i n Europe, and i n such circumstances 
His Majesty's Government are accordingly 
disposed to t h i n k t h a t they would have 
no choice "but to regard a German i n v a s i o n 
o f Holland as a casus b e l l i assuming t h a t 
Holland r e s i s t e d invasion."(58) 
That Holland would r e s i s t was not i n doubt. Bland, 
from h i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e p o s i t i o n a t the Hague, thought 
(59) 
the Dutch 'would f i g h t l i t e r a l l y t o the l a s t d i t c h ' . 
By the end o f January B r i t a i n ' s hopes f o r a long 
period o f European peace had experienced s h a t t e r i n g 
blows. Von Dirksen, even a t the beginning o f the 
month, recorded h i s b e l i e f t h a t appeasement was a 
vanishing mirage and t h a t Chamberlain was ' f a r t h e r 
now from h i s r e a l goal, the establishment o f Anglo-
German f r i e n d s h i p , than at any time since the Munich 
(60) 
Conference'. . Much had happened i n the four weeks 
since he wrote those words to make them r i n g even t r u e r . 
The d i s t u r b i n g reports concerning H i t l e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s 
d i d not r e s u l t i n any change i n B r i t a i n ' s basic p o l i c y 
w i t h regard to Europe. The dual p o l i c y o f appeasement 
and rearmament which had been s e r i o u s l y adopted i n 
November, s t i l l a p p l i e d . Gradually, however, the 
emphasis was being switched from the appeasement 
to the rearmament angle i n deference to the l a t e s t 
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motions i n Europe. Speaking to the Birmingham 
Jewellers 1 A s s o c i a t i o n on January 28 Chamberlain 
gave evidence o f t h i s accent on rearmament: 
"Let us then continue to pursue the 
path o f peace and c o n c i l i a t i o n , h ut 
u n t i l we can agree on a general 
l i m i t a t i o n o f arms l e t us continue to 
make t h i s country strong."(61) 
H a l i f a x reviewing general government p o l i c y on January 
24 t o l d Washington t h a t : 
"His Majesty's Government...have decided 
to accelerate as f a r as possible the 
pre p a r a t i o n o f t h e i r defensive and 
counter-offensive measures. I n the 
meantime they are employing such 
methods as are a v a i l a b l e t o them f o r 
b r i n g i n g home t o t h e German people 
the wanto/wess and f o l l y o f embarking 
on aggressive m i l i t a r y adventures."T62) 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t i s not H i t l e r but the 
German people that B r i t a i n would now t r y to i n f l u e n c e 
to peaceful ends, a change symptomatic o f B r i t a i n ' s 
loss o f f a i t h i n H i t l e r , and o f the desperate hope 
th a t h i s hand might y e t be stayed by p a c i f i c sentiments 
on the p a r t o f h i s own.people. The i l l u s i o n t h a t 
H i t l e r could be c a l l e d t o h e e l had now almost completely 
vanished and c o n t i n u i n g attacks on B r i t a i n i n the 
German press during January served to confirm the 
despair w i t h which the Nazis were viewed. 
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I t was the o p i n i o n o f ;0gilvie-Forbes, however, 
t h a t towards the middle o f January t h e r e was a 
considerable d i m i n u t i o n o f outspoken c r i t i c i s m o f 
B r i t a i n i n the German press, and he requested t h a t 
some favourable comment be made i n London concerning 
(63) 
t h i s development. He had e v i d e n t l y shrugged o f f 
h i s melancholy mood o f ea r l y January and was now 
f o l l o w i n g the same k i n d o f appeasement t a c t i c s i n 
B e r l i n as Perth was a t Rome. He i s now eager f o r 
London to do something p o s i t i v e i n an attempt t o 
improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Reich. He suggested 
two possible courses o f a c t i o n . F i r s t l y , a 
dampening o f unnecessary c r i t i c i s m o f Germany i n the 
B r i t i s h press and, secondly, t h a t Chamberlain h i m s e l f 
might make some f r i e n d l y reference t o the improved 
tone o f the German press expressing the hope t h a t 
i t might continue s t i l l f u r t h e r i n the i n t e r e s t s o f 
(64) 
general appeasement. 
The B r i t i s h government's r e a c t i o n to these 
suggestions re v e a l the hardening a t t i t u d e which was 
now being taken towards Germany. This was contained 
i n a l e t t e r from K i r k p a t r i c k i n which he s t a t e d t h a t 
the f o r e i g n o f f i c e would not recommend any government 
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o f f i c i a l to express a p p r e c i a t i o n before i t was 
ascertained t h a t c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s had been given to 
the German press to adopt a b e t t e r tone, and t h a t the 
improvement i n the press r e l a t i o n s was l i k e l y to be 
(65) 
l a s t i n g . I t soon became apparent t h a t the 
improvement was not t o be l a s t i n g . An i n d i c a t i o n 
to t h i s e f f e c t was sent from Warsaw on January 27 when 
Kennard, the B r i t i s h ambassador at t h a t c a p i t a l , 
reported t h a t von Ribbentrop had t h a t day spoken 'with 
considerable b i t t e r n e s s o f the a t t i t u d e o f His Majesty's 
Government which he considered was l a r g e l y responsible 
,(66) 
f o r the present unrest i n Europe. Ogilvie-Porbes 
recharged, optimism had been proved unfounded w i t h i n 
f o r t y - e i g h t hours o f i t s expression. 
The s t i f f e n i n g a t t i t u d e o f B r i t a i n towards Germany 
which was r e l e g a t i n g appeasement t o the p l a i n o f 
f a n c i f u l theory had, i n p a r t , been a s s i s t e d by the 
United States. On January 4 Roosevelt i n a speech to 
Congress had r e f e r r e d t o the e x t e r n a l dangers f a c i n g 
the U.S.A. i n the f o l l o w i n g words: 
"...the world ha3 grown so small and the 
weapons o f a t t a c k so s w i f t t h a t no n a t i o n 
can be safe i n i t s w i l l to peace so long 
as any other s i n g l e powerful n a t i o n 
refuses to s e t t l e i t s grievances a t the 
c o u n c i l t a b l e . " (67) 
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The reference was obviously to Germany and on the 
f o l l o w i n g day Chamberlain issued a statement i n f u l l 
(68) 
support o f the President's observations. I t has 
even been suggested (by von Dirksen) t h a t the 
(69) 
American i n i t i a t i v e a c t u a l l y o r i g i n a t e d w i t h Chamberlain 
but the published documents do not support the suggestion. 
B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n was ge n e r a l l y s o l i d l y i n favour: 
"President Roosevelt's message...has met w i t h 
u n i v e r s a l approval i n t h e p u b l i c o p i n i o n 
of t h i s country and i n the press of a l l 
p a r t i e s . 
...One cannot escape the impression t h a t 
a c e r t a i n s a t i s f a c t i o n i s evinced here 
t h a t the strong cousin on the other side 
of the ocean has used language which they 
would o f t e n l i k e t o use themselves, b u t 
which so f a r they have not had s u f f i c i e n t 
courage to use."(70) 
The importance o f Chamberlain's o f f i c i a l response 
i s t h a t by echoing the sentiments of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
he was ranging B r i t a i n w i t h the U.S.A. against Germany. 
This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f B r i t i s h w i t h American i n t e r e s t s 
was, i n von Dirks en's o p i n i o n the most probable r e s u l t 
o f the f a i l u r e of Anglo-German appeasement. He had 
w r i t t e n the day before Roosevelt's speech: 
"The only possible a l t e r n a t i v e which can 
be s e r i o u s l y considered i s to f o s t e r 
c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h the United 
States. Such an arrangement would o f f e r 
Great B r i t a i n f u l l support and the same 
s e c u r i t y as would agreement w i t h the 
t o t a l i t a r i a n powers."(71) 
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Some sense of s e c u r i t y was c e r t a i n l y becoming wanted. 
I t should not be i m p l i e d t h a t such a r e - o r i e n t a t i o n 
o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y on the p a r t o f B r i t a i n would he 
easy or automatic. I t was never i n f a c t during 
January o f f i c i a l l y adopted. The p o s i t i o n was t h a t 
w h i l e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany were so unpromising the 
f o r e i g n o f f i c e c o u l d gain a c e r t a i n degree of comfort 
from these signs o f s t r e n g t h from across the A t l a n t i c . 
As January wore on and the signs from the c o n t i n e n t 
became more and more depressing B r i t a i n l a i d i n c r e a s i n g 
value on t h i s American connection, f o r Chamberlain had 
always been glad t o use the United States f o r h i s own 
ends, H a l i f a x was i n frequent contact w i t h M a l l e t 
sending i n f o r m a t i o n to the State Department at 
Washington, Roosevelt was kept up to date w i t h the 
(72) 
l a t e s t B r i t i s h views o f and p o l i c i e s towards Europe, 
and i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f m i l i t a n t tones from H i t l e r 
i n h i s speech at the Reichstag scheduled f o r January 
30 i t was even hoped t h a t a f u r t h e r p u b l i c announce-
ment would be made from Washington i n the hope t h a t 
(73) 
i t might help to stay H i t l e r ' s hand. However, 
Roosevelt was at t h i s time experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the new Congress and no such 
statement was forthcoming f o r f e a r o f 'going too f a r 196. 
ahead of p u b l i c opinion' i n America and l o s i n g c o n t r o l 
(74) 
of Congress. Mal l e t was a t l e a s t able t o r e p o r t t o 
the f o r e i g n o f f i c e t h a t t h e United States government 
'had f o r some time been basing t h e i r p o l i c y uppn the 
(75) 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f j u s t such a s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g ' , as 
had been foreshadowed i n H a l i f a x ' s communications 
concerning the State of a f f a i r s i n Europe, I t was 
o f f i c i a l l y asserted t h a t 'the speeches and acts o f 
the President and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n recent months had 
a l l been d i r e c t e d towards meeting such a s i t u a t i o n . ' 
I n the l i g h t of American rearmament t h i s was r e -
assuring news despite Roosevelt's statement to the 
e f f e c t t h a t America was not t h i n k i n g o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
. (76) 
i n European wars, f o r i t was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the 
United States were prepared t o do a l l they could t o 
(77) 
b o l s t e r up B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe. 
As things turned out, the substance of H i t l e r ' s 
January 30 speech seemed t o b e l i e the need f o r t h i s 
B r i t i s h o r i e n t a t i o n towards America. This speech, 
eagerly awaited f o r some weeks as an i n d i c a t i o n o f 
the way i n which Germany was going, proved t o be much 
less extreme and o f f e n s i v e than a n t i c i p a t e d , and 
t e m p o r a r i l y dispersed many of the rumours of aggressive 
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German i n t e n t i o n s . R e f e r r i n g to t h i s speech a month 
l a t e r , Henderson (who by then had resumed h i s post 
i n B e r l i n ) decribed i t s immediate impact on Europe i n 
the l i g h t o f the tension t h a t had b u i l t up: 
"Herr H i t l e r ' s comparatively moderate speech 
on the 30th. January came, t h e r e f o r e , 
somewhat as a shock to a l l those who had 
worked themselves up i n t o a p o t e n t i a l s t a t e 
o f h y s t e r i a as to German aggressive i n t e n t i o n . 
The terms o f th a t speech were, g e n e r a l l y 
speaking, more reassuring than had been 
expected and. the reference to the hope o f 
a long peace produced an immediate calming 
e f f e c t . 1 ' (78) 
This 'calming e f f e c t ' was, i n f a c t , due to two main 
features o f the speech. F i r s t l y , as Henderson claimed 
there was H i t l e r ' s p r o f e s s i o n o f b e l i e f i n a long peace, 
but there were also expressions o f f r i e n d s h i p w i t h many 
of the s t a t e s i n Europe f o r which grave fears had 
r e c e n t l y been held. 
H i t l e r i n e v i t a b l y gave much a t t e n t i o n t o the Axis 
and a f i r m d e c l a r a t i o n o f s o l i d a r i t y w i t h I t a l y was 
given. But the value o f t h i s a l l i a n c e was not described 
pur e l y i n terms o f mutual advantage; a wider, more 
generous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was made: 
"The s o l i d a r i t y o f these two regimes i s . . . 
more than a matter o f e g o i s t i c expediency. 
On t h i s s o l i d a r i t y i s founded the s a l v a t i o n 
o f Europe from i t s threatened d e s t r u c t i o n 
by Bolshevism." (79) 
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And t h i s was not a l l . Not only was Germany, and 
I t a l y w i t h her, Europe's insurance against Bolshevism 
"but also a safeguard against war by v i r t u e o f t h e i r 
combined m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h : 
" I know, too, t h a t not only our own Defence 
Forces but also I t a l y ' s m i l i t a r y power are 
equal to the severest m i l i t a r y requirements,«• 
Nat i o n a l S o c i a l i s t Germany and F a s c i s t 
I t a l y are strong enough to safeguard peace 
against everyone and t o end r e s o l u t e l y and 
s u c c e s s f u l l y any c o n f l i c t s which i r r e s p o n -
s i b l e elements l i g h t l y s t a r t . " ( 8 0 J 
H i t l e r supported h i s benevolent claims f o r Europe 
by desires f o r stable- r e l a t i o n s w i t h other European 
powers. He stressed the value o f having 'genuinely 
f r i e n d l y and n e u t r a l s t a t e s ' on Germany's f r o n t i e r s 
m aintaining t h a t r e l a t i o n s w i t h Switzerland, Holland 
and Belgium (amongst many others) were becoming ' a l l 
the more s a t i s f a c t o r y ' . 
Such words d i s p e l l e d much o f the suspicion 
concerning the p o s s i b i l i t y of a German move i n the 
west. But perhaps gr e a t e r r e l i e f was t o be found i n 
H i t l e r ' s statements about countries on Germany's 
eastern f r o n t i e r s * For despite the j u s t i f i a b l e 
anxiety t h a t had been engendered by the rumours of 
aggression against Holland or Switzerland, the f o r e i g n 
o f f i c e had not l o s t s i g h t of t h e more f e a s i b l e possib-
i l i t y : t h a t H i t l e r would go east. Henderson, i n 
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h i s memoirs, having referred to the reports which 
olaimed westward direction for German aims stated 
that he "believed these were merely red herrings put 
about by the Nazi extremists to obscure r e a l and more 
immediate objectives: 
" . . . i t was obvious that H i t l e r had other 
f i s h to fry before embarking on such 
adventureSoo.Danzig and Memel, of which 
two c i t i e s the population was preponderantly 
.German, were the most obvious of H i t l e r ' s 
next and e a r l i e s t objectives, and Germany's 
relations with Czechoslovakia had yet to be 
d e f i n i t e l y s e t t l e d , 1 1 (81) 
Thus, when H i t l e r seemed to deny aggressive designs 
on these 'other f i s h ' , hopes were understandably raised. 
He wished Czechoslovakia success i n re-establishing 
i n t e r n a l order, while references to Poland were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y amicable. I n view of what was to happen 
i n j u s t over seven months time h i s assessment of the 
value of h i s non-aggression pact with Poland of 1954 
i s worth quoting: 
"There can scarcely be any difference of 
opinion today among the true friends of 
peace with regard to the value of th i s 
agreement. One only needs to ask 
oneself what might have happened to Europe, 
i f t h i s agreement, which brought such 
r e l i e f , had not been entered into f i v e 
years ago. I n signing i t the great 
Poli s h Marshall and pa t r i o t rendered 
h i s people j u s t as great a service as 
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the leaders of the N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t 
State rendered the. German people. 
During the t r o u b l e d months of the past 
year the f r i e n d s h i p between Germany and 
Poland was one of the reassuring f a c t o r s 
i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e o f Europe."(82) 
These signs of peaceful German c o h a b i t a t i o n i n 
Europe helped to remove the s t i n g from other more 
t r u c u l e n t parts o f h i s speech. Even a reference 
to not t o l e r a t i n g the Western States' attempts, f o r 
the f u t u r e , 'to i n t e r f e r e i n c e r t a i n matters which 
(83) 
concern nobody but ourselves' i . e . matters concerning 
Germany's r e l a t i o n s i n Central and Eastern Europe -
d i d not cause umbrage to Chamberlain and H a l i f a x since 
they were i n c r e a s i n g l y prepared to give H i t l e r a f r e e 
r e i n i n Europe provided he d i d not p r e c i p i t a t e t r o u b l e 
(84) 
by using m i l i t a r y f o r c e . 
There was even cause f o r optimism w i t h reference 
to d i r e c t Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . Good r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Great B r i t a i n could be q u i c k l y r e - e s t a b l i s h e d , 
H i t l e r maintained, by the e l i m i n a t i o n o f unscrupulous 
press propaganda. I t was claimed, moreover, t h a t 
there was no r e a l c o n f l i c t between the i n t e r e s t s o f 
the two countries and t h a t no German desired to make 
(85) 
d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the B r i t i s h Empire. The only 201. 
problem e x i s t i n g between the Reich and England and France 
was t h a t o f Germany's l o s t c o l o n i e s , but even t h i s was 
no source o f r e a l t r o u b l e : 
"While the s o l u t i o n o f t h i s question would 
c o n t r i b u t e g r e a t l y to the p a c i f i c a t i o n o f 
the w o r l d , i t i s i n no sense a problem 
which would cause war."(86) 
By such professions o f p a c i f i s m , then, was the calming 
e f f e c t , o f which Henderson spoke, produced. And i t was 
an e f f e c t a s s i s t e d i n B r i t a i n by the Prime M i n i s t e r who 
endeavoured t o reassure h i s country t h a t appeasement 
was working. 
" I very d e f i n i t e l y got the impression 
t h a t i t was not the speech of a man 
who was preparing to throw Europe i n t o 
another c r i s i s . I t seemed to me t h a t 
there were many passages i n the speech 
which i n d i c a t e d the necessity o f peace 
f o r Germany as w e l l as f o r other countries."(87) 
I n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e , however, w h i l e due respect was 
p a i d t o t h i s o f f i c i a l statement o f H i t l e r ' s , i t d i d 
not cause any r e l a x i n g i n guard o r p r e p a r a t i o n . The 
campaign of optimism now being launched i n the B r i t i s h 
press was no r e f l e c t i o n o f o p i n i o n o f f i c i a l l y h e l d i n 
the f o r e i g n o f f i c e , but r a t h e r o f the hopes t o which 
(88) 
Chamberlain was s t i l l c l i n g i n g . 
On the same day (January 31) t h a t t he Prime M i n i s t e r 
commented on t h e speech i n the House o f Commons, Phipps 
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sent a r e p o r t from Paris c l a i m i n g t h a t there was a 
more hopeful f e e l i n g i n t h a t c a p i t a l about H i t l e r 
(89) 
than there had been f o r several weeks. This was 
l a r g e l y due t o the l i g h t H i t l e r ' s speech had throv/n 
on Germany's p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s the I t a l i a n claims 
against her. The argument was t h a t H i t l e r , by 
i n f e r r i n g ' t h a t Mussolini's a t t i t u d e a t the time o f 
the "Anschluss'• was merely a r e t u r n f o r Germany's 
support during the p e r i o d o f Sanctions', had shown t h a t 
the d i c t a t o r s were t h e r e f o r e ' a l l square'. There was 
thus: 
"...no necessary o b l i g a t i o n on the p a r t of 
H i t l e r a c t i v e l y t o support the Duce i n 
the l a t t e r ' s claims against Prance."(90) 
To the French t h i s was a soothing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r 
despite the outward signs of c o l l a b o r a t i o n and f r i e n d s h i p 
t h a t had.surrounded the December D e c l a r a t i o n w i t h 
Germany, the atmosphere between the two countries had 
(91) 
been anything but f r i e n d l y , and the v i s i o n of 
Germany championing the I t a l i a n claims had c o n t i n u a l l y 
(92) 
haunted the French. 
The matter o f I t a l i a n claims against France had also 
been causing B r i t a i n much concern, and t h i s i n d i c a t i o n 
that Germany might not be so eager to support I t a l y 
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could a f f o r d a c e r t a i n degree o f r e l i e f i n view o f an 
observation o f Perth's r e l a i d t o H a l i f a x t e n days 
bef o r e ; 
"•••the Germans seem t o be showing a 
d i s p o s i t i o n at the moment t o recognise 
t h i s I t a l i a n f e e l i n g and Germany's debt 
to I t a l y , and by keeping German claims and 
i n t e n t i o n s i n the background t o put I t a l y ' s 
claims on the map. "(93) 
Perth had, however, mentioned another angle on the 
I t a l i a n claims, which c a r r i e d as much danger and which 
was, i n e f f e c t , augmented by H i t l e r ' s above i n s i n u a t i o n s ; 
"Some observers t h i n k t h a t the I t a l i a n s 
g r e a t l y fear t h a t the Germans, having 
turned Czechoslovakia (94 ) i n t o a s o r t o f 
German p r o t e c t o r a t e , w i l l proceed i n -
exorably i n the sp r i n g w i t h the next step 
i n t h e i r programme, and t h a t , unless I t a l y 
moves f a s t , her own claims on France w i l l 
be obscured and overlooked i n the r e s u l t i n g 
general disturbance. There i s no doubt 
tha t many I t a l i a n s are a f r a i d o f t h i s , . . , 
and a f e e l i n g undoubtedly e x i s t s . . . . t h a t i t 
i s now I t a l y ' s t u r n , and t h a t she must some-
how or other get i n f i r s t w i t h her claims."(95) 
The c a l l i n g up o f several classes o f r e s e r v i s t s i n 
I t a l y seemed to suggest t h a t the I t a l i a n s might, i n 
f a c t , be preparing f o r such i n i t i a t i v e ; i t was Francois 
Poncet's b e l i e f t h a t t h i s was being done 'as a means 
of pressure on France, i n the hope t h a t i t would cause 
France t o weaken and Great B r i t a i n t o f a i l i n her 
absorbed A u s t r i a and the Sudetenland and 
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(96) 
support o f Prance.' As i n the case o f speculation 
on German a c t i v i t y i t was impossible f o r B r i t a i n to 
draw any d e f i n i t e conclusions on what I t a l y was 
in t e n d i n g . Not t i l l February was the B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e 
to I t a l y t o be more c l e a r l y and openly explained but 
i n t h e meantime there was no s h r i n k i n g from the t r u t h 
t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n between Rome and Paris was 
con t i n u i n g t o jeopardise c l o s e r A n g l o - I t a l i a n under-
standing and t h a t i t was one which r e q u i r e d 'the 
(97) 
greatest watchfulness'. 
As a r e s u l t o f the rumours o f a n t i c i p a t e d German 
aggression Prance had experienced considerable 
p e r t u r b a t i o n s owing t o her m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s w i t h 
both Czechoslovakia and Poland. While i n t e n d i n g to 
preserve an outward aspect o f calm, pretending t h a t 
her D e c l a r a t i o n w i t h Germany was i n f u l l o peration 
(98) 
t i l l the l a t t e r v i o l a t e d i t , she had serious fears 
as t o the m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n o f B r i t a i n . I n a meeting 
w i t h Phipps on January 29 Deladier 'enquired r a t h e r 
anxiously whether Great B r i t a i n would not soon i n t r o -
(99) 
duce compulsory m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e ' . This question 
was accompanied by an e n t h u s i a s t i c o f f e r o f assistance 205. 
i n making good any agreed d e f i c i e n c i e s . Phipps 1 r e p l y 
was t h a t the c h i e f e f f o r t f o r t h e time being had t o be 
on a v i a t i o n . 
The ominous motions on the continent during the 
past f o r t n i g h t had r e s u l t e d i n f a i r l y frequent con-
s u l t a t i o n between the two countries i n order to e s t a b l i s h 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s w i t h regard to H i t l e r ' s reported aims. 
B r i t a i n ' s a t t i t u d e t o Prance a t t h i s time was s t e a d i l y 
becoming more genuine and honest, even to the extent 
o f organising j o i n t s t a f f conversations to adopt the 
(100) 
a t t i t u d e o f war against Germany and, w i t h i n only a 
matter o f days, t o p u b l i c l y announce the p o s i t i o n of 
B r i t a i n v i s a v i s Prance i n unmistakable terms. 
I t i s , i n f a c t , w i t h t h i s announcement t h a t 
B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n Europe becomes more c l e a r l y 
d e f i n e d as a power which would need to be reckoned 
w i t h by any other power in t e n d i n g to upset the balance 
i n Europe by the use of i l l e g a l f o r c e . 
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Chapter e i g h t 
Prom Strength to Strength 
Perhaps the outstanding f e a t u r e o f B r i t i s h 
diplomacy during February was her more confident and 
t h e r e f o r e f i r m e r approach t o the European s i t u a t i o n . 
This was i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to the depression and 
pessimism which had c h a r a c t e r i s e d much of her a t t i t u d e 
i n January. Three main f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d to t h i s 
change of approach; the f i r m e r tone o f Roosevelt and 
h i s growing i n f l u e n c e on American opinion, a d e c l i n e 
i n the German f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n , and the more r e l i a b l e 
s t a t e o f B r i t a i n ' s defences. The American i n f l u e n c e 
on B r i t i s h p o l i c y has already been considered,(1) and 
the German economic s i t u a t i o n w i l l be d e a l t w i t h l a t e r 
(2) 
i n t h i s chapter. I t was the improved s t a t e o f h i s 
own country's defence p o s i t i o n which was the main 
source o f hope t o Chamberlain. 
Great progress had c e r t a i n l y been made since 
Munich i n improving the country's defence p o t e n t i a l . 
Reviewing the s i t u a t i o n i n February t h e Chancellor 
o f the Exchequer, S i r John Simon r e f e r r e d t o 1938-39 
as 'a year o f the most s u b s t a n t i a l progress i n t h e 
(3) 
production o f defence ma t e r i a l s o f a l l k inds,' He 
released i n f o r m a t i o n t o the e f f e c t t h a t the t o t a l 
defence expenditure f o r the year 1939-40 would amount 
to £580 m i l l i o n s , an increase on the previous year o f 210. 
(4) 
£174 m i l l i o n s . 1939 was to see the ' f u l l b l a s t o f 
p r o d u c t i o n . 1 
Immediately upon Munich a t t e n t i o n had been p r i m a r i l y 
devoted to measures of c i v i l defence but since then a l l 
three main s e r v i c e departments had experienced impressive 
expansions. The greatest improvements were made by the 
a i r f o r c e . This was l o g i c a l i n view o f the p a r t 
e s p e c i a l l y f i g h t e r planes would play i n the event of 
aggression against the country but also, as Hoare 
explained, i t was an emphasis f a c i l i t a t e d by the f a c t 
t h a t t h e French f l e e t was f e l t t o be capable o f g i v i n g 
e s s e n t i a l support t o B r i t a i n i n the Mediterranean and 
(5) 
Far East. Simon was able to c l a i m t h a t the R.A.F. 
had been: 
"..•very g r e a t l y strengthened during the 
year, both by the recruitment o f many 
thousands o f r e c r u i t s o f h i g h q u a l i t y . . . 
and by the a d d i t i e n o f large numbers o f 
up-to-date a i r c r a f t . " (6) 
Later when Kingsley^Wbod, the a i r m i n i s t e r , presented 
h i s estimates f o r the coming year t o the Commons he 
could c l a i m t h a t a qua r t e r o f a m i l l i o n pounds was being 
(7) 
spent on the production o f a i r c r a f t alone every day. 
Kingsley-Wood had t o l d the House i n November t h a t the 
programme f o r expanding the f i r s t - l i n e a i r c r a f t a t 
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(8) 
home would be accelerated. He was now able to 
r e p o r t t h a t the t a r g e t o f 1,750 "by March 31, would be 
(9) 
reached. Moreover, these a i r c r a f t were 'as formidable 
(10) 
as any i n the w o r l d , 1 and i n order t o continue 
b u i l d i n g at t h i s r a t e and even increase i t , a t o t a l 
(11) 
a i r expenditure o f £205 m i l l i o n s was a n t i c i p a t e d o 
The achievements i n the army and navy, i f on not 
such an impressive l e v e l were s i m i l a r l y encouraging as 
a f i r m basis f o r B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . As a t January 
1 1937 the tonnage o f shipping under c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r 
the navy had been 375,000 tons; by March 31 i t was 
(12) 
c o n f i d e n t l y expected to be 660,000 tons. The personnel 
o f the f l e e t had, as w i t h t h e a i r f o r c e , increased 
impressively, A r i s e of 32,000, or 36 per cent was 
recorded between 1933 and 1938. Hore-Belisha's plans 
f o r the army envisaged nineteen d i v i s i o n s t o p r o t e c t 
the country i n the event o f war i n Europe. Of these 
s i x were r e g u l a r (two o f them armoured), nine t e r r i -
t o r i a l i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , three motorised and one 
armoured d i v i s i o n . Every f i g h t i n g arm of the service 
had been remodelled and was to be supplied w i t h modern 
(13) 
weapons. 
The pace of rearmament had quickened d r a s t i c a l l y . 
212. 
But even though t h i s advance i n the country's war 
p o t e n t i a l was s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y those who had 
been regarded as 'war-mongers 1, the emphasis from 
Chamberlain's p o i n t o f view was s t i l l q u i t e d e f i n i t e l y 
on i t s defensive nature. He explained a t Birmingham 
t h a t "out motto i s not defiance, and, mark my words, i t 
(14) 
i s n o t, e i t h e r , deference. I t i s defence.' I t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t , however, t h a t the conception o f defence 
was now much more r e a l i s t i c than i t had been a few 
months before. There i s even a suggestion of 
aggressiveness i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t : 
"...they c o u l d not make nearly such a 
mess of us now as they could have 
done then, (at Munich) w h i l e we could 
make much more o f a mess o f them."(15) 
This s i g n o f m i l i t a n c y d i d not mean t h a t h i s 
dream o f appeasing the d i c t a t o r s had diminished at 
a l l . I n the same speech at Birmingham he had admitted 
to h i s audience t h a t t he t o t a l i t a r i a n governments 
d i d not share t h e i r peoples 1 eagerness f o r l a s t i n g 
peace, but h i s f a i t h i n human nature could not be 
destroyed; there was another angle i n appeasement 
t h a t gave cause f o r hope; 
" • • • l e t us c u l t i v a t e the f r i e n d s h i p o f the 
p e o p l e s . a • l e t us make i t c l e a r to them t h a t 
we do n6t regard them as p o t e n t i a l foes, 
but r a t h e r as human beings l i k e ourselves.."(16) 
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Despite the ugly rumours o f German o f f e n s i v e 
a c t i o n (although diminished by H i t l e r ' s Reiohstag 
speech), the explosive nature o f Pranoe - I t a l i a n 
r e l a t i o n s , and the depressing atmosphere "between 
B r i t a i n and the d i c t a t o r s , Chamberlain s t i l l hoped 
f o r success i n such a p o l i c y as expressed above. He 
could even convince h i m s e l f t h a t the European s i t u a t i o n 
i t s e l f gave promise o f success. He wrote e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y 
to Lord T\veedsmuir early i n February: 
" I must t e l l you t h a t I myself f e e l 
conscious of some easing i n the 
ten s i o n , , .a number o f impressions 
d e r i v e d from various sources, which 
somehow seem to fuse i n t o a general 
sense o f greater brightness, i n the 
atmosphere,"(17) 
I t seems t h a t he was escaping f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r from 
r e a l i t y , a v a i l i n g h i m s e l f o f t h a t one comfort which 
promoted the prospect o f peace - hope, H a l i f a x 
f r e q u e n t l y defended Chamberlain's p o l i c y at the time 
saying t h a t 'the dominant c o n s t i t u e n t i n h i s thought 
(18) 
was hope r a t h e r than f a i t h , ' But i t was a hope, 
the p r o p o r t i o n s o f which deluded i t s owner and l e d 
him away from the s t a r k r e a l i t y o f Europe. 
" • • • w i t h a thrush s i n g i n g i n the garden, 
the sun s h i n i n g , and the rooks beginning 
to discuss among themselves the prospects 
o f the coming n e s t i n g season, I f e e l as 
214, 
though s p r i n g were g e t t i n g near, 
A l l the i n f o r m a t i o n I get seems to 
p o i n t i n the d i r e c t i o n o f peace," (19) 
This q u o t a t i o n i s an e x t r a c t from Chamberlain's 
d i a r y f o r February 19. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t on 
t h a t very day he received from B e r l i n a communication 
f u l l o f encouraging opinions on German desires f o r 
peace, which went f a r to counteract the p e s s i m i s t i c 
impressions created i n t h a t c a p i t a l over the previous 
(20) 
few weeks, Henderson had returned t o B e r l i n . 1 
A f t e r a f o u r months' absence during which he had been 
recovering from an operation he had resumed o f f i c e 
as ambassador i n B e r l i n 'moderately h o p e f u l , and not 
(21) 
i n c l i n e d to see the black side o f anything.' The 
reoovery^-however, had not been complete and, on h i s 
(22) 
own admission, he was s t i l l p h y s i c a l l y u n f i t . 111 
h e a l t h , i t seems, was s t i l l t o cloud h i s v i s i o n of the 
exact s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . 
Soon a f t e r h i s r e t u r n to B e r l i n Henderson had 
two important i n t e r v i e w s , one w i t h Ribbentrop and one 
w i t h Goring. 
The meeting w i t h Ribbentrop on February 16 was very 
f r i e n d l y . The Reich f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r asserted t h a t (23) 
'nobody i n Germany was t h i n k i n g o f anything but peace' 
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- a statement t h a t Henderson was almost prepared t o 
(24) 
take a t face value. Ribbentrop f u r t h e r claimed 
t h a t he f e l t the best beginning f o r a b e t t e r atmosphere 
between Germany and Great B r i t a i n l a y along economic 
l i n e s and he r e f e r r e d t o the p r o j e c t e d v i s i t o f t h e 
president o f the board o f trade t o Germany i n March i n 
o p t i m i s t i c terms. Such references were to breed 
considerable hope i n Henderson f o r although t h i s v i s i t 
was a p r i v a t e one he b e l i e v e d i t was the key to much 
grea t e r t h i n g s , 
"...behind the facade o f p r i v a c y , the r e a l 
i n t e n t i o n o f the v i s i t was patent, and 
though the. primary o b j e c t was a modest 
one, i t was l e g i t i m a t e t o hope t h a t i t 
might lead to more general and concrete 
trade discussions. From economics to 
p o l i t i c s was no great step."(25) 
The congenial atmosphere o f t h i s f i r s t i n t e r v i e w was 
maintained a t Henderson's subsequent meeting w i t h 
Goring on the morning o f the 18th, despite an expression 
of German uneasiness over B r i t i s h rearmament, a mis-
understanding t o which Henderson was, i n any case, f u l l y 
(26) 
sympathetic. 
On the s t r e n g t h o f these two meetings Henderson 
f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n r e p o r t i n g t h a t he d i d not b e l i e v e 
Germany was contemplating any aggression f o r 1939, and 
t h a t a l l s t o r i e s and rumours t o the contrary were 
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completely w i t h o u t r e a l foundation. He wrote on the 
evening o f the 18th: 
"These may sound strange opinions i n the 
l i g h t of a l l rumours cu r r e n t during the 
past few months but I take f u l l responsib-
i l i t y f o r making them mine. I regard 
and always have regarded i t as a bad 
mistake t o a t t r i b u t e excessive importance 
to s t o r i e s spread g e n e r a l l y w i t h i n t e n t i o n 
e i t h e r by those who regard war as the only 
weapon w i t h which Nazi regime can be over-
thrown or by those Nazis themselves who 
desire war f o r t h e i r own s a t i s f a c t i o n or 
aggrandisement. Germany i s not going to 
be a lamb w i t h which i t w i l l be pleasant 
i n the f u t u r e to l i e down but her people 
want peace j u s t as much as and even more 
than ourselves and Herr H i t l e r i s not 
going to disappoint them i f he can help 
it."127) 
A few f r i e n d l y words from H i t l e r h i m s e l f at the B r i t i s h 
stands at the motor e x h i b i t i o n i n B e r l i n were a f u r t h e r 
i n d i c a t i o n , however s l i g h t , t o Henderson's mind i n the 
d i r e c t i o n o f peace. He advised H a l i f a x t h a t f u l l 
p u b l i c i t y should be given to H i t l e r ' s peaceful i n -
t e n t i o n s , both i n press and speeches. 
There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t Henderson, a f t e r 
h i s prolonged absence from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene, 
had not seen t h i n g s c l e a r l y , though he was the subject 
o f German dec e i t and camouflage. Yet even when he was 
faced w i t h m i l i t a n t outbursts from Germany he could s t i l l 
f i n d grounds f o r t h e i r excuse. Goring had, before 
h i s meeting w i t h Henderson, accused the B r i t i s h press 
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o f i n c i t i n g the Western powers to war against Germany. 
With t h i s he had issued what v i r t u a l l y amounted to 
an ultimatum: 
" i f t h i s campaign p e r s i s t e d German 
Government, he s a i d , would have to 
consider whether i t would not be 
more opportune to take a c t i o n now 
themselves before i t was too l a t e 
and w h i l e Germany was s t i l l i n 
stronger m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n . " ( 2 8 ) 
News o f t h i s was reported t o H a l i f a x on February 22 
and Henderson t r i e d t o e x p l a i n i t away as being the 
•argument w i t h which the Nazi extremists sought to 
,.(29) 
j u s t i f y t h e i r p o l i c y o f adventure, 1 Moreover he 
refused t o a l i g n H i t l e r w i t h these extremists. 
On the same day H a l i f a x saw Von Dirksen p r i o r to 
the l a t t e r ' s r e t u r n to Germany f o r a f o r t n i g h t . L i t t l e 
value r e s u l t e d from t h i s meeting w i t h reference to the 
immediate f u t u r e o f Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s f o r i t was 
l a r g e l y a resume o f mutual suspicions. H a l i f a x 
expressed the hope t h a t the German government would 
be f u l l y aware o f the anxi e t y created i n B r i t i s h 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n by 'the d e l i b e r a t e f a i l u r e o f the German 
Government to.,,take advantage o f the new o p p o r t u n i t i e s ' 
t h a t B r i t a i n considered t o have been created a t Munich. 
I n r e p l y the German ambassador maintained t h a t he 
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thought H i t l e r had resented B r i t i s h concern w i t h 
Czechoslovakia, and t h a t the p o s i t i o n had "been 
aggravated by the behaviour o f the American President, 
As a r e s u l t o f t h i s there was no chance o f a suspension 
o f German armaments production: 
"That the head o f a great country should 
make once a week, i n some form o r other, 
the k i n d o f d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t President 
Roosevelt had been making f o r some time 
past was very d i s t u r b i n g . I t seemed 
q u i t e evident t h a t , i f Prance and Great 
B r i t a i n were i n v o l v e d i n war, America 
would also j o i n i n and support Great 
B r i t a i n , not i n two months but i n two 
days. This n a t u r a l l y caused great con-
cern to the German Government and they 
could- not be blamedj t h e r e f o r e , f o r f e e l i n g 
t h a t i t was i n present circumstances 
impossible f o r them t o suspend t h e i r 
armaments production."(31) 
The conversation was not e n t i r e l y devoid o f hope f o r 
the f u t u r e , f o r von Dirksen r e i t e r a t e d Ribbentrop's 
e a r l i e r b e l i e f i n the promise h e l d out by economic 
discussions. He 'looked forward' he s a i d 'to the 
gradual d i m i n u t i o n o f tension under the soothing 
i n f l u e n c e o f economics.' 
The r e v i v a l o f i n t e r e s t i n economic appeasement 
i s worthy o f a t t e n t i o n . I t was a ray of hope which 
Chamberlain and H a l i f a x were determined to pursue f o r 
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they could not know a t the time t h a t despite the 
w i l l i n g n e s s o f Germany t o explore more f u l l y t h i s 
avenue o f cooperation, she was s t i l l equally determined 
not to a l l o w any discussions t o leave economic matters 
(32) 
and 'lead up t o questions of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . ' 
Prom the B r i t i s h p o i n t o f view economic appeasement, 
which had been cherished by t h e 'inner c i r c l e ' i n 
October and e a r l y November, had received a severe 
set-back by the German a t r o c i t i e s against the Jews. 
Economic appeasement had never e n t i r e l y died, however. 
As has been seen von Dirksen was concerned t o keep t h i s 
t o r c h a l i g h t ; Schacht had v i s i t e d London i n mid-December 
and a r e t u r n v i s i t by Stanley,President o f t h e Board o f 
(33) 
Trade, had been mooted. At t h i s time von Dirksen 
had t o l d H a l i f a x t h a t he thought: 
"various points o f contact e x i s t e d i n 
the economic f i e l d which might lead to 
agreements, d i r e c t l y f r u i t f u l and 
p o s i t i v e f o r economic l i f e and thus 
i n d i r e c t l y f o r p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s as 
w e l l . " ( 3 4 ) 
More p o s i t i v e advances were made j u s t before Christmas 
when the B r i t i s h and German Federations of I n d u s t r y 
h e l d preparatory discussions towards reaching a 
(35) 
comprehensive agreement on p r i c e s and markets. 
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Towards the end o f January several o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
o f f e r e d themselves f o r g r e a t e r a c t i v i t y i n the economic 
f i e l d ; n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an Anglo-German Goal Agreement 
were w e l l advanced; the annual dinner o f the Anglo-
German Chamber o f Commerce took place; the f i r s t 
meeting o f the c e n t r a l i n d u s t r i a l federations o f the 
(36) 
two countries was f i x e d f o r the end o f February. 
I t was at the Chamber o f Commerce dinner t h a t both 
Leith-Ross and Henderson made the opening gambit f o r 
resuming t o p - l e v e l economic discussions. They suggested: 
" . . . t h a t a v i s i t t o London by Funk, Reich 
M i n i s t e r o f Economics and President o f 
the Reichsbank, would c e r t a i n l y be w e l l 
timed f o r extending the i n f o r m a l economic 
conversations s t a r t e d i n October o f l a s t 
year."(37) 
The German representatives d i d not respond, however, 
so Leith-Ross repeated the suggestion to von Dirksen 
on January 31. I n the meantime the Anglo-German 
Coal Agreement had been signed which o f f e r e d an i d e a l 
excuse f o r a v i s i t by Funk to London. Leith-Ross t o l d 
von-Dirksen t h a t t he i n t e n t i o n was: 
"... to give a dinner to cele b r a t e the 
successful conclusion o f t h e Anglo-
German coal n e g o t i a t i o n s t o which Funk 
. . . i s to be i n v i t e d as guest o f honour 
from Germany and O l i v e r Stanley...to 
represent Great B r i t a i n . " ( 3 8 ) 
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Von Dirks en requested B e r l i n ' s r e a c t i o n , b ut Wiehl, 
D i r e c t o r o f the Economic P o l i c y Department o f the 
German Foreign M i n i s t r y , w h i l e encouraging Stanley's 
proposed v i s i t t o Germany, was not y e t prepared t o l e t 
Punk go t o London? 
"Punk has so many engagements as a r e s u l t 
o f assuming o f f i c e as President o f the 
Reichsbank that he i s q u i t e unable to 
f i n d time f o r a v i s i t t o London i n the 
near f u t u r e . "(39) 
This r e p l y was despatched t o von Dirksen on February 6 
but i t s negative nature d i d not cool the B r i t i s h ardour 
f o r economic appeasement. Stanley's v i s i t was i n s i s t e d 
(40) 
upon and arranged f o r March 17, two days a f t e r the 
meeting o f the i n d u s t r i a l federations i n Dusseldorf. 
The t i m i n g o f these two arrangements seems to be 
s i g n i f i c a n t , the B r i t i s h wishing t o know the r e s u l t s 
o f the l a t t e r before Stanley s t a r t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s on 
(41) 
broader economic issues. Von Dirksen records w i t h 
reference t o t h e Dusseldorf meeting t h a t 'the English 
side attached greater importance' to i t 'than was 
(42) 
warranted by i t s r a t h e r moderate agenda 1. 
By the middle o f February a f i r m basis had been 
l a i d f o r an improvement i n the atmosphere between 
London and B e r l i n . Chamberlain and H a l i f a x were 
222. 
making a sincere attempt to r e t r i e v e appeasement 
from i t s depression by the only means a v a i l a b l e t o 
them. The f a c t t h a t a v a i l a b l e B r i t i s h documents give 
l i t t l e evidence o f t h i s important f a c e t of Anglo-
German dealings t e l l s the same s t o r y as i n October and 
November - Chamberlain was by-passing the f o r e i g n o f f i c e 
and using u n o f f i c i a l channels t o execute t h i s business. 
That he found a readiness i n Germany to communicate on 
ghe economic l e v e l was under the s t r a i n of purely 
p o l i t i c a l matters, adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n h i s mind 
to use such methods. Ribbentrop a t the end o f 
January had 'betrayed a l i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n more 
a c t i v e l y promoting Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s i n the 
(43) 
economic sphere 1, and as has already been noted 
Henderson was made aware of t h i s a t t i t u d e soon a f t e r 
(44) 
h i s r e t u r n t o o f f i c e r e p o r t i n g t o H a l i f a x accordingly. 
(45) 
Von Dirksen was an e n t h u s i a s t i c middle man t h i n k i n g 
t h a t 'the atmosphere was unusually favourable and also 
(46) 
had an a l i e n a t i n g e f f e c t on the p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n ' • 
Moreover, the a t t i t u d e o f the German press was encour-
(47) 
aging. 
Here then i s some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r Chamberlain's 
223 
j u b i l a n t mood i n mid-February, though i t should be 
stressed t h a t progress was being made s o l e l y i n the 
economic f i e l d , t h a t even t h i s was as y e t i l l - d e f i n e d 
and i n i t s infancy and t h a t despite Henderson 'a" 
optimism f o r an easy passage from economic t o p o l i t i c a l 
matters there was no v a l i d reason f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t 
any d e f i n i t e and l a s t i n g improvement i n diplomatic 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany would r e s u l t . Indeed, a v a i l a b l e 
evidence suggested t h a t the improved German tone was 
d i c t a t e d i n lar g e measure by sheer economic need. 
"Recent repor t s on the breakdown i n 
the communications system, general labour 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , food shortage, the 
general u n p o p u l a r i t y o f r e s t r i c t i v e 
measures and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f any 
f u r t h e r l a r g e increase i n the rearmament 
programme, owing to export and import con-
s i d e r a t i o n s , recorded the f a c t s which may 
have opened Herr H i t l e r ' s eyes t o the t r u e 
p o s i t i o n and have accounted f o r h i s more 
c o n c i l i a t o r y statement o f German p o l i c y . 
I n f a c t economic needs may have f o r the 
f i r s t time outshadowed p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a -
t i o n s . "(48) 
Such was Henderson's ra t h e r more sombre v e r d i c t on 
Germany's motives as expressed a f t e r being back i n 
B e r l i n a month. 
Tnere was a t t h i s time l i t t l e progress made i n 
deciding the d i r e c t i o n t h a t economic r e l a t i o n s between 
the two co u n t r i e s should take, Henderson reported, as 
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much t o H a l i f a x a f t e r h i s meeting w i t h Ribbentrop: 
"We agreed t h a t n e i t h e r o f us knew very 
c l e a r l y what l i n e any economic discussions 
would take hut t h a t the f i r s t aim was 
to discover where co-operation could most 
u s e f u l l y be sought,"(48) 
Chamberlain, however, knev; where he wanted discussions 
to lead. His mind turned again to c o l o n i a l appeasement, 
(50) 
an idea t h a t had l a i n dormant since mid-October, 
He wrote to Henderson i n t h i s sense on February 19 
" i f a l l went w e l l we should have so 
improved the atmosphere t h a t we might 
begin to t h i n k o f c o l o n i a l discussions."(51) 
H a l i f a x d i d not share h i s Prime M i n i s t e r ' s optimism, 
and on the 20th he advised Henderson t o exert a 
c e r t a i n degree o f r e s t r a i n t , 
" I do not myself f e e l t h e r e i s any hope o f 
• making any sense o f c o l o n i a l discussions 
• ...unless and u n t i l your German f r i e n d s 
can. r e a l l y show more than smooth words as 
evidence o f f r i e n d l y hearts."(52) 
Even Henderson could not side w i t h Chamberlain on t h i s 
p o i n t and t r i e d t o curb h i s enthusiasm: 
" I should keep away from the C o l o n i a l 
question. I t h i n k H i t l e r . . . f u l l y 
r e a l i s e s t h a t t h a t question must w a i t 
a long time y e t and t h a t economics and 
disarmament must come f i r s t and create 
t h a t g r e a t e r confidence which can alone 
give H i t l e r the hope of a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
c o l o n i a l s o l u t i o n , (53) 
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While t h i s correspondence was being conducted 
Ashton-Gwatkin had a r r i v e d i n B e r l i n f o r .talks o f an 
exp l o r a t o r y nature i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r Stanley's v i s i t . 
While h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s had "been 'to renew personal 
contacts w i t h o f f i c i a l s o f the Foreign O f f i c e , M i n i s t r y 
o f Economics, Reichsbank e t c , and t o exchange views w i t h 
(54) 
them' h i s v i s i t was not very valuable i n g e t t i n g , a 
composite p i c t u r e o f German economic plans. To the 
Germans i t was c l e a r t h a t Ashton-Gwatkin's aims transcended 
the bounds of economics. 
"He r a t h e r gave the impression o f wanting 
to leayn from the Foreign M i n i s t e r how 
f a r Germany was prepared f o r a f u r t h e r 
rapprochement. When, however, the 
M i n i s t e r f o r h i s p a r t expressed no s p e c i a l 
wishes or proposals, Ashton-Gwatkin s a i d 
i n r e p l y t o f u r t h e r questions t h a t i t was 
tr u e t h a t he had concrete ideas, but t h a t 
these extended beyond the l i m i t s o f 
economy i n t o the sphere o f p o l i t i c s , " ( 5 5 ) 
Ashton-Gwatkin was unable to r e p o r t w i t h c e r t a i n t y 
what approach would be best received by the Germans. 
For Goring ' i n s i s t e d t h a t Anglo German economic co-
op e r a t i o n should begin a t once, and t h a t t h i s would 
l e a d on to p o l i t i c a l agreements' w h i l e Wohltat (Goring's 
p r i n c i p a l economic adv i s e r ) 'thought that some k i n d o f 
pact between the United Kingdom (and others perhaps) 
guaranteeing peace i n Europe would be a necessary 
(56) 
prelude t o economic co-operation on any wide scale'. 
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Such was the c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t faced Ashton-Gwatkin. 
Commenting on the several conversations which took place 
between the 20th and the 25th, G.H.S. Pinsent, F i n a n c i a l 
Attache i n B e r l i n , d i d not t h i n k they h e l d much promise 
f o r the f u t u r e : 
"Altogether these conversations h e l d out, 
i n my o p i n i o n , l i t t l e hope o f progress i n 
economic co-operation."(57) 
Ashton~.jGwatkin's own r e p o r t was less than hopeful and 
t o l d H a l i f a x l i t t l e more than he already knew e 
"There can he no doubt o f Germany's 
increasing preoccupation w i t h economic 
questions a t the present time; nor, I 
t h i n k , o f a c e r t a i n t u r n i n g towards 
England i n the hope o f b e n e f i t and ad-
vantages. I t i s less easy t o discern 
any w i l l and i n t e n t i o n on the German 
side t o c o n t r i b u t e a c t i v e l y tov/ards 
peace i n Europe and i n the w o r l d i n a 
way which would j u s t i f y s a c r i f i c e s on 
our p a r t and a l i v e l y hope i n a b e t t e r 
f u t u r e . "(58) 
This then was the s i t u a t i o n t h a t had been reached 
i n Anglo-German economic r e l a t i o n s by the end o f 
February. One main question had a r i s e n w i t h e f f e c t on 
the wider subject o f B r i t i s h diplomacy i n Europe - . 
what should the r e l a t i o n s h i p be between economic and 
p o l i t i c a l dealings w i t h Germany? This question was 
to come to a head i n the early days o f March. 
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While advances were being made i n t h i s one 
element of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany, B r i t a i n was 
becoming more concerned at the way F r a n c o - I t a l i a n 
r e l a t i o n s were goingo The a t t i t u d e o f I t a l y appeared 
to be g e t t i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y h o s t i l e and provided the b i g 
stumbling-block i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s during 
February. An abnormal amount o f m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y 
on the p a r t o f I t a l y a t the end o f January was con-
(59) 
t i n u e d i n t o February w i t h d e f i n i t e emphasis on 
three c o l o n i a l centres - Libya, Somaliland and Tunis. 
This appeared t o be an e v i l poibtent e s p e c i a l l y i n view 
o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t Perth had put on the e f f e c t 
(60) 
o f H i t l e r ' s speech on the I t a l i a n claims. However, 
on February 2 there appeared i n the I t a l i a n press an 
a s s e r t i o n which tended t o counteract Perth's suggestion: 
"The German expression...has induced ' 
some to t h i n k t h a t Germany w i l l only 
help I t a l y i f she i s attacked. Let 
there be no doubt. I f I t a l y i s 
i n v o l v e d i n a war, whether she i s the 
a t t a c k e r or the attacked, Germany w i l l 
lose no time i n enquiring who i s the 
aggressor but w i l l immediately give 
f u l l m i l i t a r y support to I t a l y being 
c e r t a i n that i f I t a l y has attacked she 
has done so t o defend her r i g h t s . " ( 6 1 ) 
This statement was issued t o erase the very s o r t o f 
(62) 
impression t h a t Perth had gathered. As f a r as 
B r i t i s h fears were concerned f o r a r e a l i s a t i o n o f the 
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I t a l i a n claims, t h i s statement while d i m i n i s h i n g one 
s p e c i f i c f e a r , served only to augment the other. 
Assured o f German support I t a l y might be encouraged t o 
take e a r l y a c t i o n against France. The s i t u a t i o n was 
f u r t h e r endangered by the f a c t t h a t Mussolini and Ciano 
were convinced a t t h i s stage t h a t they could implement 
t h e i r c o l o n i a l demands on Prance w i t h o u t having t o take 
i n t o account m i l i t a r y o p p o s i t i o n from B r i t a i n . 
" • • • i t i s h e l d more or less generally i n 
Rome t h a t England w i l l not f i g h t , at l e a s t 
unless she i s d i r e c t l y threatened. The 
French Embassy have been very i n s i s t e n t 
l a t e l y t h a t Ciano and probably Mussolini 
are convinced o f t h i s . (63) 
I t has been noted e a r l i e r t h a t t h i s was p a r t l y the 
legacy o f the January Rome t a l k s . Perth f e l t the 
danger inherent i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n only too keenly and 
advised t h a t the I t a l i a n s should be made f u l l y aware 
t h a t an atta c k on France would b r i n g B r i t a i n i n . 
" i n my view i t would t h e r e f o r e be a l l t o the 
good i f the Prime M i n i s t e r f e l t able to 
make some p u b l i c reference t o the p o s i t i o n 
•••and perhaps the sooner the b e t t e r . " ( 6 4 ) 
Phipps, too, w h i l e not b e l i e v i n g t h a t I t a l y meant war 
stressed the need f o r a sig n o f s t r e n g t h i n the Anglo-
French connection. 
"The main e s s e n t i a l was t h a t France and 
-Great B r i t a i n should remain u n i t e d -
the s l i g h t e s t s i g n o f cleavage would 
be most dangerous." (65) 
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These opinions coincided w i t h a request from the 
French government f o r a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h 
p o s i t i o n i n the event o f I t a l i a n aggression against 
(66) 
Prance, Perth's suggestion was q u i c k l y taken up by 
Chamberlain, His announcement i n the House o f Commons 
on February 6 could leave l i t t l e ambiguity i n I t a l i a n 
minds: 
" i t i s impossible to examine i n d e t a i l 
a l l the h y p o t h e t i c a l cases which may 
a r i s e , but I f e e l bound t o make p l a i n 
t h a t the s o l i d a r i t y o f i n t e r e s t , by 
which France and t h i s country are 
u n i t e d , i s such t h a t any t h r e a t t o the 
v i t a l i n t e r e s t s o f France, from what-
ever q u a r t e r i t came must evoke the 
immediate co-operation o f t h i s country."(67) 
This c l a r i f i c a t i o n had the two desired e f f e c t s ; i t 
put the I t a l i a n s squarely i n the p i c t u r e and helped 
to reassure France a f t e r the repercussions f o l l o w i n g 
(68) 
H i t l e r ' s l a s t speech. 
The e f f e c t o f the prime m i n i s t e r ' s announcement 
on I t a l y i s d i f f i c u l t t o gauge. As a method o f 
dissuading Mussolini from demanding concessions o f 
France by force i t was, i n a way, superfluous. For 
Deladier had, unbeknown t o Chamberlain (and indeed the 
Q,uai d'Orsay) already taken e f f e c t i v e u n o f f i c i a l a c t i o n 
He had despatched M, Baudouin, president o f the Banque 
de l'Indo-Chine, to Rome w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s to convey 
to the Fascists d e t a i l s o f c e r t a i n concessions he was 
$0-
(68) 
prepared t o make t o the I t a l i a n demands. These 
concerned D j i b o u t i , E t h i o p i a , Suez and Tunis. Thus, 
by underhand means Daladier had set i n motion a scheme 
f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h I t a l y which would preclude the 
need on the l a t t e r ' s p a r t too r e s o r t to f o r c e . 
Ciano recorded Mussolini's r e a c t i o n t o the p l a n : 
"He i s i n favour of diplomatic negotia-
t i o n s ; t h e r e f o r e , he authorised me to 
answer M. Baudouin t h a t we consider 
the proposals worthy o f consideration."(70) 
I t was made c l e a r to the I t a l i a n s t h a t these n e g o t i a t i o n s 
could not lead t o any open t e r r i t o r i a l concessions by 
the French. Mussolini knew t h a t i f he wanted t o go 
a f t e r t h a t i t would mean war. 
Perhaps Chamberlain'3 statement o f B r i t i s h s o l i d a r i t y 
w i t h France only served t o stop Mussolini having'second 
thoughts on t h i s score, though there i s no evidence 
to suggest t h a t he s e r i o u s l y intended provoking a war 
w i t h France i n . t h e near f u t u r e . Negotiations on the 
basis o f the Baudouin proposals continued between the 
two countries u n t i l the middle o f May. 
The B r i t i s h government, unaware of these dealings 
behind the scenes, continued t o exert what soothing 
i n f l u e n c e they could on F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s 
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'without attempting to mediate between the French and 
I t a l i a n Governments on the a c t u a l p o i n t s a t issue 
m) 
between them'... - The attempts o f the I t a l i a n press t o 
minimise the importance o f Chamberlain's statement 
made i t a l l the more necessary from the B r i t i s h p o i n t 
o f view t o request explanations f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y 
' i n order t h a t the I t a l i a n Government may r e a l i s e t h a t 
we are f u l l y aware of what i s going on. 1 
On February 3 H a l i f a x had i n s t r u c t e d Perth to f i n d 
out from Ciano the reason f o r the m i l i t a r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
(74) • 
i n Libya • Three days l a t e r a r e p l y was received to the 
e f f e c t t h a t i t v/as necessitated by an increase i n the 
number o f French troops being sent to t h a t area, and t h a t 
(75) 
the I t a l i a n response v/as 'purely f o r defensive purposes'. 
I n r e f u t i n g Ciano's explanation H a l i f a x drew a t t e n t i o n to 
the A p r i l Agreement as foreshadowing a p o l i c y o f 
(76) 
r e d u c t i o n i n the Libyan g a r r i s o n , but again the 
r e p l y echoed the need o f 'providing f o r complete s e c u r i t y 
J (77) 
o f Libya' against p o s s i b l e French a t t a c k . 
Since the January t a l k s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Rome had 
(78) 
been aggravated by 'renewed b i t t e r n e s s ' and by 
mid-February H a l i f a x d i d not share Chamberlain's 
c o n t i n u i n g optimism: 
23.2-. 
" I am a f r a i d t h e business o f g e t t i n g 
the b r i d g e b u i l t between Paris and 
Rome i s l i k e l y t o be more d i f f i c u l t 
than the P.M. appears t o f e e l . " ( 7 9 ) 
I n the l a s t h a l f o f the month t h i s aspect o f B r i t a i n ' 3 
diplomacy was f u r t h e r embarrassed by the a t t i t u d e o f 
the I t a l i a n press. An a r t i c l e had appeared i n 
'Relazioni I n t e r n a z i o n a l i ' on February 11 thr e a t e n i n g 
France w i t h war unless she made c e r t a i n concessions 
to I t a l y . This drew from B r i t a i n a s t e r n reminder 
(80) 
of the essence o f Chamberlain's speech of February 6. 
This was soon f o l l o w e d by the p u b l i c a t i o n o f a gerraan 
a r t i c l e on I t a l y ' s ' j u s t claims' against France. The 
f a c t t h a t Ciano refused to comment on such m a t e r i a l , 
e s p e c i a l l y on t h a t d e p i c t i n g I t a l y as prepared t o go t o 
war w i t h France, was taken great exception t o i n Eondon» 
Perth wa3 i n s t r u c t e d t o l e t the I t a l i a n s know t h a t the 
pipe o f appeasement s t i l l smouldered and t h a t '.articles 
i n t h i s s t r a i n . , . g r a v e l y embarrass the Prime M i n i s t e r 
(82) 
i n h i s work f o r peace.« Perth o b l i g e d but was 
c u r t l y t o l d t o r e a l i s e t h a t a s t a t e o f t e n s i o n e x i s t e d 
(83) 
between France and I t a l y . 
The m i l i t a n c y o f the press together w i t h Ciano's 
r e f u s a l t o confirm or deny views p r i n t e d threw a 
d i f f e r e n t and dangerous l i g h t on the s i t u a t i o n as f a r 
2'33. 
B r i t a i n was concerned. H a l i f a x , w h i l e not "believing 
t h a t Mussolini would r e s o r t to arras, thought t h a t the 
press incitements might lead the I t a l i a n s ' i n t o a 
p o s i t i o n they could not get out o f . This, he 
(8a) 
asserbed, was the touch-paper of most wars. 
The B r i t i s h , so f a r , had f a i l e d i n t h e i r dealings 
w i t h Ciano to r e l i e v e t h e .tension between Prance and 
I t a l y so they looked i n other d i r e c t i o n s f o r the answer. 
Advantage was now taken o f the easier atmosphere between 
London and B e r l i n to e n l i s t the support o f Germany. 
H a l i f a x l e t i t be known to von Dirksen before h i s 
departure f o r Germany on the 23rd. t h a t : 
"any i n f l u e n c e t h a t the German Government 
could exercise on t h e i r Axis p a r t n e r i n 
the d i r e c t i o n of reducing the temperature 
of the treatment o f any question between 
I t a l y and France would be i n f l u e n c e w e l l 
exerted."(85) 
At the same time Perth communicated from Rome h i s fears 
th a t t h e s i t u a t i o n could q u i c k l y become p e r i l o u s and 
recommended c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h the French as a matter 
o f urgency. 
" I wonder whether the time has not come 
when we should thrash out the whole 
matter w i t h the French Government i n 
order t o avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y o f such 
a catastrophe as t h a t to which I have 
a l l u d e d . I f we leave i t u n t i l too 
l a t e , I f e a r the s i t u a t i o n may develop 
i n t o a c r i s i s when a settlement becomes 
f a r more d i f f i c u l t because i t i s l i k e l y 
to t u r n on p r e s t i g e , " (86) 
The a d v i s a b i l i t y o f such a c t i o n was r e i n f o r c e d on the 
27th. when Perth reported t h a t I t a l y was presuming t h a t 
French m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i n Tunis amounted to prepare 
(87) 
t i o n f o r o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n . Before he received t h i s 
news H a l i f a x had already despatched a cable to Phipps 
(88) 
adv i s i n g c o n c i l i a t o r y a c t i o n by France, He now 
thought t h a t i f much a c t i o n was not taken immediately 
the s i t u a t i o n would 'so d e t e r i o r a t e as t o become very 
, (89) 
d i f f i c u l t to c o n t r o l , 1 I t was e v i d e n t l y s t i l l 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y t o calm t r o u b l e d waters i n Europe.' The 
B r i t i s h approach t o France was contained i n a s i n g l e 
sentences 
"Without attempting to mediate between the 
French and I t a l i a n Governments as t o the 
a c t u a l p o ints at issue between them, I am 
wondering whether the French Government 
would care t o make use of our good o f f i c e s 
to induce the ' I t a l i a n Government to r e f r a i n 
from f u r t h e r concentrations i n r e t u r n f o r 
some corresponding undertakings o f a 
reasonable character on the p a r t o f the 
French Government,"(90) 
The French r e a c t i o n to t h i s prompting was un-
cooperative. Bonnet claimed t h a t the French troop 
movements i n Tunis were merely i n response to the 
I t a l i a n movements and would only cease when I t a l y 
stopped sending reinforcementso Consolation f o r 
B r i t a i n could, however, be gained from an assurance t h a t 
the French concentrations were p u r e l y defensive and t h a t 
(91) 
care was being taken to avoid f r o n t i e r i n c i d e n t s . 
I f t h i s r e p l y was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o the B r i t i s h 
i n t h a t i t d i d not implement H a l i f a x ' s suggestion, i t 
d i d a t l e a s t show t h a t the French were handling the 
s i t u a t i o n f i r m l y and were not prepared (so i t seemed) 
to make u n c o n d i t i o n a l concessions t o Mussolini. I t 
was patent t h a t any f i n a l s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem 
r e l i e d upon the conclusion o f the Spanish C i v i l War 
which had been so severe a cause of animosity between 
the two c o u n t r i e s , and B r i t i s h p o l i c y , r a t h e r than 
attempting t o f i n d an a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n , had aimed 
at c o n t a i n i n g the I t a l i a n demands and preventing them 
from g e t t i n g out o f hand. Although tension had mounted 
considerably i n the l a s t two weeks o f February, greater 
hopes were i n s p i r e d by signs o f an e a r l y t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
h o s t i l i t i e s i n Spain. Barcelona had f a l l e n t o Franco on 
January 26 and a t the end o f February h i s conquest o f 
Catalonia r e s u l t e d i n the f l i g h t o f t h e republican govern-
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ment to Prance and the r e s i g n a t i o n o f i t s p r e s i d e n t . 
By then the outcome was s u f f i c i e n t l y c e r t a i n to allow 
of the r e c o g n i t i o n o f Franco's n a t i o n a l i s t government 
(92) (93) 
by Prance and England . Thus one o f the main 
causes of f r i c t i o n between I t a l y and France was almost 
removed g i v i n g genuine hope f o r f u r t h e r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . 
To Chamberlain t h i s t u r n o f events was the s i g n a l 
f o r much wider optimism - the prospect o f appeasement 
was now brought s u b s t a n t i a l l y c l o s e r ; He wrote on 
February 19: 
" I t h i n k we ought to be able t o e s t a b l i s h 
e x c e l l e n t r e l a t i o n s w i t h Franco, who seems 
w e l l disposed to us, and then, i f t h e 
I t a l i a n s are not i n too bad a temper, we 
might get F r a n c o - I t a l i a n conversations 
going, and i f they were reasonably amicable 
we might advance towards disarmament,"(94) 
H a l i f a x , i t has been seen, was more reserved i n h i s 
expectations, but could draw a measure o f comfort from 
the q u i e t e r mood o f Germany during February as compared 
w i t h January, 
"While we are not disposed t o under-rate 
the l a t e s t danger i n the present i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , our l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n 
i n c l i n e s us t o t h i n k t h a t H i t l e r has f o r 
the time being abandoned the idea o f pre-
c i p i t a t i n g an immediate c r i s i s , such as 
he seemed to be contemplating a t the 
beginning o f the year. '(95) 
237. 
This e x t r a c t i s from a communication dated February 27 
to Lindsay i n Washington. C o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h a t 
c a p i t a l had been continued i n t o February w i t h H a l i f a x 
s u b m i t t i n g almost weekly reviews o f the European 
(96) 
s i t u a t i o n t o the State Department. Although t h i s 
Anglo-American concert was resented i n Germany i t was, 
from t h e B r i t i s h p o i n t o f view, a valuable steadying 
(97) 
i n f l u e n c e on Europe. 
February r e a l l y marks a d e l i c a t e , but d i s t i n c t 
swing i n the angle o f the appeasers' p o l i c y . As the 
chance o f success f o r the method o f personal contact 
had dwindled so d r a s t i c a l l y since Munich Chamberlain was 
now endeavouring, through demonstrations o f s o l i d a r i t y 
between B r i t a i n , France and the United States, t o create 
an atmosphere i n Europe which would deter the t o t a l i t a r i a n 
s t a t e s from l i g h t l y committing any act which would 
consume Europe i n war. I t was a l i n e he could take 
because he f e l t t h a t B r i t a i n was m i l i t a r i l y i n a stronger 
p o s i t i o n than she had been. I t was a l o g i c a l extension 
o f the rearmament side o f h i s p o l i c y which d i d not deny 
h i s c o n t i n u i n g hopes t h a t H i t l e r and Mussolini could i n 
time be brought to s e t t l e outstanding problems round the 
conference t a b l e . I t was, to Chamberlain's mind, the 
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necessary insurance p o l i c y t h a t the business man takes 
out against p o s s i b l e catastrophe. Here, i n H a l i f a x ' s 
words, v/as the 'umbrella' t h a t 'helps t o keep, the r a i n 
(98) 
away'. Thus i t w i l l be shown t h a t when i n March the 
European s i t u a t i o n had d e t e r i o r a t e d to such an extent 
t h a t B r i t a i n began to extend guarantees to s e v e r a l 
East European s t a t e s , t h i s was not such a v i o l e n t 
change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y as many observers have wished 
to t h i n k . 
Chamberlain's announcement concerning B r i t a i n ' 3 
support f o r Prance marks the r e a l p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s 
p o l i c y . I t was an announcement which removed any 
doubts t h a t B r i t a i n , though passionately concerned t o 
preserve peace, would under c e r t a i n circumstances f i g h t . 
But t h i s , i n essence, was nothing r a d i c a l l y new. 
Chamberlain had asserted as much a t Birmingham on 
(99) 
January 28 and i n the House of Commons on t h e 31st, 
I m p l i c a t i o n s from H a l i f a x on February 3 had also been 
q u i t e d e f i n i t e t h a t B r i t a i n ' s desire f o r peace d i d not 
amount t o p a c i f i s m . 
"However much B r i t i s h people may want peace, 
they f e e l i n s t i n c t i v e l y t h a t there are 
things w i t h o u t which l i f e as they know i t 
would not be worth l i v i n g . They would not 
be slow i f need arose to make up t h e i r minds 
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what these t h i n g s are, remembering t h a t 
f o r them the l i f e o f the n a t i o n consists 
not only i n m a t e r i a l possessions, but i n 
the assurance o f independence and freedom 
to l i v e t h a t l i f e according t o the fashion 
they desire."(100) 
What was so important about Chamberlain's 
February 6 statement was t h a t i t marked a departure 
from such g e n e r a l i t i e s as quoted above and i n d i c a t e d 
s p e c i f i c circumstances which would see B r i t a i n i n 
arms. The vague t h r e a t s o f e a r l i e r days had been 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a d e f i n i t e promise. While the 
subsequent guarantee to Poland represented a f u r t h e r 
set o f con d i t i o n s which would b r i n g B r i t a i n i n t o 
m i l i t a r y support o f an East European country, the 
February promise i f o f p a r t i c u l a r importance i n t h a t 
i t was the f i r s t time Europe was given proof t h a t 
B r i t a i n would go to war. For although t h e statement 
to France had been d i c t a t e d l a r g e l y by the tensio n i n 
F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s and at the time had s p e c i a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h a t area o f European diplomacy, i t 
d i d not per se exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y o f aggression 
against France from other quarters - namely Germany. 
Thus i t amounted i n e f f e c t t o a f i r m stand being taken 
by B r i t a i n against the opponents of peace, a s t e r n 
warning presented i n the context of Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s 
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to Europe and the world. 
The f a t a l shortcoming o f t h i s p o l i c y i n p r a c t i c e , 
liowever, was t h a t i t was not i n t e r p r e t e d a3 c o n s t i t u t i n g 
any r e a l i n n o v a t i o n i n B r i t i s h t h i n k i n g . I t appeaared 
too i n s u l a r , the new found s t r e n g t h o f B r i t a i n being 
r e l a t e d t o Western Europe only. This impression was 
heightened by t h e f a c t t h a t B r i t a i n continued t o employ 
dulc e t tones w i t h H i t l e r as f a r as C e ntral and Eastern 
Europe were concerned. Chamberlain's concern over 
Czechoslovakia, f o r instance, was t r a n s m i t t e d t o H i t l e r 
i n the form of an enquiry as t o the nature, of Germany's 
p o s i t i o n w i t h reference to the Guarantee o f t h a t s t a t e . 
I t was p l a i n t h a t B r i t a i n s t i l l abided by the basic 
p r i n c i p l e which had guided her p o l i c y o f appeasement 
over the past months and thus i t was reasonable f o r 
H i t l e r to presume t h a t her d e c l a r a t i o n to France was 
l i t t l e or no evidence o f B r i t a i n t a k i n g a f i r m e r l i n e 
i n Europe g e n e r a l l y , Weizsacker l a t e r c r i t i c i s e d t h i s 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y inept approach to H i t l e r : 
"•••they d i d not use the r i g h t way o f 
t a l k i n g t o H i t l e r , which would have 
been to declare unambiguously t h a t they 
would put up w i t h no f u r t h e r acts o f 
f o r c e . , , , . I n s t e a d of g e t t i n g H i t l e r t o 
drop any ideas o f using f o r c e against 
Prague because t h i s would be too 
dangerous, they sought t o b i n d him 
morally."(101) 
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Had B r i t a i n ' s recuperated s t r e n g t h been extended a t t h i s 
time from Prance t o Czechoslovakia a f a r more s a l u t o r y 
i n f l u e n c e would have been exerted on Germany. But i t 
was not yet time f o r Chamberlain so t o abandon appease-
ment. 
The relevance o f the February d e c l a r a t i o n f o r 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h France i s s e l f - e v i d e n t . February 
gen e r a l l y witnessed a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the u n i t e d 
B r i t i s h and French p o s i t i o n w i t h reference to possible 
(102) 
German aggression against other V/est European c o u n t r i e s . 
Arrangements and procedure were agreed upon f o r the 
conduct o f s t a f f conversations. The scope o f the 
p r o j e c t e d t a l k s was i n d i c a t i v e o f the suspicion w i t h 
which the d i c t a t o r s were viewed, despite the f r a n t i c 
hopes to which Chamberlain s t i l l clung and the a l l e v i a -
t i o n i n . general European tension t h a t February had 
brought. Taking the standpoint o f a war s i t u a t i o n the 
conversations were t o cover a l l p o s s i b l e theatres o f 
war i n which j o i n t Anglo-French operations could take 
place, i n c l u d i n g the Far East. They were t o proceed by 
stages: 
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" ( i ) 1 s t . Stage: Discussion.•.of...general 
s t r a t e g i c a l conception o f a war i n 
which B r i t a i n and France were engaged 
as a l l i e s against Germany and I t a l y . , . 
( i i ) 2nd. Stage: Discussion i n broad 
o u t l i n e o f plans i n the several, 
theatres of ope r a t i o n , 
( i i i ) 3 r d. Stage: Preparation o f d e t a i l e d 
j o i n t plans."(103) 
The idea o f s t a f f t a l k s o f t h i s k i n d had been the 
product o f the anxiety i n the l a t t e r h a l f o f January 
created by the i n d i c a t i o n s o f some impending aggression 
by H i t l e r together w i t h the r i s i n g tempo of I t a l i a n 
claims. A matter o f days now was to show t h a t the 
o v e r a l l b r i g h t e r aspect o f Europe during February d i d 
not obviate the a d v i s a b i l i t y o f such a c t i o n on the p a r t 
o f B r i t a i n and France. Henderson, on the l a s t day o f 
February foresaw ' i n the immediate f u t u r e a p e r i o d of 
(104) 
r e l a t i v e calm', but there were other reports 
prophesying the event th a t was to take place i n a 
f o r t n i g h t ' s time, Ashton-Gwatkin during h i s v i s i t t o 
Germany had received i n t i m a t i o n s from Ribbentrop to the 
e f f e c t t h a t 'there was some f u r t h e r task f o r Germany 
(105) 
to do i n Central Europe', 
I t needed less than an i n t e l l i g e n t mind t o deduce 
t h a t such a task i n v o l v e d , again, Czechoslovakia, f o r 
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there were i n d i c a t i o n s from both Prague and B r a t i s l a v a 
t h a t the i n g r e d i e n t s f o r a c r i s i s were maturing. 
Although the Czech government were doing a l l i n t h e i r 
power to achieve s t a b l e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Reich, 
g r e a t l y increased a c t i v i t y on the p a r t o f the German 
Volksgruppe was umbraging c e r t a i n elements i n the 
country. Troutbeck, the B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r i n Prague, 
reported t h a t t he speeches o f Herr.Kurdt, leader o f the 
Volksgruppe, together w i t h the h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e o f the 
German press were ' p a i n f u l l y reminiscent o f the s i t u a t i o n 
(106) 
l a s t year'. German i n f l u e n c e on the Czech government 
had become p a r t i c u l a r l y marked; i t seemed t h a t K r e j c i , 
c h i e f of the general s t a f f and 'an ardent supporter o f 
the o l d t r a d i t i o n ' had been forced to r e s i g n by German 
pressure and the Reich was also urging the dismis s a l o f 
c e r t a i n members o f the cabinet associated w i t h the pre-
(107) 
Munich regime. This l a t t e r subject had been a cause 
of f r i c t i o n w i t h i n Czechoslovakia between the separate 
c e n t r a l Slovak and Ruthenian D i e t s , an area where 
dissension was growing r a p i d l y . M i n o r i t y problems 
(which were e a s i l y f o s t e r e d by Germany) were an ever-
growing t h r e a t to the u n i t y o f the country. The predominant 
s p l i t was between Slovakia, which was on very close terms 
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w i t h the Reich, and the Czechs, who l a r g e l y showed an 
(108) 
anti-German "bias • This problem was "becoming more 
intense as a r e s u l t o f the d i f f i c u l t economic p o s i t i o n 
o f Slovakia. A r e p o r t from B r a t i s l a v a on February 26 
gave cause f o r concern: 
"The f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n o f the Government 
seems t o "be growing r a p i d l y worse. The 
Czechs are w i t h - h o l d i n g t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
support and i t looks as i f i n a few months 
a disastrous s i t u a t i o n might arise."(109) 
The s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n Czechoslovakia was such t h a t 
Germany could t u r n t o her own use at any t i m e c This 
was a discouraging f a c t t h a t could not be denied i n 
B r i t a i n , and by the end o f February fears f o r the s a f e t y 
o f the remaining rump o f Czechoslovakia from German 
a c t i o n were s t r o n g l y f e l t : 
"While recent secret i n f o r m a t i o n suggests 
t h a t any plan f o r m o b i l i s a t i o n e a r l y i n 
March may have been postponed, reports 
have r e c e n t l y reached us p o i n t i n g to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a m i l i t a r y occupation o f 
Czechoslovakia."(110) 
Such was H a l i f a x ' s d i s t r e s s i n g news to. Washington on 
February 27. I t was i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t heralded the 
d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l a s t vestiges o f f a i t h i n German good-
w i l l and w i t h i t the very s t r u c t u r e o f post-Munich 
appeasement. 
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I t was n a t u r a l t h a t w h i l e such ominous reports had 
to receive the c l o s e s t s c r u t i n y by the policy-makers i n 
B r i t a i n , t h e i r accuracy was t o be doubtedo Indeed, t h e i r 
accuracy continued t o be questioned r i g h t up t i l l 
f i n a l l y proved. This obstinacy was even t o be accompanied 
by outward shows o f s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the European scene. 
Such t a c t i c s however, disguised a deeper f e e l i n g - f e a r . 
For, by the end o f February most of the genuine optimism 
i n the B r i t i s h approach to Europe which had been 
generated i n the e a r l y p a r t o f the month, had been 
d i s s i p a t e d . The h e a l t h i e r s t a t e o f B r i t a i n ' s defences, 
the- r e v i v a l o f a c t i v i t y i n economic appeasement, and 
the promise h e l d out o f an e a r l y t e r m i n a t i o n t o the 
c o n f l i c t i n Spain, had a l l conspired t o a f f o r d Chamberlain 
a new lease o f l i f e and hope i n h i s search f o r peace. 
At no time since Munich had the omens seemed so good. 
But t h i s optimism had been s h o r t - l i v e d . Confidence as 
the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y had been 
overcome by f e a r . Strength i n defences had enabled 
Chamberlain t o adopt, during e a r l y February, an a t t i t u d e 
o f greater s t r e n g t h i n Europe, but subsequent events had 
revealed that a s o l u t i o n t o Europe's problems was no 
c l o s e r . The d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f F r a n c o - I t a l i a n r e l a t i o n s 
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had done much to demonstrate t h i s . I t was, however, the 
explosive nature o f a f f a i r s w i t h i n Czechoslovakia 
together w i t h the menacing suspicions o f German designs, 
t h a t was the most eloquent adviser. For here was a 
s i t u a t i o n uncomfortably reminiscent o f the immediately 
pre-Munich days. At no time during the spate o f 
rumours i n mid-January had there been such f e a s i b l e 
grounds f o r concern, f o r not one o f the suspicions aimed 
at Germany then had been supported by a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s 
so l i k e l y to prove i t s t r u e foundation as t h a t now 
presented i n Czechoslovakia, 
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Chapter nine 
Spring Fever 
The ear l y p a r t o f March was, f o r the B r i t i s h , 
a time o f e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i r p o l i c y towards Germany.' 
During t h e w i n t e r the immediate e f f o r t s o f appeasement 
had been focused on I t a l y . But t h i s could never be -
and was never intended to be-an end i n i t s e l f . I t 
was very much a means to an end, f o r success or 
f a i l u r e u l t i m a t e l y l a y i n the a b i l i t y t o r e s t r a i n 
the German Puhrer from the i l l e g a l use o f f o r c e . 
Thus towards the end o f January and during February 
a t t e n t i o n had been focused again on Germany. Specula-
t i o n as t o H i t l e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s together w i t h the 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the s t a t e o f the German economy had 
as s i s t e d t h i s r e - o r i e n t a t i o n but i t was i n e v i t a b l e 
because o f the appeasers' desires to make some headway 
where i t mattered most. The stimulus given to 
economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany l a i d the foundations 
f o r hope i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . Economic r e l a t i o n s , 
however, l i k e Rome, could be no more than a stepping-
stone to t h a t necessary p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n w i t h 
Germany o f s u f f i c i e n t t r u s t , honesty, and soundness 
to secure a l a s t i n g peace. So B r i t a i n ' s economic 
p o l i c y t o Germany was, i n conception, a v e h i c l e to 
c a r r y the desired p o l i t i c a l rapprochement. 
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During February i t had been s u f f i c i e n t to get 
the v e h i c l e i n t o reasonable running order. But 
once arrangements had been made f o r o f f i c i a l government 
economic discussions the question was bound t o a r i s e 
as t o the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p o f p o l i t i c a l endeavours 
to progress i n the economic f i e l d . The issue was p i n -
p o i n t e d by Henderson on March 3. Two p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
e x i s t e d as f a r as he saw i t : 
(a) Whether on the economic side His 
Majesty's Government should refuse 
to go f u r t h e r i n the d i r e c t i o n o f 
cooperation w i t h Germany, so long 
as she pursues her present course of 
senseless rearmament, on the ground 
t h a t any assistance would simply be 
employed f o r strengthening s t i l l 
f u r t h e r her m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n ; or 
(b)Whether economic co-operation should 
be pursued i n the hope t h a t the 
p o l i t i c a l atmosphere may be improved 
thereby and Germany may be f i n a l l y 
induced to r e f r a i n from any p o l i t i c a l 
adventures which she might contemplate, 
and perhaps even d e s i s t up to a c e r t a i n 
p o i n t from the present armaments race."(1) 
This was clea'rly a matter o f the h i g h e s t importance 
reaching to the h e a r t o f appeasement. 
Henderson was not prepared to cast h i s vote 
d e f i n i t e l y i n favour o f e i t h e r course. To him there 
were strong arguments i n support o f both p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; 
to show unreadiness f o r economic co-operation might 
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"be i n t e r p r e t e d by Germany as a measure of economic 
encirclement which could i n c i t e her t o increased 
armaments a c t i v i t y , w h i l e the b e n e f i t s accruing to 
her from continued economic dealings w i t h B r i t a i n c o u l d 
equally be ploughed i n t o her rearmament programme. 
He was t h e r e f o r e i n c l i n e d to s i t on the fence: 
" i n these circumstances i t appears t o me 
t h a t some middle course i s the best temporary 
s o l u t i o n , whereby we could co-operate on a 
scale which i n i t s e l f would not be so 
appreciable as m a t e r i a l l y to a f f e c t German 
rearmament, but which might be j u s t enough 
i n i t s e l f to give the German mind the 
impression t h a t v oluntary r e n u n c i a t i o n o f 
excessive rearmament might lead t o a large 
measure of co-operation and g o o d w i l l from 
Great B r i t a i n . " ( 2 ) 
This whole question had been brought to the f o r e 
by a memorandum from Colonel Mason-Macfarlane to 
Henderson on the m i l i t a r y aspect o f economic concessions 
to Germany. Mason-Macfarlane disagreed w i t h 
Henderson: 
" i f Germany i s given f a c i l i t i e s f o r 
maintaining her export trade on a 
s u f f i c i e n t scale, there seems to'be 
but l i t t l e prospect t h a t we s h a l l see 
any r e d u c t i o n i n the tempo of armament. 
I f she i s not given such f a c i l i t i e s 
there i s every p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a r e -
duction o f the speed w i t h which she i s 
rearming and o f the scope of her 
armaments w i l l be f o r c e d upon her... 
...Prom the m i l i t a r y p o i n t of view 
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concessions made by us to the 
present regime i n Germany are 
ge n e r a l l y to he deplored." (3) 
The danger i n t h i s p o l i c y was t h a t H i t l e r might be 
tempted to embark on a major war r a t h e r than submit 
to pressure o f t h i s nature from B r i t a i n . But 
Henderson, i n h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , claimed t h a t he 
was f a r from convinced by t h i s argument! 
" I was always d i s i n c l i n e d to accept the 
o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d theory t h a t H i t l e r 
would n e c e s s a r i l y be o b l i g e d to seek 
f u r t h e r adventure i n order t o avoid 
economic c o l l a p s e , " ( 4 ) 
I f Henderson genuinely b e l i e v e d e a r l y i n March 1938 
t h a t to v/ith-hold economic a i d from Germany would 
not induce her t o embark on some f u r t h e r t e r r i t o r i a l 
adventure, why d i d he not agree w i t h Mason-Macfarlane• 
conclusions and advise h i s government accordingly? 
Perhaps the above q u o t a t i o n from F a i l u r e o f a Mission 
i s an example o f wisdom a f t e r the event. On the 
other hand Henderson's behaviour i n f a i l i n g to support 
'Mason-Macfarlane's views although he agreed w i t h them 
would be understandable i f he already s t r o n g l y 
suspected t h a t H i t l e r was, i n any case, i n t e n d i n g 
s:ome European adventure i n the near f u t u r e . For then 
to r e l a x the one s t a b l e element i n Anc-lo-German 
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r e l a t i o n s could be used by H i t l e r as propaganda i n 
support o f h i s premeditated a c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y to 
confer u n c o n d i t i o n a l economic aid on Germany would 
serve only to encourage H i t l e r i n any i n t e n t i o n he 
had i n mind. Henderson wanted to steer a middle 
course which would not commit B r i t a i n i n e i t h e r 
d i r e c t i o n and t h i s was because he already had a 
d i s t i n c t presentiment o f what was t o happen i n less 
than two weeks' time. 
Only three days before Henderson despatched these 
observations on economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany to 
London, he had reported t h a t he a n t i c i p a t e d a p e r i o d 
(5) 
o f r e l a t i v e calm i n the immediate f u t u r e . His 
changed o p i n i o n (culpably not communicated t o H a l i f a x ) 
came about as a r e s u l t o f impressions gained o f 
H i t l e r at a f u n c t i o n on March 1. This was the occasion 
o f a dinner given by H i t l e r f o r the Diplomatic Corps. 
Henderson's account o f h i s f e e l i n g s a t t h e time, as 
expressed i n h i s memoirs, i s worth quoting i n f u l l : 
"My f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n o f imminent t r o u b l e 
was a t the annual banquet which H i t l e r 
gave to the diplomatic corps, somewhat 
l a t e r than usual, on March 1 s t . A f t e r 
dinner H i t l e r used t o remain standing i n 
the drawing room, and would speak f o r 
some f i v e or t e n minutes i n t u r n t o each 
of the Heads o f Missions i n the order o f 
t h e i r precedence. The apparent f r i e n d -
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l i n e s s which he had shown a t the motor 
e x h i b i t i o n was notably absent a t t h i s 
dinner. At the e x h i b i t i o n he had shaken 
me by the hand not once, but three times. 
On t h i s occasion he c a r e f u l l y avoided 
l o o k i n g me i n the face when he was speak-
ing t o me: he kept h i s eyes f i x e d over 
my r i g h t shoulder and confined h i s remarks 
to general subjects, w h i l e s t r e s s i n g the 
p o i n t t h a t i t was not B r i t a i n ' s business 
to i n t e r f e r e w i t h Germany i n Central 
Europe, I had heard i t a l l before, b ut, 
though he s a i d nothing new o r s t a r t l i n g , 
h i s a t t i t u d e l e f t me w i t h a f e e l i n g of 
vague uneasiness. I n the l i g h t o f wisdom 
a f t e r t h e event, I have no doubt t h a t he 
was already weighing the various contingencies 
i n regard to Prague, and making h i s Dlans 
f o r March 15,"(6) 
While i n a l l f a i r n e s s i t mu3t be admitted t h a t t h e r e 
nothing t a n g i b l e here f o r Henderson to r e p o r t i n 
evidence o f German p e r f i d y the e x t r a c t shows t h a t he 
was s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed by H i t l e r ' s demeanour to 
warrant genuine suspicion. I t was, moreover, a 
suspicion supported by Weizsacker's h i n t s t o hira 
over the past few weeks: 
"Since February I had ventured the guess, t o 
Henderson: " C r i s i s - yes. War - no,"(7) 
Nothing o f t h i s reached the f o r e i g n o f f i c e i n London, 
Henderson's r e p o r t to H a l i f a x on March 2 was n e u t r a l , 
even s l i g h t l y o p t i m i s t i c i 
" A f t e r agreeing on necessity f o r gradual 
improvement o f atmosphere, Herr H i t l e r 
observed, w i t h considerable f e e l i n g t h a t 
the only question which s t i l l separated 
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the two co u n t r i e s was the c o l o n i a l one, 
t h a t he admired the B r i t i s h Empire, and 
had no desire t o work against i t s i n t e r e s t s , 
but t h a t the l a t t e r i n . r e t u r n must r e -
cognise the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n o f Germany 
on the continent*. " (8) 
To a suggestion f o r c o n f i d e n t i a l t a l k s to continue the 
s p i r i t o f Munich 'Herr H i t l e r bowed but w i t h o u t 
comment and d i d not give me the impression t h a t he 
welcomed the idea. 1 
This i s p l a i n l y much less o f t h e t r u t h than 
Henderson reveals i n h i s book, though h i s r e f l e c t i o n s 
might w e l l c o n t a i n a strong element o f a f t e r - t h o u g h t . 
Yet i t appears t h a t , up to a p o i n t , he was c e r t a i n l y 
t r y i n g t o mask r e a l i t y . Why he should have done 
t h i s needs no great understanding, Henderson was, 
perhaps, the appeaser ad absurdum. For as the 
months a f t e r Munich had spun out t h e i r disparaging 
t a l e the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the appeasers became 
hope r a t h e r than f a i t h . This has been noted i n 
Chamberlain; i t was a shade less t r u e o f H a l i f a x . 
But i t was the very l i f e - b l o o d o f Henderson - a 
stubborn hope t h a t refused to despair and could only 
be discarded through the very e x t i n c t i o n o f i t s own 
o b j e c t . His w i l l i n g n e s s t o concede t o German 
demands was marked i n the dealings o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
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Commission. I t i s possible th a t he was galvanised 
i n t o a v i r t u a l 'peace at any p r i c e ' p o l i c y by the 
might o f t h e German m i l i t a r y machine. He described 
(9) 
h i s p o s i t i o n at B e r l i n as 'a s o u l - s c a r i f y i n g j o b ' . 
F e l l i n g describes him as ' c l u t c h i n g at what seemed 
(10) 
l e a s t unreasonable i n an unreasonable w o r l d 1 , and 
h i s eagerness to a n t i c i p a t e the best w h i l e d i m i n i s h i n g 
signs t o the contrary was probably a sublimation o f 
h i s worst f e a r s . I n deference to 'the s t r e n g t h o f 
the Nazi movement1 he was a t t h i s time anxious t o 
avoid a l l p o i n t s o f f r i c t i o n w i t h Germany ' i n which 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s are not d i r e c t l y or v i t a l l y i n v o l v e d ' 
even t o the extent o f producing some k i n d of ' B r i t i s h 
n e u t r a l i t y i n the event o f Germany being engaged i n 
(11) 
the East'. Bearing a l l t h i s i n mind i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Henderson's impressions o f H i t l e r , 
as gained on March 1, were kept p r i v a t e . 
Two days l a t e r , however, there came more t a n g i b l e 
i n d i c a t i o n o f German designs and t h a t Czechoslovakia 
was the immediate t a r g e t o f H i t l e r ' s ambition. This 
was Ribbentrop's r e p l y to the B r i t i s h and French 
communications o f February 8 enquiring the a t t i t u d e 
o f the German government t o the question o f the 
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guarantee of Czechoslovakia. I t amounted t o a v i r t u a l 
d e n i a l o f the existence o f such a guarantee accompanied 
"by a sharp rap on t h e a l l i e d knuckles f o r i n t e r f e r i n g 
i n a matter which was not r e a l l y t h e i r concernj 
"The German Government i s . , , f u l l y aware 
t h a t fundamentally the general l i n e o f 
development i n t h i s European area f a l l s 
p r i m a r i l y w i t h i n the sphere o f the most 
important i n t e r e s t s o f the German Reich, 
hot only from the h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t o f 
view, but i n the l i g h t o f geographical 
and above a l l economic necessity."(12) 
This was a strong p o i n t e r to H i t l e r ' s desire t o take 
the i n i t i a t i v e i n t h a t p a r t of Central Europe w i t h o u t 
arousing a c t i v e sympathy from B r i t a i n and Prance, 
I t also comprised yet another d e n i a l of the . v a l i d i t y 
o f Munich which had s p e c i f i c a l l y provided t h i s 
guarantee. The German note argued t h a t 'the assump-
t i o n by England and Prance o f such a guarantee' 
had come at a very i l l - a d v i s e d time owing t o the 
present di f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n between Czechoslovakia 
and her neighbours, and t h a t i t would not provide any 
safeguard against the development or i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n 
o f these tensions. I t was even suggested t h a t to 
pro c l a i m a guarantee: 
"...would r a t h e r have the e f f e c t o f 
accentuating the di f f e r e n c e s between 
t h a t country and the surrounding 
States. "(iL3) 
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While dissuading the French and B r i t i s h governments 
from taking any steps to define a guarantee Germany 
t a c i t l y excused her own l i a b i l i t y i n the matter by 
inferring that the problem of the Polish and Hungarian 
minorities had not yet been f i n a l l y s e t t l e d owing to 
(14) 
those differences of opinion s t i l l e xisting. 
The B r i t i s h government, apparently, accepted the 
note without offence or objection* Such reaction i s , 
of course, symptomatic of the prevailing mood of 
appeasement of l e t t i n g the sleeping dogs of Central 
Europe l i e , of 'the avoidance of constant and vexatious 
interference i n matters i n which B r i t i s h interests 
(15) 
are not d i r e c t l y or v i t a l l y involved, 1 to use 
Henderson's words. But i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r instance 
the f a i l u r e to act reflected anything but- credit on 
the country. Originally Czechoslovakia had only 
agreed to the Anglo-French Plan of September 19 on 
the c l e a r understanding that the guarantee of her 
boundaries against unprovoked aggression formed a 
(16) 
s p e c i f i c clause of i t . The existence of th i s 
guarantee had been used by the government as a 
powerful argument i n defence of the Munich Agreement -260. 
(17) 
they considered i t aa 'a moral o b l i g a t i o n ' 
A f t e r t h a t t h e i r tardiness i n r a i s i n g the question 
(18) 
w i t h Germany has already been poin t e d out. But 
now t h a t t h a t a c t i o n had brought a response and shown 
t h a t Germany was i g n o r i n g the existence o f any such 
guarantee and thereby f a c i l i t a t i n g any f u t u r e t r a n s -
gression on her p a r t o f t h a t country's independence, 
B r i t a i n p r e f e r r e d t o remain q u i e t about i t than to 
f u l f i l l her promises t o Czechoslovakia and c l a r i f y 
her p o s i t i o n w i t h regard t o t h i s 'embarrassing 
(19) 
commitment.' Admittedly there had been no request 
from the Czechs f o r an e l a b o r a t i o n - to them 'the 
(20) 
guarantee was apparently i n c o l d storage' but 
t h i s d i d not d i m i n i s h B r i t a i n ' 3 r e p o n s i b i l i t y i n the 
event o f aggression against them. Her s i l e n c e now, 
at a time when suspicion o f German a c t i o n i n Czecho-
sl o v a k i a was g r a d u a l l y mounting, was a d e n i a l o f 
t h a t moral o b l i g a t i o n she had undertaken. 
Not only was i t a dishonourable omission b u t 
also one o f f o l l y . By acquiescing h o p e f u l l y i n the 
s t a t e d German i n t e n t i o n t o : 
"...await a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the i n t e r n a l 
development of Czechoslovakia and t h e 
improvement o f t h a t country's r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h the surrounding s t a t e s . " ( 2 1 ) 
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B r i t a i n encouraged the event she hoped to a v e r t . 
Passiveness i n t h i s case made a mockery o f appease-
ment. For i t can be asserted w i t h a l j . confidence 
t h a t B r i t a i n ' s f a i l u r e to act upon Germany's note 
could only have given H i t l e r good reason t o expect 
t h a t he would not have t o reckon w i t h armed o p p o s i t i o n 
from the a l l i e d powers i f he threatened the independence 
o f Czechoslovakia. 
Such reasoning was a l l t he more v a l i d when considered 
i n the context of B r i t a i n ' s recent expression o f 
s o l i d a r i t y w i t h France, A d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n 
r e l a t i o n s between France and I t a l y over the l a t t e r ' s 
c o l o n i a l a s p i r a t i o n s had brought t h e spectre o f 
war i n Europe much close r and had e l i c i t e d from 
B r i t a i n a c a t e g o r i c a l a s s e r t i o n t h a t she would f i g h t 
i f the i n t e r e s t s of her a l l y v/ere threatened. But 
when Germany refuses to countenance the guarantee o f 
Czechoslovakia's f r o n t i e r s as being o p e r a t i v e , 
B r i t a i n , ' having pr e v i o u s l y pledged her support t o 
t h i s guarantee, f a i l s t o r a i s e the s l i g h t e s t 
objection. 1 The l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r Germany 
e s p e c i a l l y at a time when Czechoslovakian p o l i t i c s 
v/ere i n a precarious state' was t h a t B r i t i s h concern 
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f o r t h a t country had somewhat dwindled. I t could 
even imply a general demarcation o f B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t 
between Western and Ce n t r a l Europe, t h a t B r i t a i n was 
t a c i t l y acknowledging the l a t t e r area as one o f 
predominantly German i n t e r e s t . I f H i t l e r was having 
any doubts as t o h i s a b i l i t y t o s u c c e s s f u l l y plunder 
the remainder o f t h e Czechoslovak s t a t e B r i t a i n had 
r e l i e v e d him o f them. The t r u t h i s , o f course, t h a t 
she had never wished t o be bound by a serious 
(22) 
guarantee and the more she suspected German a c t i o n , 
the less she wanted i t . I f B r i t a i n had o r i g i n a l l y 
entered i n t o the guarantee as a matter o f expedience 
she was soon t o s u f f e r the consequences. 
The German note was forwarded to H a l i f a x by 
Henderson on March 3. Henderson r e f r a i n e d from 
making any personal comment. Five days l a t e r news 
was received t h a t ' r e l a t i o n s between Czechscand 
(23) 
Slovaks seem to be heading f o r a c r i s i s ' . Matters 
had come t o a head over a Slovakian demand f o r 
f i n a n c i a l assistance, and i t was also suspected t h a t 
the Slovaks were eager f o r a l a r g e measure o f 
independence i n army matters. This r e p o r t was 
i n d i c a t i v e o f the way th i n g s were going but on the 
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same day (March 8) H a l i f a x received a second r e p o r t 
(24) 
from Newton which gave cause f o r hope. The Czech 
press had i m p l i e d t h a t a v i r t u a l c a p i t u l a t i o n o f the 
Slovaks was l i k e l y . The hope was s h o r t - l i v e d . By 
the 10th the c r i s i s had erupted w i t h the dismissal 
o f the Slovak government and a r r e s t o f i t s premier 
(25) 
"by the Czech President. Only at t h i s stage, when 
the die was cast, would Henderson inform London o f 
(26) 
h i s fears f o r Czechoslovakia. 
I t was not u n t i l the 10th. t h a t H a l i f a x received 
Henderson's o r i g i n a l communication regarding B r i t a i n ' s 
politico-economic p o l i c y t o Germany. Economic 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany were suspended w i t h i n a few 
days as a r e s u l t o f the c r i s i s over Czecho-Slovakia, 
so there i s no i n d i c a t i o n o f o f f i c i a l r e a c t i o n t o the 
problem r a i s e d . Before the s i t u a t i o n had become 
acute, hov/ever, Henderson had made f u r t h e r observations 
i n a communication to H a l i f a x i n which he gave a f u l l 
(27) 
a p p r a i s a l o f Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . There was 
now l i t t l e doubt i n h i s mind t h a t B r i t a i n should push 
on w i t h economic appeasement. Convinced t h a t 
' Europe v / i l l never be s t a b l e and peaceful u n t i l 
Germany i s once more prosperous' he argued against 
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Mason-Mac farlane's desires to r e s t r i c t t r a d i n g : 
" i f there were any apparent c o n s t r u c t i v e 
value i n the p o l i c y o f standing a l o o f 
and keeping Germany lean,- one might 
"be prepared to recommend i t . I t i s , 
however, d i f f i c u l t to see any p r a c t i c a l 
advantage i n i t , even i f we could -
which we probably cannot - keep one of 
our best customers permanently lean... 
the d e n i a l o f a l l help and the r e f u s a l 
o f a l l sympathetic understanding i s 
c a l c u l a t e d to produce a f e e l i n g o f 
despair which, even i f i t does not 
a c t u a l l y b r i n g about the explosion 
t h a t we f e a r , w i l l a t l e a s t leave 
behind i t a h e r i t a g e o f h a t r e d and 
a desire f o r revenge."(28) 
The p o l i c y he advised was aimed a t persuading 
Germany to f a l l i n l i n e w i t h the appeasers f o r she 
was, under th e circumstances p r e v a i l i n g i n Central 
Europe, faced w i t h two a l t e r n a t i v e courses: 
" . . . e i t h e r to misuse her great 
s t r e n g t h f o r purposes o f p o l i t i c a l 
domination and the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f 
r e s t l e s s and ever-increasing ambitions; 
or to abandon jun g l e law i n i t s 
cruder forms and g r a d u a l l y to r e t u r n t o 
normalcy and i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation." 
B r i t a i n ' s a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e t h i s choice was, 
Henderson thought, considerable: 
"...Germany's f u t u r e course may Ibo a 
great extent depend on the p o l i c y which 
His Majesty's Government w i l l adopt 
towards her a t t h i s c r i t i c a l time." 
He s t r o n g l y discouraged t h a t ' p o l i c y o f despair 1 
265. 
which considered that German world domination would 
he the inevitable r e s u l t of her 'immensely pov/erful 
m i l i t a r y organisation 1, and saw no viable alternative 
for B r i t i s h policy than to display such generosity to 
Germany as might convince her of B r i t a i n ' s benevolence. 
Included i n t h i s attitude should be a reticence to 
concern h e r s e l f too much with a f f a i r s of central 
Europe; i f Germany thought that B r i t a i n was prepared 
to concede a large measure of i n t e g r i t y i n t h i s area 
to the Reich, . she would be more l i k e l y to 'return to 
normalcy'• I t would also greatly reduce the chances 
of H i t l e r precipitating d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the west, 
"Germany's continental future l i e s eastward 
and i t i s probably not unfortunate that 
i t should do so. The 'Drang nach Osten' 
i s a r e a l i t y but the 'Drang nach West en': 
w i l l only become so i f Germany finds 
a l l the avenues to the East blocked or 
i f western opposition i s such as to 
convince H i t l e r that he cannot go east-
ward without f i r s t having rendered i t 
innocuous."(29) 
This was j u s t what Germany had been wanting for some 
time, what Germany had demanded i n her reply about 
the guarantee, and what H i t l e r needed to give him 
ease of movement against Czechoslovakia. Henderson 
was so se n s i t i v e about H i t l e r ' s immediate intentions 
and a f r a i d of t h e i r consequences that he would prefer 
vaguely to dissociate B r i t a i n from the turmoil of 
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Central Europe i n the w i l d hope t h a t H i t l e r d i d not 
e n t e r t a i n the use o f i l l e g a l f o r c e , than t o make a 
move which would deter such methods. 
By the time London had received t h i s r e p o r t 
from B e r l i n i t s whole s t r u c t u r e had been demolished 
by Germany's invasion of Prague. Even up t o a few 
days before t h i s event Chamberlain's hopes f o r Europe 
had not s u f f e r e d and were indeed r i s i n g h i g h . He was 
c l i n g i n g t e n a c i o u s l y to the prospect o f disarmament 
discussions which he saw promised i n the h e a l i n g of 
(30) 
F r a n c o - I t a l i a n wounds ' and which had been a s s i s t e d 
by France's r e c o g n i t i o n o f Franco's regime i n Spain 
(31) 
a t the end o f February, A calmer a t t i t u d e i n the 
(32) 
I t a l i a n press was a good s i g n . Great hopes were 
invested i n Stanley's forthcoming v i s i t to Germany 
and t h i s s p i r i t o f cooperation was being emulated by 
France who was also approaching Germany on economic 
(33) 
t o p i c s . Above a l l , perhaps, Henderson's h i g h l y 
o p t i m i s t i c survey o f February 28 which endorsed and 
increased Chamberlain's own hopes, was a s i g n t h a t 
Europe was at l a s t progressing t o permanently happier 
times. Chamberlain gave vent t o h i s enthusiasm a t a 
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conference w i t h lobby press representatives on March 9. 
Six days before appeasement was t o be swept back to 
i t s pre-Munich days he c o n f i d e n t l y asserted t h a t 
(34) 
•Europe i s s e t t l i n g down to a period o f t r a n q u i l i t y ' 
and t h a t the government was hoping to arrange a 
disarmament conference before the end of . t h e year. 
I t appears t h a t what he had intended to be merely 
(35) 
background i n f o r m a t i o n was reported verbatim, but 
i t i s , none the l e s s , proof of h i s outlook on t h e 
European scene. 
I t i s t r u l y r e g r e t t a b l e t h a t at so c r i t i c a l a 
time the prime mover o f appeasement should have been 
06) 
so hidden from r e a l i t y . His own 'i n s i d i o u s c o n v i c t i o n ' 
i n the Tightness of h i s p o l i c y had c e r t a i n l y clouded 
t h i n g s . But had the Czech press given a c l e a r e r 
i n d i c a t i o n o f the degree o f tension e x i s t i n g i n 
(37) 
Czechoslovak p o l i t i c s , and had Henderson reported 
h i s uneasiness i n the ear l y days o f March, Chamberlain 
would c e r t a i n l y have had a more accurate es t i m a t i o n 
of the s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n Europe. As t h i n g s were 
h i s i n s u l a r i t y o f outlook was f a t a l . 
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Chapter t e n 
H i t l e r i n Hradschin 
On March 10 the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, 
t a k i n g h i s cue from the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o p t i m i s t i c 
tones o f the day before, spoke c o n f i d e n t l y t o h i s 
c o n s t i t u e n t s a t the Chelsea Town H a l l o f the outlook 
f o r Europe. He t a l k e d of ah approaching 'Golden Age' 
to be engineered by the f o u r leading statesmen i n 
Europe, Chamberlain, Deladier, H i t l e r and S t a l i n who 
were faced w i t h 'the greatest o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t has 
ever been o f f e r r e d . t o the leaders o f the world'. 
The European s i t u a t i o n was apparently r i p e f o r a 
g l o r i o u s harmony t o be produced by these statesmen, 
who: 
" i f they worked w i t h a singleness of 
purpose and a u n i t y o f a c t i o n to 
t h a t end, might i n an i n c r e d i b l y 
s h o r t time transform the whole 
h i s t o r y o f the world." 
B r i t a i n , claimed Hoare, was ready to meet the challenge 
f o r ; 
"confidence.,.has returned, hope has taken 
the place o f f e a r , moral and p h y s i c a l 
robustness has overcome h y s t e r i a and 
h e s i t a t i o n . " ( 1 ) 
This was a speech which Hoare was l a t e r to c l a i m t o 
(2) 
have been'misrepresented 1. L i t t l e wonder, f o r before 
he had even s t a r t e d speaking the c r i s i s i n C e n t r a l 
Europe, which was to r e v e a l the shallowness o f h i s 
remarks, had been p r e c i p i t a t e d by the d i s m i s s a l o f 
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the Slovak government and a r r e s t o f I t s premier by 
(3) 
the Czech p r e s i d e n t . 
(4) 
Prom then events moved s w i f t l y . On March 11 
Prague attempted to come t o an understanding w i t h the 
new Slovak government "but at a meeting o f t h e cabinet 
t h a t evening appeared Burckel and Seyss-Inquart w i t h 
f i v e German generals o r d e r i n g the government t o announce 
Slovakian independence. The order was not obeyed as 
the new premier, Sidor, wished to continue negotia-
t i o n s w i t h Prague. I n the meantime the ex-premier, 
Tiso, was escorted to Germany f o r an i n t e r v i e w w i t h 
H i t l e r , w hile a large number o f German troops concentra-
ted near the Czech f r o n t i e r . At the same time the 
German press swung i n t o v i o l e n t a c t i o n against 
Czechoslovakia, preparing p u b l i c opinion f o r what 
was to f o l l o w . Tiso met H i t l e r and an assortment 
o f German o f f i c i a l s i n the New Reich Chancellry on the 
evening o f the 13th. Annoyed t h a t h i s order f o r 
Slovakian independence had not already been obeyed, 
H i t l e r issued Tiso w i t h an ultimatum to the e f f e c t t h a t 
the Czechs would be 'crushed by the German steam 
(6) 
r o l l e r ' w i t h i n eighteen hours unless he proclaimed 
Slovakian independence. Tiso assured the Fuhrer he 
could r e l y on Slovakia and claimed he was glad to have 
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heard the Puhrer's a t t i t u d e towards Slovakia a t f i r s t 
hand. He rushed back to B r a t i s l a v a , resumed o f f i c e 
as President, and announced Slovakia's independence 
the f o l l o w i n g day. 
The d i s s o l u t i o n of the Czechoslovak s t a t e t h a t 
s u i t e d H i t l e r ' s needs so admirably, had taken place. 
The Prague government had been helpless against these 
German i n t e r f e r e n c e s . I n t h i s c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n 
the President o f the Czechs, Hacha, had but one choice -
an appeal t o Germany. This again f e l l i n w i t h H i t l e r ' s 
design and was, i n f a c t , prompted by him. On the 
afternoon of the 14th. Hacha and h i s f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r 
Chvalkovsky were b l u n t l y informed t h a t t h e i r presence 
was r e q u i r e d i n B e r l i n . They a r r i v e d t h a t evening 
and the stage was set f o r the f i n a l , dramatic scene. 
During these f o u r c r i t i c a l days the f o r e i g n o f f i c e 
i n London was, of course, l a r g e l y i n b l i s s f u l ignorance 
of these machinations. But t h i s does not mean t h a t 
B r i t a i n f a i l e d t o draw l o g i c a l conclusions from the 
evidence a t her d i s p o s a l . The d i s m i s s a l o f the 
Slovak government, the heated German press a t t a c k 
against the Czechs, the incitement o f the Slovaks <bn 
the Vienna r a d i o , the m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y , and Tiso's 
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v i s i t to B e r l i n were a l l reported to Halifaz. On 
the 10th. Henderson, as a result of reports from h i s 
m i l i t a r y attache and the vice-consul at Dresden, at 
l a s t made h i s worst fears known to h i s superiors: 
" i f Herr H i t l e r seeks adventure the most 
obvious form which i t would be l i k e l y 
to take would be some coup i n Czecho-
slovakia. • .Germany i s so situated that 
i t i s possible for her to foment almost 
any intrigue there with success.•• 
The present constitutional c r i s i s i n 
Czecho-Slovakia tends to render t h i s 
matter one of a c t u a l i t y with Germany 
possibly fishing i n troubled waiters 
though with what exact ultimate object 
I cannot say."(7) 
The next day he was resigning himself to the 
'unpleasant f a c t 1 t h a t 'no solution of the Czech 
problem w i l l be worth anything unless i t has German 
(8) 
approval 1, but the hope that H i t l e r would not take 
things into h i s own hands persisted stubbornly. 
Henderson advised strongly against B r i t a i n adopting 
any attitude to H i t l e r which could possibly drive 
him over the edge: 
" . . . I doubt whether Herr H i t l e r has yet 
taken any decision and I consider i t 
therefore highly desirable that nothing 
should be s a i d or published abroad 
during the weekend which w i l l excite 
him to precipitate action."(9) 
His advice was taken. B r i t a i n waited to see which way 
the coin would drop. 
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On the 12th Henderson was s t i l l unable t o give 
any concrete evidence t h a t H i t l e r intended to e x p l o i t 
the s i t u a t i o n . Yet i t was acknowledged t h a t whatever 
s o l u t i o n was to he found t o the i n t e r n a l t r o u b l e s of 
Czechoslovakia, H i t l e r had an i d e a l excuse f o r 
i n t e r v e n t i o n : 
"•••he can f o r purposes .of p u b l i c 
consumption here base h i s a c t i o n 
e i t h e r on Germany's r i g h t to 
p r o t e c t German m i n o r i t y or on 
Slovak r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . " ( 1 0 ) 
There was s t i l l no r e a c t i o n from the B r i t i s h 
government when on the 13th there were extensive 
(11) 
troop movements towards the Czechoslovak f r o n t i e r , 
(12) 
and the violence o f the German press was in c r e a s i n g , 
i n d i c a t i n g : 
" • • • t h a t German government i s 
contemplating some form o f i n t e r -
v e n t i o n e i t h e r by force or by 
ultimatum under armed menace."(13) 
Newton i n Prague now expected serious t r o u b l e w i t h i n 
(14) 
f o r t y - e i g h t hours. 
The p o l i c y behind the co n t i n u i n g B r i t i s h s i l e n c e 
i s contained i n a f o r e i g n o f f i c e memorandum dated 
March 13, I t amounted v i r t u a l l y to a carte blanche 
f o r H i t l e r ' s f u t u r e a c t i o n c l a i m i n g B r i t a i n ' s 
i n a b i l i t y t o prevent him from a c t i n g as. he desir e d , 
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and absolving B r i t a i n o f any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
towards Gzechoslovakiaj 
" i f the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Germany 
has convinced him t h a t some a c t i o n i s 
e s s e n t i a l i n Czecho-Slovakia there i s 
nothing we can do to stop him s h o r t o f 
war. As i s w e l l known, the Germans 
have always maintained t h a t Czecho-
sl o v a k i a i s no concern o f H.M.G, and 
i t i s c e r t a i n l y the case t h a t we should 
oniy have any locus s t a n d i f o r making 
a p r o t e s t a t B e r l i n i f Germany were 
g u i l t y o f t e r r i t o r i a l aggression against 
the Czecho-Slovak S t a t e , I n t h a t 
event i t might be h e l d t h a t we were 
bound by our undertaking i n the annex 
to the Munich Agreement to stand by our 
o f f e r i n the Anglo-French proposals o f 
September 19 to j o i n i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
guarantee o f the new boundaries o f the 
Czecho-Slovak s t a t e against unprovoked 
aggression. We could not, however, 
take any e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n unless the 
French Government also decided t o take 
a c t i o n and as the German Government have 
h i t h e r t o refused to b r i n g the general 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee i n t o f o r c e by 
implementing t h e i r own Munich pledge, 
i t seems t o me most u n l i k e l y t h a t France 
would wish t o take any a c t i o n i n the 
matter,"(15) 
B r i t i s h concern was d i r e c t e d e n t i r e l y towards good 
r e l a t i o n s being preserved w i t h Germany, I t was 
t h e r e f o r e decided not to make any p r o t e s t t h a t the 
government was not prepared to implement, and also 
to r e f r a i n from making any statement which would, i t 
was thought, be i n e f f e c t i v e i n every respect apart from 
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i r r i t a t i n g H i t l e r . P roviding t h a t Germany avoided 
d i r e c t t e r r i t o r i a l aggression the s i t u a t i o n would 
remain ' t e c h n i c a l l y an i n t e r n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
(16) 
q uestion w i t h which we are not d i r e c t l y concerned' 
B r i t a i n ' s s i l e n c e throughout the in c r e a s i n g 
t e n s i o n was evidence o f her v i r t u a l abandoning o f 
Czechoslovakia and as such could only .encourage 
H i t l e r i n h i s determination t o reduce the country 
to a German p r o t e c t o r a t e . This B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e 
(17) 
was q u i t e apparent t o the Germans and was, moreover, 
endorsed "by Henderson. Weizsacker records i n h i s 
memoirs h i s c o n v i c t i o n at the t i m e : 
"...they were not prepared t o come to 
the assistance o f Prague. This was 
most obvious i n a conversation I had 
w i t h the B r i t i s h Ambassador on March 
12 and 13, Henderson was emphatic 
t h a t Germany had a predominant 
i n t e r e s t i n the Czech area."(18) 
This B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e was equally shared i n the 
Quai d'Orsay where n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n was the general 
p o l i c y . On the morning o f March 15 Coulondre, the 
French ambassador i n B e r l i n , d e l i v e r e d a weak 
(19) 
o b j e c t i o n to the t u r n o f events i n Czechoslovakia, 
but i t s lack o f f o r c e was v i r t u a l l y a t a c i t 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the French b e l i e f t h a t Czechoslovakia 
was l e f t c l e a r f o r H i t l e r to play the game the way 
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he chose. 
The day before the occupation o f Prague there 
was news t h a t H i t l e r had made up h i s mind to take 
(21) 
a c t i o n on the separation of Slovakia from Bohemia. 
I t came from a ' g e n e r a l l y w e l l informed source 1 but 
Henderson s t i l l hoped t h a t no ' f i n a l d e c i s i o n ' had 
r e a l l y been taken. By mid-day o f t h a t day he should 
have been i n no doubt as to what was about to happen. 
For i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Weizsacker he was given the 
broadest o f h i n t s . Weizsacker elahorates i n h i s 
memoirs: 
" I was able t o give a h i n t a t the l a s t 
minute to the B r i t i s h Ambassador... 
I assured him t h a t , whatever might 
happen, everything would be done i n a 
decent manner, and when Henderson put 
the d i r e c t question whether the German 
Army had been assigned any p a r t i n the 
business, I answered t h a t the German 
Army always behaved decently. I could 
go no f u r t h e r than t h i s . " ( 2 2 ) 
(23) 
Henderson corroborates t h i s s t o r y i n h i s own memoirs 
and recounts how he was f i l l e d w i t h 'the gloomiest 
forebodings'. Yet, as can be seen from h i s r e p o r t 
on t h i s i n t e r v i e w to H a l i f a x , he s t i l l endeavoured 
to hope f o r the best* fAny general impression was 
t h a t no d e f i n i t e l i n e o f a c t i o n has been decided 
(24) 
upon Thus, when he was i n r e c e i p t o f s u f f i c i e n t 
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i n d i c a t i o n s to forecast d e f i n i t e German a c t i o n 
against Czechoslovakia, he condescended to r e p o r t 
merely t h a t 'the use of for c e was c e r t a i n l y not 
(25) 
excluded i f Prague Government proved r e c a l c i t r a n t ' . 
Later the same day (March 14) i t was reported 
t h a t the Slovak government had voted f o r complete 
(26) 
independence and that Hacha and Chvalkovsky were 
(27) 
en route f o r B e r l i n , Henderson had encouraged 
(28) 
them t o go f o r 'the Czech Government was alone i n 
(29) 
a p o s i t i o n to save i t s e l f by i t s a c t i o n . Had they 
gone before 'things might have turned out d i f f e r e n t l y ' , 
he maintained l a t e r . But he knew i t was now'too l a t e ' 
(30) 
and t h a t ' a l l was l o s t 1 . 
Only now d i d the B r i t i s h government attempt to 
r e s t r a i n H i t l e r , to h a l t the remorseless signs which 
were coming i n from Central Europe, At 8,30p,m, on 
the 14th (a bare f o u r and a h a l f hours before the f a t a l 
Hitler/Hacha meeting) H a l i f a x despatched the f o l l o w i n g 
i n s t r u c t i o n s to Henderson: 
"Please take e a r l i e s t possible o p p o r t u n i t y 
o f conveying f o l l o w i n g message to the 
German Government, 
His Majesty's Government have no desire 
to i n t e r f e r e unnecessarily i n matters 
w i t h which other Governments may be more 
d i r e c t l y concerned than t h i s country. 
They are however, as the German 
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Government w i l l s u r e l y appreciate, 
deeply concerned f o r the success 
o f a l l e f f o r t s to r e s t o r e confidence 
and a r e l a x a t i o n of t e n s i o n i n Europe* 
This seems to them more p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d e s i r a b l e a t a moment when a s t a r t i s 
being made w i t h discussions on economic 
subjects to which, as His Majesty's 
Government b e l i e v e , the German Govern-
ment a t t a c h no less importance than 
they do themselves, and t h e f r u i t f u l 
development o f which depends so 
d i r e c t l y upon general s t a t e o f 
confidence. 
Prom tha t p o i n t of view they would 
deplore any a c t i o n i n Central Europe 
which would cause a setback t o the 
growth o f t h i s general confidence on 
which a l l improvement i n the economic 
situation.depends and t o which such 
improvement might i n i t s t u r n 
c o n t r i b u t e . " ( 3 1 ) 
This p a t h e t i c appeal to H i t l e r to be a good boy was 
q u i t e out o f keeping w i t h the r e a l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n 
and i s symptomatic o f the w i l d hopes o f the appeasers 
t h a t H i t l e r would not f i n a l l y reverse h i s pledges 
and r i d i c u l e t h e i r p o l i c y . Henderson l a t e r admitted 
t h a t *nothing but the d i r e c t and immediate t h r e a t o f 
,(32) 
war would have stopped H i t l e r a t t h a t stage. 
The nature o f the B r i t i s h appeal would have been 
e n t i r e l y i n e f f e c t i v e . The occupation o f Bohemia 
a t 6.00a.m. the f o l l o w i n g morning made the d e l i v e r y 
o f the note l i t t l e more than a f o r m a l i t y . 
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Tine events o f the n i g h t o f Maroh 14-15 i n the 
New Reich Chancellery need not be d e a l t w i t h a t le n g t h . 
H i t l e r prepared the s e t t i n g f o r the meeting w i t h the 
Czech President^ i n meticulous d e t a i l so t h a t e v e r ything 
conspired to e x t o r t Hacha's signature to Czechoslovakia 1 
(33) 
death warrant. A f t e r a three hours' ordeal the 
aged Czech President having faced a f i e r c e t i r a d e from 
H i t l e r , been hounded p i t i l e s s l y by Goring and 
Ribbentrop around the conference t a b l e f o r h i s signature 
been threatened w i t h a bomb a t t a c k on Prague, and twice 
been r e v i v e d from f a i n t s by doctors' i n j e c t i o n s , 
f i n a l l y c a p i t u l a t e d t o the German demands. Before 
doing so he had sought the consent o f the Prague 
cabinet by telephone and ordered t h a t no resistance 
should be o f f e r e d to the invading German forces. 
Not only had H i t l e r enforced h i s w i l l on the 
Czechs, but by securing Hacha's signature to the 
' t r e a t y ' he was also able to give h i s coup a pseudo-
l e g a l context. Czechoslovakia (or Czechia as i t 
became known by the Germans f o r a short time) had 
become a German p r o t e c t o r a t e . 
At 10.35a,m. the t e x t of the Agreement which 
made i t such, was received at the f o r e i g n o f f i c e i n 
B r i t a i n : 280. 
"...The Czecho-Slovak President declared 
t h a t ...he placed the destiny of the 
Czech people and country w i t h confidence 
i n the hands o f the Puhrer o f the German 
Reich. 
Hie Puhrer accepted t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n 
and expressed h i s determination to take the 
Czech people under the p r o t e c t i o n o f the 
German Reich and to guarantee to i t an 
autonomous development o f i t s n a t i o n a l 
l i f e i n accordance w i t h i t s p a r t i c u l a r 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . " ( 3 4 ) 
H i t l e r had meanwhile journeyed t o Prague and i n 
a proclamation to the German people made from the 
upper windows o f the Hradschin Palace issued the 
memorahle words "Czechoslovakia has ceased to 
„ ( 3 5 ) 
e x i s t . On the f o l l o w i n g day Slovakia placed 
"(36) 
h e r s e l f under the p r o t e c t i o n of the Reich, and 
(37) 
Ruthenia was over-run by Hungarian troops. 
I n B r i t a i n the appeasers r e f l e c t e d upon'.the c r i s i s 
i n the same way they had anticipated, i t . Their 
concern was s t i l l f o r Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s r a t h e r 
than the f a t e o f Czechoslovakia. When von DLpksen 
o f f i c i a l l y presented H a l i f a x w i t h the t e x t of the 
d e c l a r a t i o n H a l i f a x : 
"...expressed r e g r e t t h a t the events o f 
the l a s t few days had created fr e s h 
unrest and upheavals and had i n t e r r u p t e d 
the process already begun o f a general 
p a c i f i c a t i o n . • . I n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s 
the closk had been put back considerably."(38) 
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As a mark of B r i t a i n ' s f e e l i n g s the v i s i t o f Stanley and 
Henderson t o B e r l i n was postponed - i n view o f the 
(39) 
circumstances p r e v a i l i n g i t was decided 'inopportune'. 
Immediately upon the occupation o f Prague the French 
ambassador i n B e r l i n had d r a f t e d a note o f p r o t e s t 
against the a c t i o n of the German government regarding 
(40) 
Czechoslovakia. I n response to a query from the 
French.ambassador i n London as to whether the B r i t i s h 
government was going t o make any o f f i c i a l move i n 
B e r l i n , H a l i f a x s t a t e d t h a t the government 'had not 
contemplated anything f u r t h e r i n t h i s sense a t the 
present time, not seeing what u s e f u l purpose would be 
(41) 
immediately served'. Even the method H i t l e r had 
used i n o b t a i n i n g Hacha's 'request' f o r p r o t e c t i o n , the 
(42) 
g i s t o f which was known i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e , d i d not 
e l i c i t any B r i t i s h p r o t e s t . 
I n the House of Commons Chamberlain e x h i b i t e d no 
sympathy f o r the Czechs and avoided p u t t i n g any blame 
on H i t l e r * 
" I have so o f t e n heard charges o f breach o f 
f a i t h banded about which d i d not seem to me 
t o be founded upon s u f f i c i e n t premises, t h a t 
I do not wish to associate myself today w i t h 
any charges o f t h a t character."(43) 
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He read out the o f f i c i a l government statement which 
explained i n c l e a r terms the p o s i t i o n t h a t was adopted 
v i s a v i s Czechoslovakia, t a k i n g f u l l advantage o f the 
Slovak excuse, 
" i n our o p i n i o n the s i t u a t i o n has r a d i c a l l y 
a l t e r e d since the Slovak D i e t declared the 
independence o f Slovakia. The e f f e c t o f 
t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n p ut an end by i n t e r n a l 
d i s r u p t i o n t o the State whose f r o n t i e r s 
we had proposed t o guarantee.,.and His 
Majesty's Government cannot accordingly 
h o l d themselves any longer bound by t h i s 
o b l i g a t i o n . " ( 4 4 ) 
Weizsacker states how Chamberlain 'abandoned the 
(45) 
Czechs w i t h o u t any signs o f f e e l i n g ' . This i s 
no exaggeration. Chamberlain d i d not f e e l o b l i g e d 
to recommend any p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n to parliament. 
Though he r e g r e t t e d t h i s s i g n from H i t l e r which was 
not ' i n accord w i t h the s p i r i t o f the Munich Agreement' 
he would not be d e f l e c t e d from the cause o f appeasement, 
mai n t a i n i n g t h a t i t was 'of too great s i g n i f i c a n c e to 
the happiness o f mankind f o r us l i g h t l y to give i t 
(46) 
up or set i t on one side. ' 
This was, however, to be f a r from the f i n a l word 
on the matter. Chamberlain was soon to f i n d out t h a t 
the country and, indeed, many i n h i s p a r t y d i d not 
support t h i s view. This l a t e s t a p p l i c a t i o n c f 
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appeasement transgressed the p u b l i c conscience. For Prague 
had s h a t t e r e d the very foundations on which appeasement 
stood. A p r e - r e q u i s i t e of the p o l i c y was t h a t the . 
p r i n c i p a l person who threatened l a s t i n g peace i n Europe 
could be f i n a l l y persuaded to "behave w i t h moderation 
and to discard, the use o f fo r c e as a diplomatic l e v e r . 
The Munich c r i s i s had put the l i k e l i h o o d o f t h i s very much 
i n doubt, but the ensuing agreement together w i t h H i t l e r ' s 
d e c l a r a t i o n supporting the method of c o n s u l t a t i o n had 
given a base f o r renewed confidence. H i t l e r ' s act at 
t h a t time could also be j u s t i f i e d as a reasonable 
t e r r i t o r i a l alignment r e v e r s i n g the i n e q u a l i t y o f the 
V e r s a i l l e s settlement and r e t u r n i n g Germans to t h e i r 
n a t i v e land. But the events o f March 15 could not 
be excused as conforming w i t h any r i g h t s o f n a t u r a l 
development or s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . This f a c t was f u l l y 
appreciated and equally rued, i n c e r t a i n German c i r c l e s . 
" P o l i t i c a l l y i t was...a c a r d i n a l mistake -
i n f a c t , an i r r e p a r a b l e mistake. Up t i l l 
then H i t l e r had s u c c e s s f u l l y operated w i t h 
the slogan: 'Germans to Germans'. To 
abandon t h i s p r i n c i p l e and t o f o r g e t so 
soon h i s solemn a f f i r m a t i o n s t h a t h i s 
t e r r i t o r i a l demands were s a t i s f i e d , i n -
e v i t a b l y had the e f f e c t o f making. Chamber-
l a i n and Deladier appear as dupes."(47) 
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The march on Prague was the s i g n a l f o r the conversion 
of many o f the previous staunch supporters o f appeasement 
i n England, One such was Lord Lothian who was thereby 
f i n a l l y convinced o f German ambitions: 
"Up t i l l then i t was possible t o believe 
t h a t Germany was only concerned v/ith 
recovery o f what might be c a l l e d the 
normal r i g h t s o f a great power, but i t 
now seems c l e a r t h a t H i t l e r i s i n e f f e c t 
a f a n a t i c a l gangster who w i l l stop a t 
nothing to beat down a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of 
resistence anywhere t o h i s w i l l , " ( 4 8 ) 
The person who was t o convince Chamberlain o f the need 
f o r a f i r m e r outlook on Germany was H a l i f a x , He too 
had seen the l i g h t : 
" A f t e r March and the f i n a l rape of Prague 
i t was no longer possible t o hope t h a t 
H i t l e r ' s purposes and ambitions were 
l i m i t e d by any boundaries o f race, and 
the l u s t o f c o n t i n e n t a l or world mastery 
seemed to stand out i n s t a r k r e l i e f , " ( 4 9 ) 
Even Henderson was presuming t h a t some s t e r n e r a t t i t u d e 
(50) 
would be adopted by the government t o Germany. 
H a l i f a x was not prepared t o l e t the prime m i n i s t e r ' s 
obstinacy t o r u i n the conservative p a r t y . He faced 
him b l u n t l y w i t h the f a c t s . Unless he declared un-
e q u i v a c a l l y what the country's r e a c t i o n t o the German 
(51) 
aggression was, there would be a r e v o l t i n the House. 
Chamberlain g r a d u a l l y came round. On the 16th he 
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informed the House t h a t no p r o t e s t had y e t been sent 
to B e r l i n but t h a t Henderson might be r e c a l l e d f o r 
(52) 
c o n s u l t a t i o n - a t a c i t way o f communicating d i s -
pleasure t o the German government. The prime m i n i s t e r ' s 
eyes were f u r t h e r opened by the stormy r e c e p t i o n given t o 
S i r John Simon a f t e r a speech i n which he had advised 
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . The i n d i g n a t i o n o f the House could 
not be r e l a t e d to p a r t y l i n e s . I t t r u l y r e f l e c t e d 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n and whatever the r i f t w i t h H a l i f a x , 
Chamberlain could not ignore t h i s . Public o p i n i o n 
had been a l l the more outraged by H i t l e r ' s a c t i o n against 
the Czechs because i t came as such a shock. Up t o the 
news o f the i n v a s i o n the confidences of Chamberlain and 
Hoare as professed but a few days e a r l i e r , were s t i l l 
on the l i p s o f the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . I n d i c a t i v e o f t h i s 
outlook 'Punch' on March 14 had p r i n t e d a cartoon 
d e p i c t i n g John B u l l waking up from a d i s t r e s s i n g n i g h t r 
mare and d e c l a r i n g 'Thank goodness t h a t ' s over' as an 
animated war scare vanished out of the window; the 
e d i t o r i r o n i c a l l y commented underneath the cartoon: 
'Pessimists p r e d i c t e d "another major c r i s i s " i n the 
middle o f t h i s month'. Such an outlook was both deeply 
shocked and g r e a t l y outraged by the reverse of the 
next day. V i r t u a l l y the whole n a t i o n a l press on the 
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16th strongly denounced the German action. There was 
such animosity i n B r i t i s h opinion that Chamberlain was 
forced to amend h i s views - or resign. Von Dirksen 
recorded the effect of public opinion: 
"The st i f f e n i n g of B r i t a i n ' s attitude did 
not originate with the Government but 
with the politically-minded public, with 
Parliament and the constituencies. (53) 
He considered i t a factor of 'decisive importance 1. 
Halifax 13 advice, supported by t h i s I r r e f u t a b l e 
evidence, was accepted by Chamberlain. He was due to 
speak at Birmingham on the 17th and t h i s was h i s 
opportunity to repeal himself i n B r i t i s h eyes. He 
completely re-drafted h i s speech and i t was a completely 
different Chamberlain that was seen and heard that 
evening. While not regretting the Munich Agreement 
and maintaining the correctness of h i s subsequent 
policy, he petulantly attacked Hitler'3 recent action. 
"Surely as a Joint signatory of the Munich 
Agreement I was entitled, i f Herr H i t l e r 
thought i t ought to be undone, to that 
consultation which i s provided for i n the 
Munich Declaration. Instead of that, he 
has taken the law into h i s own hands. (54) 
This had changed the whole prospect of Europe. 'Is 
t h i s the end of an old adventure 1, he asked, 'or the 
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beginning o f a new?e.«is t h i s , i n f a c t , a step i n the 
d i r e c t i o n o f an attempt t o dominate the world by f o r c e ? 1 
Not only d i d he condemn the aggression but also issue a 
s t e r n warning t o the opponents of peace t h a t B r i t a i n ' s 
p o s i t i o n should not be under-rated. He concluded: 
" I f e e l bound t o repeat t h a t , w h i l e I am 
not prepared to engage t h i s country by 
new and u n s p e c i f i e d commitments op e r a t i n g 
under conditions which cannot be foreseen, 
yet no gre a t e r mistake could be made than 
to suppose t h a t , because i t believes war 
to be a senseless and c r u e l t h i n g , t h i s 
n a t i o n has so l o s t i t s f i b r e t h a t i t w i l l 
not take p a r t to the uttermost o f i t s power 
i n r e s i s t i n g such a challenge i f i t were 
made."(55) 
That these words comprised a pronouncement of government 
p o l i c y was shown by the f a c t t h a t the speech was broad-
cast throughout B r i t a i n and America, 
On the same evening H a l i f a x sent i n s t r u c t i o n s to 
Henderson to inf o r m the German government o f the view 
B r i t a i n had taken o f the recent c r i s i s : 
"His Majesty's Government...cannot but 
regard the events o f the past few days 
as a complete r e p u d i a t i o n o f the Munich 
Agreement and a d e n i a l o f the s p i r i t i n 
which the n e g o t i a t o r s o f t h a t Agreement 
bound themselves t o co-operate f o r a 
peaceful settlement. His Majesty's 
Government must a l s o . . . p r o t e s t against 
the changes e f f e c t e d i n Czecho-Slovakia 
by German m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , which are i n 
t h e i r view devoid o f any basis o f 
l e g a l i t y . " ( 5 6 ) 
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Weizsacker had received i n s t r u c t i o n s from headquarters 'to 
(57) 
r e j e c t a l l such p r o t e s t s brusquely'. He had already 
had a disagreeable meeting w i t h Coulondre who had t r i e d 
to lodge a French p r o t e s t w i t h him. To avoid a s i m i l a r 
i n c i d e n t w i t h Henderson he telephoned him to say t h a t the 
German government was not accepting p r o t e s t s and t h a t 
(58) 
any communication had b e t t e r be i n w r i t i n g . Henderson 
obl i g e d . The f o l l o w i n g day he l e f t B e r l i n 'to r e p o r t ' 
(59) 
to London having been r e c a l l e d on the 17th. This 
a c t i o n amounted t o a v i r t u a l breaking o f f of r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h B e r l i n . 
The r e a c t i o n i n Prance t o the c r i s i s had been 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n England. The general l i n e taken by 
the press on the 16th was t h a t Germany had 't o r n the 
Munich Agreement to shreds, and destroyed the hopes o f 
(60) 
appeasement'. But Daladier, l i k e Chamberlain, was 
slow e i t h e r to denounce Germany or t o agree to a r e -
a p p r a i s a l o f Prance's p o l i c y . On the f i r s t day o f the 
debate i n the Chamber he f a i l e d even to mention 
Czechoslovakia and on the second only expressed h i s 
(61) 
sympathy f o r the Czech people. B r i t a i n and Prance 
agreed to inf o r m each other before anv dec i s i v e a c t i o n 
(62) 
was taken i n B e r l i n . 
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As ideas on the issues a t stake became c l a r i f i e d 
Coulondre, l i k e Henderson, was i n s t r u c t e d to lodge a 
p r o t e s t denouncing Prague as 'a f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n o f 
both the l e t t e r and the s p i r i t o f the Agreement signed 
(63) 
i n Munich'. Thus B r i t a i n and France had j o i n t l y 
denoted t h a t t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s were no longer 
based on the o p t i m i s t i c tones created by Munich but 
were d i r e c t e d w i t h reference to an aggressive Germany 
whose actions put the peace o f Europe i n complete 
jeopardy. As Ribbentrop l a t e r discerned, 'the B r i t i s h 
and French p r o t e s t s opened a new phase i n European 
(64) 
a f f a i r s ' - a phase p r e c i p i t a t e d , o f course, by the 
German coup. 
The question soon arose i n the Anglo-French camp 
as to what e f f e c t recent events would have on f u t u r e 
I t a l i a n p o l i c y . On the 13th. H a l i f a x had drawn the 
a t t e n t i o n o f Grandi t o the d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n atmosphere 
(65) 
since he and Chamberlain had v i s i t e d Rome. His 
fears r e s u l t i n g from the F r a n c o - I t a l i a n pressure p o i n t 
i n Tunis and Ciano's r e f u s a l to deny any echo o f o f f i c i a l 
government p o l i c y i n the w a r l i k e statements o f the 
(66) 
I t a l i a n press had been mounting. The a t t i t u d e o f 
Grandi, however, gave him a 'measure o f reassurance', 
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i f only s l i g h t . The issue was s t i l l very much i n the 
balance, and spe c u l a t i o n was increased as a r e s u l t of 
H i t l e r ' s gains i n Czechoslovakia. The possible reper-
cussions on I t a l y were of deep concern to France. 
" I t was impossible t h a t Signor Mussolini 
could be very pleased at what had occurred, 
and i t must increase the temptation upon 
him t o t r y and get something to redress 
the balance between the Axis p a r t n e r s . 
The I t a l i a n people would surely t h i n k i t 
very strange i f a l l the b e n e f i t s o f the 
par t n e r s h i p continued to go one way."(67) 
Perth warned H a l i f a x o f the danger o f confusing the 
wholly i l l e g i t i m a t e a ctions o f Germany w i t h the com-
p a r a t i v e l y l e g i t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n s o f I t a l y , e s p e c i a l l y 
i f t h i s confusion were evident i n the press. To take 
i t f o r granted t h a t Mussolini would behave as outrageous 
as H i t l e r : 
"may be the most l i k e l y way o f making 
him f e e l t h a t only by ao doing can he 
a t t a i n what he regards as h i s j u s t i -
f i a b l e ends."(68) 
The w i s e s t p o l i c y , Perth thought, would be somehow f o r 
Mussolini to receive 'public or p r i v a t e assurances' 
t h a t h i s claims would be given f a i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
C e r t a i n l y should no a c t i o n be taken w i t h regard to the 
F r a n c o - I t a l i a n dispute t h a t might amount to provocation 
of M ussolini to emulate the H i t l e r method. As can be 
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(69) 
seen from Ciano's d i a r y , Mussolini had been g r e a t l y 
shocked by H i t l e r ' s coup, and disappointed t h a t he had 
not been taken i n t o the Fuhrer's confidence. He was, 
i n f a c t , very gloomy about the idea o f a l l i a n c e w i t h 
Germany. As f a r as Prance and B r i t a i n were concerned . 
a more d e f i n i t e a t t i t u d e would be adopted towards I t a l y 
a f t e r Mussolini's reactions had been more ac c u r a t e l y 
(70 
estimated from a speech he was due to make on March 26, 
By March 27 B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe stood a t the 
cross-roads* Chamberlain had described an a t t i t u d e 
to the recent c r i s i s and shown determination t o r e s i s t 
any f u r t h e r attacks on peace, but the exact form o f 
f u t u r e a c t i v e p o l i c y was a matter f o r s p e c u l a t i o n . As 
yet there was no i n d i c a t i o n o f the degree o f support to 
be o f f e r e d to other possible v i c t i m s o f German 
aggression or of any c l o s e r c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h other 
major powers i n order to dissuade Germany from g i v i n g a 
repeat performance. 
One t h i n g , however, was c e r t a i n . Chamberlain 
had been forced to re-assess h i s p o l i c y and t o harden 
h i s a t t i t u d e . His r e s o l u t i o n i n appeasement had 
received a s h a t t e r i n g blow. Yet h i s basic purpose 
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stood f i r m . I f he were forced to change h i s t a c t i c s 
he would s t i l l f i g h t the same "battle. The l a s t 
f o r t n i g h t o f March witnessed the e v o l u t i o n o f a new 
plan to promote peace. 
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Chapter eleven 
Appeasement i n Eclipse 
One t h i n g was abundantly c l e a r t o Chamberlain 
as he r e f l e c t e d on the March c r i s i s ; h i s f u t u r e 
p o l i c y i n Europe could' no longer be formulated i n 
the context of Munich: 
"As soon as I had time to t h i n k I 
saw t h a t i t was impossible to deal 
w i t h H i t l e r a f t e r he had thrown 
a l l h i s own assurances to the 
winds." (1) 
He had l o s t a l l f a i t h i n H i t l e r . But t h i s d i d mean 
tha t h i s t e n a c i t y f o r appeasement would f a l t e r 
anymore than i t d i d a f t e r Munich. He would never 
submit to what he c a l l e d t he 'bleak and barren p o l i c y 
(2) 
o f the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f war.' I f Prague had seemed 
to b r i n g the prospect o f war closer to Europe there 
were s t i l l ways i n which he might r e s t r a i n H i t l e r 
from t h a t f i n a l act t h a t would make i t a r e a l i t y . 
He was already l a y i n g the basis of a new approach 
i n Europe. He wrote on the 19th: 
" I have worked out a pl a n which a few 
mi n i s t e r s have accepted today, and 
which I s h a l l put t o the Cabinet 
tomorrow. I t i s p r e t t y b o l d and 
s t a r t l i n g , b u t I f e e l t h a t something 
o f t h e k i n d i s needed, and though I 
can't p r e d i c t the reactions i n B e r l i n , 
I have an idea t h a t i t won't b r i n g us 
to an acute c r i s i s , at any r a t e a t 
once....As always I want to gain time, 
f o r I never accept the view t h a t war 
i s i n e v i t a b l e . " ( 3 ) 
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That the f a l l a c y o f appeasement I n i t s 
previous form had. been exposed by Prague was the 
basic reason f o r a new plan. But there were other 
promptings. Chamberlain i n the past few days had 
been faced w i t h a c r i s i s of o p i n i o n not only i n h i s 
(4) 
own pa r t y but i n the country as a whole. His 
Birmingham statement of the 17th had saved him i n 
the eyes of many and disposed o f a s i t u a t i o n which 
amounted to v i r t u a l p o l i t i c a l defeat. There was, 
however, s t i l l an i n f l u e n t i a l s e c t i o n o f Tory o p i n i o n 
pressing f o r a s w i f t and decisive r e - o r i e n t a t i o n o f 
B r i t a i n ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y which needed t o be p a s s i f i e d -
not only so t h a t Chamberlain's p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n might 
be made the more secure, but also because h i s mission 
i n Europe must be continued, and t h e i r p o l i c y viewed 
war as a c e r t a i n t y . 
Hence the need f o r a scheme which would main-
t a i n reasonable calm w i t h i n the p a r t y ranks w h i l e 
aiming to deter H i t l e r from f u r t h e r s u p e r i o r acts. 
The enhanced German s t r a t e g i c , m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l 
p o s i t i o n also needed to be reckoned w i t h : 
" S t r a t e g i c a l l y Germany has placed 
h e r s e l f between Poland and Hungary.. 
(Germany) commands the gateway t o 
Krakow...and the Russian Ukraine. 
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Her new p o s i t i o n now places her 
armies on three sides o f Poland.,, 
w i t h respect to Hungary. Germany 
also threatens Budapest from the 
n o r t h and west and her armies are 
i n a p o s i t i o n to march d i r e c t l y i n t o 
the f e r t i l e p l a i n s o f Hungary, or 
through Hungary t o Roumania. '(5) 
As a r e s u l t o f the complete disbandment o f the Czech 
army, t h e armament, equipment and war reserves f o r a 
considerable p r o p o r t i o n o f the ex-Czechoslovak army 
had f a l l e n i n t o German hands, i n c r e a s i n g her f i g h t i n g 
power on land 'by probably much more than 25 per cent. 
Vast supplies of raw materials had also been f u n n e l l e d 
(7) 
i n t o the Reich. 
These f a c t o r s were th e greater spur to a c t i o n 
f o r Chamberlain at a time when repor t s were coming i n 
t h a t H i t l e r was expected to s t r i k e again soon. Even 
before he had spoken a t Birmingham, T i l e a , the 
Roumanian Ambassador i n London had t o l d H a l i f a x t h a t 
the Roumanian government had received 'something very 
(8) 
much l i k e an ultimatum' from Germany, T i l e a 
wished to know the a t t i t u d e of the B r i t i s h government 
(9) 
i n the event of German aggression against Roumania, 
M i l i t a r y o p i n i o n i n Prance thought t h a t H i t l e r would 
s t r i k e f i r s t a t Hungary and then a t Roumania and t h a t 
(10) 
events would 'move q u i c k l y ' . At t h e same time 
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i n f o r m a t i o n was received from L i t h u a n i a t h a t Germany-
was sending arms to Memel and th a t a German coup was 
(11) 
expect ed 1any day'. 
Such i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t Prague had, i n f a c t , been 
the beginning of a. new adventure f o r Germany impressed 
on Chamberlain the need f o r d e v i s i n g some plan to 
deter H i t l e r from going through w i t h i t . The more 
apparent became the t h r e a t t o peace, the greater were 
h i s e f f o r t s to salvage i t . His p o l i c y now resided 
i n the hope t h a t H i t l e r would be dissuaded from 
r u p t u r i n g the s t a b i l i t y of Europe by the c r e a t i o n o f 
an alignment o f European opinion opposing h i s aims. 
The idea was described as: 
"...the o r g a n i s a t i o n o f mutual support 
on the p a r t o f a l l those who r e a l i s e 
the necessity o f p r o t e c t i n g i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l s o c i e t y from f u r t h e r v i o l a t i o n 
o f fundamental laws on which i t r e s t s . " ( 1 2 ) 
I t was w i t h t h i s idea i n mind t h a t t h e B r i t i s h 
Ambassador i n Moscow, S i r W i l l i a m Seeds, was 
i n s t r u c t e d to f i n d out whether the Soviet government 
would i f requested by the Roumanian government 
(13) 
' a c t i v e l y help the l a t t e r to r e s i s t German aggression.' 
A s i m i l a r enquiry was put t o the government o f other 
powers l i k e l y t o be d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h f u t u r e 
German a c t i v i t y i n C e n t r a l and Eastern Europe -
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(14) 
Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland, Seeds 
saw L i t v l n o v , the People's Commissar f o r Foreign 
(15) 
A f f a i r s , e a r l y on the evening o f the 18th and 
l a t e r t h e same evening received the o f f i c i a l Soviet 
r e p l y . The U.S.S.R. considered t h a t the best way to 
combat the German menace was by immediately c a l l i n g a 
conference. The view was taken t h a t : 
"...no good purpose would be served by 
various governments e n q u i r i n g o f each 
other i n t u r n what a c t i o n others would 
take before.malting up t h e i r own minds. 
Soviet Government t h e r e f o r e proposed t h a t 
delegates appointed by B r i t i s h , Soviet, 
French, P o l i s h and Roumanian Governments 
should meet to discuss p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f 
common acti o n . " ( 1 6 ) 
This p r a c t i c a l suggestion, though i n harmony 
w i t h the B r i t i s h desire t o organise mutual support 
f o r the resistance o f aggression, was not agreed t o . 
Chamberlain, i t appears, was very dubious about e n t e r i n g 
too c l o s e l y i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Bolsheviks. 
Suspicion o f Soviet p o l i t i c a l i n t e n t i o n s was one of 
the main f a c t o r s : 
" I must confess t o the most profound 
d i s t r u s t o f Russia. I have no be-
l i e f whatever i n her a b i l i t y t o 
maintain an e f f e c t i v e o f f e n s i v e , 
even i f she wanted t o . And I d i s t r u s t 
her motives, which seem to me to 
have l i t t l e connection w i t h our ideas 
of l i b e r t y , and t o be concerned only 
w i t h g e t t i n g everyone else by the ears."(17) 
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An organised discussion was th e r e f o r e t o be avoided. 
Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador i n London at the 
time, has attempted i n h i s book 'Who Helped H i t l e r ? ' 
to show t h a t Chamberlain's"unwillingness to deal w i t h 
the U.S.S.R. was motivated by h i s expectation o f a 
war between Germany and Russia which would exhaust 
both powers and reduce, w i t h one stone, the two th r e a t s 
to Europe o f German domination and Communist i n f i l -
t r a t i o n . 
" i f the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r had 
r e a l l y been concerned f o r the 
maintenance o f peace, as he repeatedly 
declared, he would g l a d l y have seized 
upon the proposal made t o him by the 
Soviet Union on March 18."(13) 
But from the B r i t i s h point o f view, despite d i s t r u s t 
of Russia, there was the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Soviet 
prooosal would lead to those 'unspecified commitments 
(19 
operating under circumstances which cannot be foreseen' 
which Chamberlain had guarded against a t Birmingham. 
H a l i f a x saw Maisky on the afternoon o f the 19th 
a f t e r the cabinet had discussed the Soviet proposal. 
He t o l d Maisky t h a t i t presented two d i f f i c u l t i e s 
which made i t undesirable to B r i t a i n : 
" F i r s t , we could h a r d l y i n present 
circumstances manage to send a 
responsible M i n i s t e r to take p a r t 
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i n the conference, and i f t h i s were 
not possible, the desired advantage 
i n the way o f quick d e c i s i o n would 
not, i n f a c t , he obtained. Secondly, 
and perhaps more important, we 
thought t h a t t o h o l d such a conference 
as M. L i t v i n o v suggested without a 
c e r t a i n t y t h a t i t would be successful 
was dangerous." (20) 
I t seems ha r d l y c r e d i b l e t h a t no responsible B r i t i s h 
m i n i s t e r could be spared and these watery excuses were 
made so tha t an a l t e r n a t i v e B r i t i s h proposal could 
soon be put forward. At the meeting w i t h Maisky 
H a l i f a x h i n t e d a t a 'proposal not a l t o g e t h e r 
d i s s i m i l a r ' which was under co n s i d e r a t i o n by the B r i t i s h 
governmento Chamberlain's new idea was s u r f a c i n g . 
The inten.tien, as he hi m s e l f described i t , was: 
"to get a d e c l a r a t i o n signed by the 
four Powers, B r i t a i n , France, Russia 
and Poland, t h a t they would act 
together i n t h e event o f f u r t h e r signs 
o f German aggressive ambitions. 
I d r a f t e d the formula myself."(2 1) 
The necessity f o r such a s i g n o f s o l i d a r i t y was 
not diminished by a r e p o r t from Bucharast t h a t there 
had a t no time, i n f a c t , been any question of a 
(22) 
German ultimatum to Roumania.. There was no doubt, 
however, t h a t Germany had made unpalatable proposals to 
Roumania which v/ould give the former a 'large measure 
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(23) 
o f c o n t r o l over a l l branches of Roumanian economy.1 
While t h i s i n i t s e l f d i d not c o n t r i b u t e to aggression 
i t was an ominous i n d i c a t i o n o f Germany's v a u l t i n g 
ambition which Chamberlain's declaration aimed a t 
curbing. 
The Memel s i t u a t i o n , on the other hand, had 
ev i d e n t l y worsened. Ogilvie-Porbes reported from 
B e r l i n on the 20th t h a t he had heard t h a t Ribbentrop 
had ordered the Lithuanian government t o hand over 
Memel under the t h r e a t t h a t unless t h i s happened the 
matter might not end a t the Memel t e r r i t o r i a l 
(24) 
f r o n t i e r . On the f o l l o w i n g after-noon i t was learned 
i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e t h a t the Lit h u a n i a n f o r e i g n 
m i n i s t e r , who had been summoned t o B e r l i n had des-
(25) 
c r i b e d the s i t u a t i o n as 'very serious'. This 
l a t e s t German encroachment was c l e a r l y an i n f r a c t i o n 
o f the Memel Convention o f 1924 and although B r i t a i n , 
as a sign a t o r y o f t h a t Convention, had informed 
L i t h u a n i a t h a t she would not intervene ' i n any 
(26) 
unforeseen developments' as regards Memel, the 
(27) 
'Anschluss' t h a t took place (bn the 22nd. was 
disturbine? news i n the context o f t h e general 
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I n d i c a t i v e o f the anxiety w i t h which Chamberlain 
viewed the German menace was h i s aopeal f o r help to 
(28) 
Mussolini on March 20, The idea t h a t the Prime 
M i n i s t e r should send a personal and c o n f i d e n t i a l 
l e t t e r t o Mussolini o r i g i n a t e d w i t h the f o r e i g n o f f i c e 
as a r e s u l t o f the fea r t h a t I t a l y might be uroposing 
(29) 
to emulate the German method. I t was intended 
t h a t the l e t t e r , s t r e s s i n g Anglo-French s o l i d a r i t y and 
r e f u s i n g t o countenance the H i t l e r technique, should 
act as a d e t e r r e n t to any embryonic I t a l i a n ultimatum. 
The l a t t e r as f i n a l l y sent was f a r from t h i s . Much 
of 'Chamberlain' i s apparent i n i t and i t echoes h i s 
b e l i e f t h a t he had achieved success w i t h Mussolini at 
Rome i n January. Par from t a k i n g a f i r m l i n e w i t h 
the I t a l i a n s i t c o n s t i t u t e d no more than an amicable 
appeal abounding i n Munich appeasement and t y p i c a l 
of the l i n e customarily adopted by Perth. 
"You t o l d me t h a t your p o l i c y was one o f 
peace and t h a t you would at any time be 
w i l l i n g t o use your i n f l u e n c e i n t h a t 
d i r e c t i o n . I earnestly hope t h a t you 
may f e e l i t p o s s i b l e , i n any way t h a t 
may be open t o you, t o take such a c t i o n 
i n these anxious days as may a l l a y 
present t e n s i o n and do something to 
restore the confidence t h a t has been 
shatt e r e d . " 
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Such tones c e r t a i n l y e x h i b i t Chamberlain's deep concern 
a t the passage o f events i n Europe and bear witness t o 
hi s anxious desire t o produce some scheme to prevent 
t h e i r d e t e r i o r a t i n g f u r t h e r . Prom a p r a c t i c a l p o i n t 
of view the l e t t e r was of no value. As i t had been 
feared i n the f o r e i g n o f f i c e a l e t t e r which d i d not 
amount t o a warning would only be i n t e r p r e t e d as a 
sig n o f weakness. Ciano made a note i n h i s d i a r y t h a t 
i t 'strengthened h i s (Mussolini's) d e c i s i o n to act 
because i n i t he f i n d s another proof o f the i n e r t i a o f 
(30) 
the democracies.' I t was nearly a f o r t n i g h t before 
the Duce r e p l i e d . 
While there was s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r concern i n 
Europe there were at l e a s t signs t h a t support f o r the 
B r i t i s h proposal as envisaged by Chamberlain would 
be forthcoming, Hie U.S.S.R. had shown i n d e f i n i t e 
terms t h a t they were i n agreement w i t h some form of 
organised o p p o s i t i o n t o German ambition. The U.S.A. 
had approved the l i n e taken by Chamberlain on the 17th 
and i t seemed c e r t a i n t h a t they would uphold any 
(31) 
d e c i s i o n to o b s t r u c t German aggressive aims. Of 
v i t a l importance was the d e c i s i o n o f the French 
government t o give a c t i v e support to Roumania i n the 
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event o f her "being the o b j e c t of German m i l i t a r y 
(32) 
a t t a c k . 
I t was thus amid reasonable enquiries t h a t 
ChamberIain's p l a n saw the l i g h t o f the diplomatic 
world on March 21. I t was proposed t h a t a 
d e c l a r a t i o n should be signed by the B r i t i s h , French, 
Soviet and P o l i s h governments on the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : 
"We the undersigned, duly authorised t o 
t h a t e f f e c t , hereby declare t h a t , inasmuch as 
peace and s e c u r i t y i n Europe are matters o f 
common i n t e r e s t and concern, and since 
European peace and s e c u r i t y may be a f f e c t e d 
by any a c t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t to 
the p o l i t i c a l independence of any European 
State, our respective Governments hereby 
undertake immediately to consult together 
as t o what steps should be taken t o o f f e r 
j o i n t resistance t o any such actionl'(33) 
This proposal was handed t o the governments of the 
three powers concerned and other governments were not 
to be approached 'before the four Powers are agreed 
on the D e c l a r a t i o n ' . 
The f u l l co-operation o f the French i n t h i s p l a n 
was e s s e n t i a l and i t was appropriate t h a t i t s 
p u b l i c a t i o n c o incided w i t h the s t a t e v i s i t of the 
President of the French Republic (accompanied by 
(34) 
Bonnet) to B r i t a i n . Anglo-French conversations 
were h e l d on the 21st. and 22nd. t o discuss the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the proposed d e c l a r a t i o n and to s e l l 
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the idea t o the French. The t a l k s c e r t a i n l y 
produced a close alignment o f opinion between the 
two powers and the v a l i d i t y o f the idea o f a declara-
t i o n as a means o f i s s u i n g a danger warning t o German 
and I t a l i a n - aggression w h i l e a t the same time being 
a r a l l y i n g p o i n t f o r the smaller countries was 
endorsedo Much o f the discussion at "both meetings 
centered around the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g 
•the p a r t i c u l a r d e c l a r a t i o n proposed. Bonnet was no 
less, wary o f dealing w i t h Russia than were the B r i t i s h . 
"M, Bonnet..,stated t h a t the Russians 
needed watching. They l i k e d to make 
dec l a r a t i o n s f o r propaganda purposes 
which d i d not correspond w i t h t h e i r 
r e a l i n t ent ions•"(35) 
For t h i s reason i t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t each s i g n a t o r y 
power should s t a t e e x a c t l y what assistance i t would 
provide i n the event o f h o s t i l i t i e s breaking out which 
would "bring the d e c l a r a t i o n i n t o a c t i o n . 
This, however, was a minor p o i n t compared w i t h 
the main obstacle to the successful adoption o f 
the d e c l a r a t i o n . This concerned the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
o f Poland. To Bonnet ' i t was ab s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l 
(36) 
t o get Poland i n 1 . While the s t r a t e g i c wisdom 
o f t h i s a t t i t u d e could not be doubted, i t s r e a l i s a t i o n 
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posed considerable d i f f i c u l t y . H a l i f a x ' s less 
dogmatic advice i s , no doubt, t a c i t admission o f t h i s 
problem: 
" . . . i f Prance and Great B r i t a i n were 
prepared to take a very f i r m l i n e , 
even w i t h o u t the c e r t a i n t y o f P o l i s h 
support at the out s e t , t h i s very f a c t 
would be l i k e l y to b r i n g Poland i n . " ( 3 7 ) 
I t was f r a n k l y admitted t h a t Poland would probably t r y 
to avoid any commitment t h a t would destroy the balance 
she had kept up t o the present between Germany and 
the Soviet Union. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the d e c l a r a t i o n 
would place Poland d e f i n i t e l y i n the Soviet camp 
(38) 
which might arouse serious r e a c t i o n i n Germany. 
Yet the value o f Russia's signature to the d e c l a r a t i o n 
r e l i e d very g r e a t l y on Poland's d e c i s i o n : 
"Russian help would only be e f f e c t i v e 
i f Poland were c o l l a b o r a t i n g . I f 
Poland c o l l a b o r a t e d , Russia could 
give very great assistance; i f not, 
Russia could give much less."(39) 
This s i t u a t i o n s u r e l y raises doubts as to 
Chamberlain's s i n c e r i t y i n proposing t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n , 
f o r from the outset i t seemed t o be doomed. He 
hi m s e l f s t a t e d d u r i n g these t a l k s t h a t : 
" i . . t h e value of the d e c l a r a t i o n l a y i n 
i t being signed by f o u r Powers. I f 
two of the four refused t o s i g n , i t 
would not c a r r y the same weight. The 
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the Soviet Union i n 
a p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n made the p a r t i c i p a -
t i o n o f Poland and others very d i f f i c u l t . " ( 4 0 ) 
H a l i f a x was equally aware, and convinced, o f the 
(41) 
i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f u n i t i n g Russia and Poland. 
Was Chamberlain genuinely concerned to give 
B r i t a i n t h i s new anti-German r o l e , or merely the 
appearance of i t ? The News Chronicle gave space to 
t h i s question on March 22: 
"There i s , i n f a c t , a suspicion i n 
many embassies and l e g a t i o n s t h a t 
a l l t h i s t a l k about a strong l i n e 
i s not much more than an attempt t o 
s i l e n c e c r i t i c i s m by a show of 
a c t i v i t y on the p a r t o f m i n i s t e r s . " 
Chamberlain had c a r e f u l l y thought out a p l a n which 
i t s e l f contained serious obstacles t o i t s own success. 
The Russian suggestion f o r a conference t o determine 
a basis f o r common a c t i o n against f u r t h e r aggression 
had been de c l i n e d . He might have l o s t a l l f a i t h i n 
H i t l e r but he was not yet prepared t o see Europe 
p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o opposing camps. This a t t i t u d e can 
be>-.seen i n a statement of h i s on the 23rd. t o the 
e f f e c t t h a t he was n o t i 
"anxious t o set up i n Europe opposing 
blocks o f co u n t r i e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t 
ideas about the form o f t h e i r i n t e r n a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " ( 4 2 ) 
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He s t i l l clung t o the hope t h a t H i t l e r would not r i s k a 
European war t o s a t i s f y h i s ambitions, and despised any 
anti-German c o a l i t i o n which might encourage H i t l e r t o 
act as soon as po s s i b l e . Chamberlain's s i n c e r i t y 
w i t h reference to the d e c l a r a t i o n proposal might be 
proved i f , i n the words of Bonnet, he had been 
prepared t o 'go t o the utmost l i m i t , even to the 
(43) 
extent of t h r e a t s , to b r i n g Poland i n ' , but i t w i l l 
be seen t h a t he was not. 
O f f i c i a l r e a c t i o n to the d e c l a r a t i o n on the p a r t 
of t he governments d i r e c t l y concerned was much as 
expected. Prance's r e p l y was 'without reserve or 
(44) 
comment i n the a f f i r m a t i v e ' . Trie Soviet Government 
also agreed t o the proposal and s t a t e d they would s i g n 
as soon as both France and Poland had promised t h e i r 
(45) 
s ignatures. I n order t o give the d e c l a r a t i o n as 
much weight as possible the U.S.S.R. proposed t h a t 
i t should be signed by the prime m i n i s t e r s o f the 
respective governments as v/ell as by the f o r e i g n 
m i n i s t e r s . H e s i t a t i o n on the p a r t o f Poland was, 
however, immediately apparent. Beck, the P o l i s h 
f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , t o l d Kennard t h a t i t ' c l e a r l y 
(46) 
demanded very serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n ' . There 
seemed l i t t l e chance t h a t Poland would associate 
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h e r s e l f d e f i n i t e l y w i t h Russia i n a d e c l a r a t i o n o f the 
s o r t proposed. 
"M. Beck i m p l i e d t h a t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
o f the Soviet Government i n any such 
d e c l a r a t i o n might lead t o d i f f i c u l t i e s 
but t h a t Poland might be able t o asso-
c i a t e h e r s e l f w i t h England and Prance 
i f Soviet Russia were omitted."(47) 
Poland was i n a very d e l i c a t e p o s i t i o n . She 
already possessed pacts o f non-aggression b o t h w i t h 
Germany and Russia, and t r e a t i e s o f a l l i a n c e w i t h 
France. The a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f a pact w i t h 
Great B r i t a i n would be very welcome, but t h i s had 
been o f f e r e d i n the form o f a d e c l a r a t i o n aimed, against 
Germany and supported by Russia, Beck wished t o take 
advantage of c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n but d i d not 
want to 'be compelled openly to i n s i s t on exclusion 
(48) 
of t h e Soviets from any j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n ' , I n 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n he proposed: 
" t h a t His Majesty's Government should 
consent, as an exceptional measure 
i n view o f the s p e c i a l circumstances, 
to the conclusion o f a c o n f i d e n t i a l 
b i l a t e r a l understanding between the 
two countries by which the two 
Governments would undertake to a c t i n 
accordance w i t h the terms o f t h e 
proposed d e c l a r a t i o n . " ( 4 9 ) 
By such means the a s s o c i a t i o n of Poland w i t h Russia 
i n a p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n would be avoided and the 
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secret nature o f the envisaged agreement would 
prevent i t s becoming general knowledge. 
The B r i t i s h Government were now themselves faced 
w i t h an awkward s i t u a t i o n and t h e i r r e a c t i o n to i t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t . The Pour-Power d e c l a r a t i o n was plainly-
being put i n jeopardy by the P o l i s h a t t i t u d e towards 
Russia, Poland had however, made a proposal which 
w h i l e d i m i n i s h i n g the psy c h o l o g i c a l value o f the 
d e c l a r a t i o n would go some way to r e t a i n i n g i t s 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s . But B r i t a i n could not r e a l l y e n t e r t a i n 
such secret n e g o t i a t i o n s because they 'might create an 
awkward p o s i t i o n between His Majesty's Government and 
(50) 
the French Government,' Under these circumstances 
i t . w o u l d seem t h a t B r i t a i n should e i t h e r b r i n g pressure 
to bear on Poland to agree to the o r i g i n a l proposal 
or else go ahead wi t h o u t Poland. No such e f f o r t 
was made. 
Had the immediate s i t u a t i o n i n c e n t r a l Europe, 
as f a r as Chamberlain saw i t , been more explosive an 
attempt to press Poland to s i g n might have been made. 
For the d e c l a r a t i o n had been p a r t i c u l a r l y desirable 
to deter H i t l e r from t a k i n g aggressive measures 
against Roumania, A d e n l a i o f the German ultimatum 
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bad since been made by Roumania and on March 23 a 
trade agreement between the two countries had been 
signed. Thus tension i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n had been 
relaxed and Chamberlain d i d not look upon t h i s German 
economic expansion w i t h concern. He s t a t e d i n the 
House o f Commons th a t the government had, 'no desire 
to stand i n t h e way o f any reasonable e f f o r t s on the 
, (51) 
p a r t of Germany t o expand her export t r a d e . ' 
Moreover, o p i n i o n w i t h i n Roumania was not e n t h u s i a s t i c 
about the proposed d e c l a r a t i o n . The B r i t i s h ambass-
ador i n Bucharest had reported on the 21sts 
"They deprecate suggestion o f general 
pact o f mutual assistance as p o s s i b l y 
provocative t o Germans and also because 
o p i n i o n i n Poland, Yugoslavia and, to 
some extent, i n Roumania would be 
opposed at any r a t e f o r the present to 
i n c l u s i o n o f Russia."(52) 
There were f u r t h e r signs t h a t the d e c l a r a t i o n 
was not good s t r a t e g y , Mussolini had r e c e n t l y f u l l y 
supported German p o l i c y and had r e a f f i r m e d , ' p a r t i -
c u l a r l y a t t h i s moment1 the ' f u l l adherence' o f 
(53) 
I t a l y t o the p o l i c y o f the Rome-Berlin Axi s , Perth 
r e p o r t e d t h a t the f a c t of B r i t a i n ' s intended 
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Russia had had considerable i n f l u e n c e 
on t h i s I t a l i a n a t t i t u d e and t h a t he had been t o l d by 
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•a prominent Roman' t h a t 1 i f Great B r i t a i n entered 
i n t o any arrangement w i t h Soviet Russia, I t a l y would 
(54) 
he l o s t to her f o r ever. 
There was also a more general danger i n the 
d e c l a r a t i o n to which Ogilvie-Forbes drew a t t e n t i o n . 
Following the customary p r a c t i c e o f those c o n t r o l l i n g 
the government o f t o t a l i t a r i a n states to represent 
reactions abroad i n a l i g h t as unfavourable as possible 
to t h e i r own people, the i n t e n t i o n s o f B r i t a i n w i t h 
reference to the proposed d e c l a r a t i o n were being t r a n s -
l a t e d as a r e v i v a l o f the pre-war p o l i c y o f encirclement. 
This wa3 dangerous i n t h a t i t gave r i s e t o much 
popular annoyance w i t h B r i t a i n i n Germany and helped 
to b r i n g the German people c l o s e r to H i t l e r ' s way o f 
t h i n k i n g . Ogilvie-Forbes was very perturbed about 
t h i s s i d e - e f f e c t : 
" I f e e l t h a t the catchword 'encirclement' 
w i l l have a more damaging e f f e c t on p u b l i c 
opinion towards Great B r i t a i n than the 
resentment a t the d a i l y reports o f f o r e i g n 
press attacks on Germany, and i s a c t u a l l y 
making a deep impression on a l l Germans 
regardless o f class and p o l i t i c a l opinion,"(55) 
There were thus several f a c t o r s which argued against 
c o n t i n u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the d e c l a r a t i o n i n i t s 
o r i g i n a l fp.rmj i f , o f course, Chamberlain had ever 
intended t h a t i t should be r e a l i s e d . 
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Kennard advised acceptance of Poland'3 o f f e r o f 
secret discussions on the grounds t h a t they could he 
(56) 
used t o convert Poland to s i g n the d e c l a r a t i o n . 
The French, neces s a r i l y unaware of the new P o l i s h 
suggestion, continued t o urge th a t B r i t a i n should 
'press her proposal on the P o l i s h Government w i t h 
(57) 
c l e a r and f i r m language'. For f o u r days the B r i t i s h 
government h e s i t a t e d - a delay which was to evoke 
comment from both Russia and France, M, Corbin -• 
asked Cadogan on the 25th whether the P o l i s h 
government wished B r i t a i n t o give them a 'more b i n d i n g 
and e f f e c t i v e guarantee than would be a f f o r d e d by the 
(58) 
d e c l a r a t i o n ' . Seeds reported from Moscow t h a t 
L i t v i n o v was ' q u i e t l y a w a i t i n g f u r t h e r news of our 
(59) 
i n t e n t i o n s ' and was obviously gaining a c e r t a i n 
amount of s a t i s f a c t i o n from the f a c t t h a t the course 
o f events had j u s t i f i e d h i s suggestion o f a conference 
as the only p r a c t i c a l method of d e a l i n g w i t h the 
(SO) 
s i t u a t i o n . Russia was t o l d t h a t 'no f i n a l answer' 
had come from Poland, 
The h i a t u s came t o an end on the 27th. when the 
P o l i s h and Roumania embassies were informed by H a l i f a x 
t h a t ' i t w i l l not be possible t o proceed w i t h o u t 
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m o d i f i c a t i o n w i t h the proposed Four Power D e c l a r a t i o n ' 
and t h a t "some a l t e r n a t i v e method o f approach must 
,(61) 
be sought. B r i t a i n had chosen deference to Poland 
r a t h e r than co-operation w i t h Russia who was not 
d i r e c t l y engaged i n the r e v i s e d proposals, Roumania, 
however, was. H a l i f a x explained the r e - d i r e c t e d 
p o l i c y by the argument t h a t : 
" i n any scheme, the i n c l u s i o n of Poland 
i s v i t a l as the one strong Power bordering 
on Germany i n the East, and the i n c l u s i o n 
of Roumania i s also o f the f i r s t importance, 
since Rbumania may be the State p r i m a r i l y 
menaced by Germany's plans f o r Eastern 
expansion."(62) 
Poland was to become the p i v o t of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y w h i l e Russia faded out o f the p i c t u r e . The 
new approach to be made t o the Polish and Roumanian 
governments was as f o l l o w s : 
"(a) Germany may e i t h e r d i r e c t l y a t t a c k 
Poland or Roumania, or may undermine 
e i t h e r country's independence,,. 
Are Poland and Roumania r e s p e c t i v e l y 
prepared a c t i v e l y to r e s i s t i f t h e i r 
own independence i s threatened,..? 
(b) I f so, Great B r i t a i n and France would 
be prepared t o come t o the help o f the 
threatened S^tate.. .Poland and Roumania 
would keep Great B r i t a i n and France 
f u l l y and promptly informed of any 
developments t h r e a t e n i n g t h e i r 
independence. 
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(c) The assurance o f f e r r e d i n (b) i s 
dependent upon Poland coming to the 
help of Roumania i f the l a t t e r i s 
the threatened State.,. 
(d) The undertaking given by Great B r i t a i n 
and Prance to Poland under (b) would be 
given as p a r t o f a r e c i p r o c a l arrange-
ment by which i f Great B r i t a i n or 
Prance v/ere attacked by Germany, or i f 
they went to war w i t h Germany to r e s i s t 
German aggression anywhere i n Western 
Europe or Yugoslavia, Poland would come 
to t h e i r help."(63) 
Russia i s i n no way a f f e c t e d i n t h i s immediate plan 
though i t was maintained t h a t i t was 'desirable t o 
preserve the i n t e r e s t o f the Soviet Union i n t h i s 
scheme'. I t was intended t o i n f o r m Russia of the 
above proposals, at some convenient moment i n the 
discussions. I n the meantime H a l i f a x would consider 
'how best t o r e t a i n t h e i r close i n t e r e s t ' . 
The §uai d'Orsay was informed of the d e t a i l s o f 
the new approach t o be made to Poland and Roumania 
(64) 
on the. same day, and French agreement t o the plan 
(65) 
was received by H a l i f a x on the 29th. Kennard and 
Hoare were then i n s t r u c t e d t o contact the respective 
governments. I n approaching Beck, Kennard was t o 
say t h a t B r i t a i n had been 'much i n t e r e s t e d 1 i n the 
suggestion f o r a b i l a t e r a l agreement but t h a t i t 
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would have r a i s e d 'considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s ' f o r 
B r i t a i n and t h a t i t was thought the a l t e r n a t i v e p lan 
being submitted was 'better designed to meet the 
(66) 
present s i t u a t i o n ' . To t u r n down Poland'3 proposal 
and supply another was a much easier task than to 
inform Russia t h a t her co-operation i n an a n t i -
aggression d e c l a r a t i o n was now, a f t e r a l l y not 
immediately required. 
I t i s not q u i t e c l e a r j u s t when H a l i f a x had 
intended t o get i n touch w i t h Russia, but the contact 
was i n c i d e n t a l l y p r e c i p i t a t e d on March 29 by a statement 
o f Chamberlain's i n the House o f Commons. When urged 
to 'maintain the c l o s e s t possible touch and co-operation 1 
w i t h Russia, Chamberlain r e p l i e d by saying t h a t 'the 
Government are i n touch w i t h the Government o f the 
(67) 
Soviet Union.' The answer i m p l i e d agreement w i t h 
the question and on the f o l l o w i n g day Maisky v i s i t e d 
H a l i f a x to e s t a b l i s h what Chamberlain had r e a l l y 
meant. The embarrassment had to be faced; the 
Soviet ambassador was f l a t l y t o l d t h a t 'His Majesty's 
Government were not pursuing idea o f Four-Power 
d e c l a r a t i o n ' and 'had been considering what other l i n e 
(68) 
they could take'. A rough o u t l i n e o f the new p o l i c y 
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was drawn by H a l i f a x and Maisky was informed t h a t 
Russian help would no doubt be appreciated i f the 
worst came t o the worst, 
" i f these countries (Poland and Roumania) 
were determined t o r e s i s t , and were u l -
t i m a t e l y engaged i n a c o n f l i c t w i t h 
Germany, they would no doubt be gl a d o f 
the sympathy and indeed o f the a c t i v e 
assistance o f the Soviet Union, i n 
whatever way might seem most s u i t a b l e 
and e f f e c t i v e , " ( 6 9 ) 
The s i t u a t i o n amounted t o l i t t l e less than a snub 
a f t e r Moscow's t e n t a t i v e approval o f the o r i g i n a l 
B r i t i s h p l a n . Perhaps the most s h o r t - s i g h t e d 
aspect of t h i s p o l i c y was t h a t i t aroused a c e r t a i n 
scepticism towards B r i t a i n i n Russia, Seeds 
reported L i t i n o v ' s o p i n i o n as expressed on A p r i l 1, 
t h a t 'Soviet Government had had enough and would 
t(70) 
henceforward stand apart f r e e o f any commitments 
Russia could h a r d l y be blamed f o r viewing any new 
proposal from London w a r i l y , 
H a l i f a x l a t e r claimed t h a t the P o l i s h and 
Roumanian a t t i t u d e t o Russia predisposed any B r i t i s h 
move i n the Soviet d i r e c t i o n a t t h i s time: 
"Unless the B r i t i s h and French Governments 
had been prepared to ove r - r i d e the fears 
o f two f r i e n d l y Governments on a matter 
these judged v i t a l to t h e i r s a f e t y , a 
l i m i t was imposed beyond which diplomacy • 
could not go."(71) 
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He continued h i s explanation o f B r i t a i n ' s new p o l i c y 
by c i t i n g doubts as to Russian p o l i c y and s t r e n g t h 
as a d d i t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s . But a t the end. o f March 
1939 i t was these doubts t h a t were by f a r the w e i g h t i e r 
f a c t o r s i n forming B r i t i s h p o l i c y , f o r H a l i f a x ' s 
o p i n i o n o f Russia's value t o the anti-aggression 
c o a l i t i o n was much lower than appears from h i s 
l a t e r w r i t i n g . The f o l l o w i n g i s a record, of h i s 
views as expressed t o Ambassador Kennedy: 
"Lord H a l i f a x believed t h a t Poland was of 
more value t o the democratic t i e - u p than 
Russia because h i s i n f o r m a t i o n showed the 
Russian a i r force 'to be very weak, o l d 
and short-ranged', the army 'poor 1, and 
i t s i n d u s t r i a l background ' f r i g h t f u l ' . . . 
The most t h a t could be expected from 
Russia, assuming t h a t Russia wanted to 
be o f help, would be 'some ammunition 
to Poland i n the event o f trouble*." (72) 
That the importance o f Russia t o s t a b i l i t y i n Europe 
was so underrated at t h i s time by the policy-makers 
i n B r i t a i n was to receive i t s penalty i n the months 
t h a t l a y ahead, culmin a t i n g i n the Soviet v o l t e -
face by the conclusion o f a non-aggression pact 
v/ith Germany. 
Opinion i n B r i t a i n was not unaware o f t h i s 
swing away from Moscow. The D a i l y M a i l s t a t e d on 
March 29 t h a t ' i t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t at t h i s stage 
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Soviet Russia i s not being sought as a pa r t n e r i n 
the contemplated a l l i a n c e , 1 but b e l i e v e d she 'may-
be i n v i t e d t o j o i n a t a l a t e r stage. 1 Hie d i r e c t i o n 
o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y was not viewed w i t h concern but 
what d i d cause a c e r t a i n amount of mis g i v i n g was the 
delay i n reaching some concrete agreement t o oppose 
German ambitions, f o r the i n d i g n a t i o n aroused by 
Prague was s t i l l running h i g h . On March 26 the 
Observer had shown impatience w i t h the apparent lack o f 
headway being made: 
"The i r o n i c s i t u a t i o n was reached 
yesterday t h a t t h e discussion o f 
the proposal f o r immediate a c t i o n i s 
postponed f o r t e n days." 
f o r progress seemed t o be await i n g the v i s i t o f the 
P o l i s h f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r to London on A p r i l 3. 
Scepticism, however, gave way to alarm during 
the l a s t days of March w i t h rumours t h a t Germany v/as 
preparing f o r some d e f i n i t e a c t i o n i n the d i r e c t i o n 
o f Poland. Some s t e r n warning v/as looked f o r from 
the government and i t was t h i s s i t u a t i o n t h a t was 
to determine Poland's p o s i t i o n unequivocally as the 
p i v o t o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe. 
The f o r n i g h t t h a t followed Prague had brought 
several new and v i t a l f a c t o r s i n t o the f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Of tantamount importance 
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was Chamberlain's d e c i s i o n to r e l i n g u i s h h i s g r i p on 
post-Munich appeasement and t o f i n d a new d i r e c t i o n 
f o r h i s peace hunt phrased i n the context o f Prague. 
He had "been coerced to t h i s d e c i s i o n r a t h e r than 
accepted i t w i l l i n g l y , f o r the s t r e n g t h of o p i n i o n 
both i n the p a r t y and the country as a whole against 
the German d e s t r u c t i o n o f Czechoslovakia could not be 
s a f e l y ignored. But w h i l e Chamberlain appreciated 
the need to i n v e s t B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe w i t h 
g reater r e s o l u t i o n t o r e s i s t f u r t h e r Nazi encroachment 
he would not so f a r abandon h i s hope o f b r i n g i n g 
H i t l e r t o he e l as to f o s t e r the formation o f f i r m 
agreement w i t h Russia. Propose i t he might have 
done but to have concluded the same would have 
pushed H i t l e r out of reach. Therefore a c e r t a i n 
amount of marking time had been done w h i l e i t was 
decided how B r i t a i n ' s involvement i n c e n t r a l Europe 
could be most e f f e c t i v e l y , yet s a f e l y , expressed. 
Poland e v e n t u a l l y emerged as the anchorage o f t h i s 
expanded p o l i c y but although t h i s expansion i n v o l v e d 
a completely new i n g r e d i e n t i n B r i t a i n ' s approach 
to Europe, i t was not a d e n i a l o f those p r i n c i p a l s 
which had guided f o r e i g n p o l i c y since Munich, but 
r a t h e r a f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f them. 
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Chapter twelve 
Guarantee to Poland - Revolution or Evolution? 
The preparations a f t e r Prague f o r some form o f 
u n i t e d o p p o s i t i o n to H i t l e r ' s ambitions had. been 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e i n view of expected aggression 
against Roumania. However, wh i l e n e g o t i a t i o n s had been 
proceeding the centre o f a t t e n t i o n had s h i f t e d from 
Roumania to Poland. The Roumanian f r o n t appeared 
comparatively calm f o l l o w i n g the conclusion o f the 
trade agreement w i t h Germany. Memel had f a l l e n and 
i t needed l i t t l e i magination to deduce t h a t H i t l e r would 
next sue f o r the r e t u r n o f Danzig. The B r i t i s h 
Government's views on Danzig were much the same as they 
had been on Memel. I f the P o l i s h government could 
come to some agreement w i t h Germany over the question 
o f Danzig, a l l w e l l and good. I f , however, i t 
became apparent t h a t Germany might be i n t e n d i n g to use 
Danzig as a l e v e r to introduce claims against P o l i s h 
independence, t h i s would c o n s t i t u t e a matter which 
(1) 
B r i t a i n v/ould. oppose. As March wore on i t became 
i n c r e a s i n g l y l i k e l y i n London t h a t the l a t t e r course 
was the one destined to see the l i g h t . There v/ere 
p e r s i s t e n t rumours o f unx-easonable German demands 
against Poland. Kennard believed, such demands had 
(2) 
been made but could not s u b s t a n t i a t e h i s b e l i e f . 
An a i r o f mystery surrounded the whole a f f a i r , to which 
the P o l i s h f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r c o n t r i b u t e d i n no l i t t l e 
measure. He v/as p e r s i s t e n t l y cagey about the German 
demands and Kennard reported t h a t i t was 1 extremely 
(3) 
d i f f i c u l t to get s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d answers' from him. 
Germany had c e r t a i n l y waited f o r Poland to j o i n the 
anti-Commitern Pact. So much was knov/n, together 
(4) 
w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t Poland had refused. The r e s t was 
very much a subject o f spec u l a t i o n . 
Beck's evasiveness c o n t r i b u t e d to the sus p i c i o n 
t h a t German - P o l i s h r e l a t i o n s were an explosive 
powder keg, a suspicion which mounted w i t h reports o f 
P o l i s h m i l i t a r y p reparations. On March 24 Kennard 
reported t h a t approximately 10,000 r e s e r v i s t s had been 
(5) 
c a l l e d up, but on the f o l l o w i n g day he received 
(6) 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t put the f i g u r e at 750,000. On 
the 28th the P o l i s h V i c e - M i n i s t e r f o r Foreign A f f a i r s 
t o l d Kennard t h a t there was 'reason to believe t h a t 
Germans may demand the more d r a s t i c s o l u t i o n o f 
annexation 'of Danzig, but there was s t i l l no i n d i c a t i o n 
(7) 
o f any 'threatening a t t i t u d e on the part o f Germany'. 
But i n f o r m a t i o n was reaching London from other sources 
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a t t h i s time t h a t p o i n t e d q u i t e d e f i n i t e l y towards a 
German coup. H a l i f a x t o l d the cabinet on the 30th 
t h a t the B e r l i n correspondent of the 'News C h r o n i c l e 1 
had been informed by various sources i n Germany t h a t 
Poland was next on the l i s t i n Germany's programme of 
(8) 
aggression. This r e p o r t was the more c r e d i b l e because 
i t was supported, by a good deal of detailed, i n f o r m a t i o n 
concerning German preparations t o t h i s end. The United 
States ambassador a t Warsaw also had reason to b e l i e v e 
t h a t Ribbentrop was 'pressing f o r immediate a c t i o n 
against Poland' being convinced t h a t B r i t a i n and 
Prance would f a i l to support Poland and t h a t such 
f a i l u r e 'would a l i e n a t e American opini o n from B r i t a i n 
(9) 
and Franc e'. .„ 
The s i t u a t i o n was met w i t h alarm i n London. 
(10) 
Von Dirks en r e f e r s to the. ' h y s t e r i c a l s t a t e o f mind' 
of B r i t a i n at the time. The cabinet met d a i l y to 
review the s i t u a t i o n . Chamberlain l a t e r admitted 
the urgency .of the time: 
"We d i d not know t h a t Poland might not 
be invaded w i t h i n a term which could 
be measured by hours and not by days. 1 1 (11) 
On March 29 a f u l l cabinet meeting was suddenly c a l l e d 
and. sat f o r three hours. I t met again the f o l l o w i n g 
327 
morning. A question had "been t a b l e d I n the House o f 
Commons f o r March 31 suggesting t h a t a German at t a c k 
on Poland was Imminent and asking what a c t i o n the 
government would take i n such an e v e n t u a l i t y . By the 
afternoon of the 30th d e c i s i o n had been reached; 
pending the conclusion of con s u l t a t i o n s between 
B r i t a i n , France, Poland and Roumania the B r i t i s h 
government would give Poland an i n t e r i m assurance o f 
support I n the event o f at t a c k by Germany on her 
independence. That evening the cabinet committee on 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y s a t , presumably to discuss the o f f i c i a l 
statement t h a t Chamberlain, H a l i f a x and Cadogan had. 
(12) 
d r a f t e d during the afternoon. I t met again the 
f o l l o w i n g morning (March 31) Immediately p r i o r t o the 
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s announcement i n the Commons. 
I t was d e s i r a b l e t h a t the guarantee should not 
appear as an impromptu measure but as a co n s i s t e n t 
element i n the European plan to thwart aggression. 
To t h i s end Chamberlain needed the support o f Prance, 
and, i f p o s s i b l e , Russia, Approval by France was 
immediately and u r g e n t l y sought. Phipps was 
i n s t r u c t e d by H a l i f a x to f i n d out: 
"...whether French Government would 
authorise me to say tomorrow, as I 
propose, t h a t i n t h i s matter t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h our own."(13) 
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(14) 
H a l i f a x received such a u t h o r i s a t i o n f i v e hours later,, 
There was not, however, any s i m i l a r hasty contact 
between London and Moscow, i n f a c t no contact a t a l l , 
A matter o f two or three hours before Chamberlain was 
due to make h i s statement, Maisky was approached 
(151 
about the guarantee i n London and was asked whether 
i t could be s a i d t h a t i t met w i t h the approval o f the 
(16) 
Soviet government . Maisky took exception to t h i s 
'unceremoniousness' and pointed out t h a t i t was 
p h y s i c a l l y impossible f o r him to a s c e r t a i n h i s 
government's viev/s i n time before the announcement 
(17) 
was made. He refused t o give such a u t h o r i s a t i o n 
but Chamberlain, nevertheless, s t a t e d t h a t afternoon 
t h a t he had 'no doubt t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s upon which 
we are a c t i n g are f u l l y understood and appreciated by 
(18) 
the Soviet G overnment, 1 This manner o f approach 
to Russia had served only to increase her scepticism 
of B r i t i s h diplomacy. 
N a t u r a l l y the approval of Poland was e s s e n t i a l , 
(19) 
Chamberlain h i m s e l f d r a f t e d the telegram to Kennard, 
When i t a r r i v e d i n Warsaw Kennard was i n discussion 
w i t h Beck on the B r i t i s h proposal of March 24. The 
meeting was i n t e r r u p t e d by an embassy o f f i c i a l who 329. 
d e l i v e r e d the B r i t i s h note. Beok d i d not even confer 
v/ith h i s government, f o r t h i s l a t e s t o f f e r from 
B r i t a i n met w i t h a l l the requirements of the e a r l i e r 
P o l i s h request - B r i t a i n would guarantee Poland's 
independence and d i d not even demand any r e c i p r o c a l 
undertaking on the p a r t of Poland. Beck 'accepted 
(20) 
without h e s i t a t i o n ' , making up h i s mind (as he 
l a t e r t o l d a f r i e n d ) between two f l i c k s of the ash 
(21) 
o f f h i s c i g a r e t t e . 
Thus the stage was set f o r Chamberlain's announce-
ment, though - almost as a second thought, i t appears -
he decided a t the l a s t minute t o i n f o r m Mussolini and 
to impress upon him t h a t the 'sole purpose' o f the 
announcement was 'to avoid any disturbance of the 
(22) 
peace'. I t seems t h a t Chamberlain was a f r a i d o f 
unbraging Mussolini by not forewarning him o f the 
B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e , e s p e c i a l l y having regard, as 
the message went 'to the c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t e x i s t 
between us 1• 
March 31 was a Friday and the House met a t 11.00a.: 
Greenwood, the a c t i n g leader o f the o p p o s i t i o n , asked 
a question about the European s i t u a t i o n , a l l u d i n g to 
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(23) 
•the wild rumours which are floating round'. 
Chamberlain was evasive, replied that the rumours were 
•not confirmed by any o f f i c i a l information,' and said 
he would make a statement on the adjournment. At 
2.55p.m. Chamberlain rose to h i s feet to make h i s 
announcement. After restating the general policy 
of the government i n Europe and maintaining that 'there 
should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful 
means,1 he issued the f a t e f u l words that were to take 
B r i t a i n into war against Germany i n l e s s than s i x 
months time: 
"As the House i s aware, ce r t a i n consultations 
are now proceeding with other Governments. 
I n order to make perfectly c l e a r the position 
of His Majesty's Government i n the meantime 
before those consultations are concluded, 
I now have to inform the House that during 
that period, i n the event of any action 
which c l e a r l y threatened Polish independence, 
a^nd which the Polish Government accordingly 
considered i t v i t a l to r e s i s t with t h e i r 
national forces, His Majesty's Government 
would f e e l themselves bound at once to lend 
the Polish Government a l l support i n t h e i r 
power. They have given the Polis h 
Government an assurance to t h i s effect."(24) 
He added that the French government had authorised 
him to make i t p l a i n that they stood i n the same 
position as the B r i t i s h government. 
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This guarantee to Poland received almost 
unanimous approval from the main powers i n t e r e s t e d i n 
d e t e r r i n g F a s cist aggression. I n B r i t a i n the 
announcement was w e l l received by the Opposition and 
the debate on the guarantee i n Parliament on A p r i l 3 
demonstrated general approval, though some members 
emphasised the need f o r the government to secure 
(25) 
Russian adhesion. I t was reassuring news t o 
Poland, though the P o l i s h Ambassador i n London f e l t 
t h a t the t e x t o f the d e c l a r a t i o n might give a wrong 
impression t o those who wished to minimise i i t s 
(26) 
importance. The immediate r e a c t i o n i n Germany was, 
nevertheless r e s t r a i n e d but mainly so because H i t l e r 
was due to speak a t Wilhelmshaven and h i s tone was 
(27) 
awaited. Across the A t l a n t i c the United States 
genuinely appreciated t h i s d i s p l a y o f s t r e n g t h from 
B r i t a i n : 
"The President...thought the statement 
e x c e l l e n t and s a i d t h a t i n h i s judge-
ment i t would have a very g r e a t e f f e c t . " ( 2 8 ) 
The main black spot i n r e a c t i o n abroad was Russia 
where, maintained Seeds, the B r i t i s h government's a c t i o n 
(29) 
was 'misunderstood and not a t a l l appreciated'. 
Littfinov showed a c e r t a i n resentment a t the f a c t t h a t 
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i n response t o recent Soviet approaches B r i t a i n 
was now 'of t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e ...engaged on a new 
plan of which he knew l i t t l e , 1 'From now on,' he 
asserted, 'Soviet Government would stand aside - a 
course which might p o s s i b l y be i n t h e i r best i n t e r e s t s ' 
a r e a c t i o n , as already mentioned, not a l t o g e t h e r 
unwarranted. 
At the time, the r e v e l a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h 
assurance t o Poland created, n a t u r a l l y enough, q u i t e 
a s t i r , f o r Chamberlain had so f a r departed from 
t h a t ' f a r away country' a t t i t u d e o f the previous 
September as to in v o l v e B r i t a i n q u i t e i n t i m a t e l y i n 
the a f f a i r s o f c e n t r a l Europe. I n r e t r o s p e c t , however 
d i d h i s March 31 announcement r e a l l y mark such a 
d r a s t i c and immediate change i n B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y ? 
To come t o a f a i r answer to t h i s question an assessment 
should f i r s t be made o f the r e a l meaning o f the 
guarantee. I t c e r t a i n l y amounted to a c r u c i a l 
involvement i n the a f f a i r s o f c e n t r a l Europe.. On 
the other hand the promise o f support t o Poland was 
not absolute. I t was c o n d i t i o n a l . There were two 
condi t i o n s under which B r i t a i n would go t o war i n 
defence o f Poland. F i r s t l y , t h a t there was a 
d e f i n i t e t h r e a t to P o l i s h independence. I t was 
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l e f t l a r g e l y to the B r i t i s h government t o determine, 
i f the oase arose, whether such a t h r e a t was i n 
existence. The d e c i s i o n to go t o war was r e t a i n e d 
i n B r i t i s h hands. Poland would not he able to r e l y 
on B r i t a i n ' s support unless the guarantor was 
convinced t h a t the f i r s t c o n d i t i o n was present. Even 
i f i t was B r i t a i n would not go t o war u n t i l a second 
c o n d i t i o n was f u l f i l l e d , namely t h a t Poland f i r s t put 
up armed resistance to the t h r e a t against her indepen-
dence. Technically Germany could occupy Poland on 
the p r e t e x t , say, o f defending her against Soviet 
i n t r i g u e and unless Poland f o r c i b l y objected B r i t a i n 
would not be bound to oppose t h i s f u r t h e r Nazi inroad 
on Europe. 
.That the B r i t i s h guarantee to Poland was so 
worded was no accident. Poland was not, i n the words 
(31) 
o f Hoare, to be given 'a blank cheque 1. Chamberlain 
had been p r i m a r i l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the d r a f t i n g o f the 
(32) (33) 
d e c l a r a t i o n and being r e l u c t a n t t o give i t 
purposely r e t a i n e d a m a j o r i t y o f the d e c i s i o n as t o 
when B r i t a i n should become Involved i n war. Only 
under the u l t i m a t e circumstances v/ould t h a t war t h a t 
he dreaded become a r e a l i t y . 
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More important, than t h i s t e c h n i c a l h a i r - s p l i t t i n g 
i n assessing the meaning o f the P o l i s h guarantee f o r 
B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s an understanding of the 
context i n which i t was given. The guarantee was 
not a piece o f i s o l a t e d p o l i c y . While i t was aimed 
at meeting immediate circumstances i t was intended to 
become i n the near f u t u r e j u s t one element i n a three 
(34 
or f o u r power d e c l a r a t i o n . I t was an 'improvisation' 
an almost snap d e c i s i o n which had not run the normal 
gamut of m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l advisers hut was 
d r a f t e d by Chamberlain, H a l i f a x and Cadogan a mere 
twenty-four hours before i t s issue as an answer t o an 
(35) 
awkward question i n Parliament. I t s intended 
temporary nature i s contained i n Chamberlain's 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f i t as 'a cover note issued i n advance 
(3€) 
of the complete insurance p o l i c y ' . The B r i t i s h 
government were o a r t i c u l a r l y concerned t h a t Poland 
(37) 
should understand i t as being 'an i n t e r i m measure' 
pending the conclusion o f the c o n s u l t a t i o n s already i n 
progress. This character of the guarantee was also 
emphasised at the time o f i t s announcement i n the 
Commons. I t i s important t h e r e f o r e not to take the 
guarantee out of i t s context i n B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
but to consider i t i n i t s proper perspective." 
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The germs of the Polish guarantee can be seen 
in the government's declaration to Prance seven weeks 
before, for the attitude of mind behind both of these 
assurances was very s i m i l a r and the intention was the 
same. Both statements were issued at a time of grave 
apprehension as to H i t l e r ' s immediate designs i n Europe 
with the intention of dissuading him from precipitating 
war. On February 7 Chamberlain had for the f i r s t time 
i n threatening terms l a i d down conditions that would 
involve B r i t a i n in war. On March 31 he was issuing 
further conditions. And the Polish guarantee was, 
as Chamberlain himself i n s i s t e d , no indication that 
he had become a man of war. 
" I am no more a man of war today 
than I was i n September.. .1 t r u s t 
that our actions begun-, but not 
concluded, w i l l prove to be the 
turning point not towards war, which 
wins nothing, cures nothing, ends 
nothing, but towards a more whole-
some era, when reason w i l l take the 
place of force. "(38) 
The guarantee was intended as a means of staying 
H i t l e r ' s hand, a method of appeasement as much as 
the declaration to France. 
Why then, i t w i l l be asked, had there been no 
comparable statement with reference to the Czechs at 
the time of Prague? The answer to t h i s i s 
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s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . Apart from the f a c t t h a t even 
up t o hours before the Prague coup B r i t a i n ' s 
suspicions were of the most speculative nature, there 
were s t i l l grounds, hov/ever s l i g h t , f o r "belief i n the 
v a l i d i t y o f Germany's expressions a t Munich and t h a t 
any deterrent a c t i o n might serve only t o d r i v e H i t l e r 
i n t o a f i n a l and complete r e p u d i a t i o n of those 
expressionso The appeasers had not been prepared to 
s a c r i f i c e t h i s l a s t thread of hope. A f t e r the 
occupation o f Czech t e r r i t o r y , however, B r i t i s h 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y could no longer be measured against 
the y a r d s t i c k o f Munich so t h a t f u r t h e r German expansion 
i n non-German r a c i a l areas could be a n t i c i p a t e d 
w i t hout charges o f loss o f f a i t h against B r i t a i n , 
Hence the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an arrangement to r e s i s t 
such expansion and the s p e c i f i c guarantee to Poland 
when the storm clouds lowered upon t h a t country. 
B r i t a i n v/as by then f u l l y j u s t i f i e d i n d i s c a r d i n g her 
i n s u l a r approach to the conditions on which she 
would go to war (the February 7 d e c l a r a t i o n had 
envisaged an a t t a c k on France as a t h r e a t to B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s ) and t o widen her i n f l u e n c e i n opposing 
German aggression. 
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Thus the guarantee to Poland viewed i n i t s 
context d i d not, of i t s e l f , c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l e n t 
swing i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . This t h e s i s i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d 
by a closer examination o f the motive "behind i t . 
During the s i x months since Munich Chamberlain and h i s 
colleagues had been endeavouring t o ensure a long 
p e r i o d of peace f o r Europe by the appeasement o f the 
prime t h r e a t t o i t - Germany. The P o l i s h guarantee 
does not mark any r e a l break w i t h t h i s p o l i c y . The 
predominant aim behind i t was to maintain peace i n 
Europe by d e t e r r i n g H i t l e r from provoking a c r i s i s 
which would jeopardise t h a t peace. I t was a f u r t h e r 
a c t i v e measure i n the search f o r peace on the d e t e r r e n t 
side of B r i t i s h p o l i c y which had s t a r t e d soon a f t e r 
Munich. Chamberlain gave voice t o h i s c o n t i n u i n g hope 
i n peace immediately p r i o r t o announcing the guarantee 
when he s t a t e d t h a t there should be no question incapable 
(39) 
of s o l u t i o n by peaceful means. Speaking i n the 
House of Lords on A p r i l 19 H a l i f a x stressed t h a t the 
actions o f the government i n the f i e l d o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
(40) 
were 'purely defensive i n t h e i r n a t u r e 1 . The 
p r i n c i p l e s of peace and freedom were consistent w i t h 
the present p o l i c y i n Europe; 338. 
"..(•the e f f o r t s which His Majesty's 
Government are making t o r e s i s t f u r t h e r 
aggressive actions involve no departure 
from the p r i n c i p l e s o f p o l i c y which I 
have t r i e d to l a y down. On the 
c o n t r a r y i t would be our hope t h a t the 
p o l i c y t h a t we are pursuing w i l l i n 
time lead t o a r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f those 
p r i n c i p l e s , and a r e t u r n from the 
technique o f aggression t o methods of 
f r i e n d l y discussion and n e g o t i a t i o n , " ( 4 1 ) 
During the debate on the P o l i s h guarantee Chamberlain 
un d e r l i n e d the defensive nature o f the present p o l i c y by 
a s s e r t i n g t h a t the discussions i n progress w i t h other 
governments at the time o f the guarantee 'contain no 
t h r e a t to Germany as long as Germany w i l l be a good 
(42) 
neighbour'. B r i t i s h p o l i c y was s t i l l appeasement -
minded. The guarantee to Poland, f a r from being viewed 
as a f i n a l commitment to war, was an expression of t h i s 
a t t i t u d e . 
Chamberlain s t i l l hoped t h a t he might be able t o 
come t o terms w i t h H i t l e r despite the s t a r k evidence 
of Prague, That t h i s was 30 i s shown by the f a c t t h a t 
he s t i l l h e l d hopes f o r economic appeasement and would 
press on w i t h t h a t p o l i c y u n t i l the unwillingness o f 
Germany to take the b a i t proved i t to be i m p r a c t i c a l . 
V i r t u a l l y upto the German invas i o n o f Poland the 
appeasers t r i e d t o induce some k i n d o f rapprochement 
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w i t h Germany. To t h i s end. Chamberlain refused to 
r e c o n s t i t u t e h i s government. To b r i n g , say, C h u r c h i l l 
or Eden i n from the c o l d would have been a popular move 
both w i t h the p a r t y and the p u b l i c but Chamberlain 
r e s i s t e d the temptation i n deference to f o r e i g n o p i n i o n . 
Chamberlain's d e n i a l o f the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f war 
was absolute. Absolute, but not p u r b l i n d . The 
v a l i d i t y o f h i s d e t e r r e n t p o l i c y r e l i e d on s t r e n g t h . 
Prague had underlined the need f o r t a k i n g rearmament 
even more s e r i o u s l y than before as i t had 'made the 
(43) 
danger of German raids more formidable.' Hore-
Belisha was confirmed i n his. c o n v i c t i o n t h a t c o n s c r i p t i o n 
was e s s e n t i a l but Chamberlain s t i l l r e s i s t e d h i s 
demands on the grounds t h a t i t was 'impracticable' 
(44) 
f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons. Yet he agreed t h a t some 
s u i t a b l e a c t i o n should be taken t o show t h a t the govern-
ment was determined to r e s i s t aggression. H a l i f a x 
(45) 
demanded as much. The immediate plan was to double 
the s i z e o f the t e r r i t o r i a l army. I t was decided t h a t 
the announcement of t h i s i n t e n t i o n should be made by 
the prime m i n i s t e r r a t h e r than Hore-Belisha i n order 
t h a t i t should have maximum e f f e c t abroad. His words, 
however, d e l i v e r e d i n the Commons on March 29 s t i l l echo 
h i s desire not t o umbrage the Nazis: 
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"...His Majesty's Government have been 
impressed w i t h the need f o r a v a i l i n g 
themselves s t i l l f u r t h e r o f the s p i r i t 
o f v o l u n t a r y service which, i s manifest 
throughout the country. I n p a r t i c u l a r 
they f e e l t h a t they cannot allow would-
be r e c r u i t s f o r the T e r r i t o r i a l Army to 
be refused because the u n i t s to which 
they apply are already over strength."(46) 
By t h i s time the question o f supply had become 
more pressing f o r the government had decided to 
b u i l d up i t s f i e l d - f o r c e t o t h i r t y - t w o d i v i s i o n s . 
I t was thus t h a t on A p r i l 20 Chamberlain announced 
the government's i n t e n t i o n t o set uo a M i n i s t r y o f 
(47) 
Supply. At the end of t h a t month Chamberlain 
f i n a l l y submitted t o pressure f o r c o n s c r i p t i o n ; there 
was to be l i m i t e d t r a i n i n g f o r men o f 20 and 21 Years 
(48) 
o f age. Chamberlain decided on t h i s measure w i t h 
r e g r e t and had been considerably i n f l u e n c e d by the 
French who were i n s i s t e n t t h a t c o n s c r i p t i o n would be 
the only r e a l evidence of B r i t a i n ' s earnestness i n 
(49) 
opposing Fascist aggression. 
By such means then was Chamberlain's d e t e r r e n t 
p o l i c y supported. I t was a degree o f support t h a t had 
been foreshadowed i n the days immediately f o l l o w i n g 
Munich when appeasement had f i r s t begun to be s e r i o u s l y 
associated w i t h rearmament. Since then the emphasis 
on the rearmament angle of t h i s t w i n p o l i c y had been 
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increased. Prague had necessitated even greater 
a t t e n t i o n to m i l i t a r y preparations by throwing 
appeasement off-balance. I t had also necessitated 
a reassessment of appeasement, f o r the s t r u c t u r e o f 
Munich had been shat t e r e d together w i t h i t s attendant 
prospects f o r European c o l l a b o r a t i o n . Chamberlain had 
had to reshape h i s p o l i c y i n Europe. His greater 
a t t e n t i o n to rearmament was a r e f l e c t i o n not only o f 
the a d d i t i o n a l weight Prague had given t o the arguments 
of those who demanded t h a t England must prepare f o r war 
but also o f h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n t h a t appeasement i n i t s 
o r i g i n a l context had been d i s c r e d i t e d . 
This d i d not mean, however, t h a t he had come t o 
b e l i e v e appeasement was wrong. But i t d i d mean t h a t a 
new angle on appeasement•needed t o be found. The P o l i s h 
guarantee represented not a r e v o l u t i o n i n h i s t h i n k i n g 
o f B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y but a new t r e n d i n p o l i c y 
operating from the same p r i n c i p l e s as immediate post-
Munich appeasement. The guiding l i g h t o f f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y had not a l t e r e d . Neither the guarantee i t s e l f 
nor the wider scheme i n which i t was envisaged was a 
d r a s t i c change i n p o l i c y . I t was aimed a t dissuading • 
H i t l e r from f u r t h e r aggression and i s symptomatic o f the 
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emphasis now to be put on the deterrent side of 
Chamberlain*s policy. 
I n fine, the guarantee i s s i g n i f i c a n t on three 
main counts. F i r s t l y , i t announced a definite B r i t i s h 
concern i n eastern Europe where B r i t a i n was now 
prepared to counter aggression with force. Secondly, 
i t meant that B r i t a i n had chosen deference to the 
p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y of Poland rather than agreement 
with Russia. Lastly, i t i s important to understand 
that B r i t a i n did not think of the guarantee as a f i n a l 
commitment to war but as a further dam to Germany's 
ambitions. I t was a dam which i n the course of the 
next few weeks (and especia l l y i n view of the fact that 
Mussolini revealed.his true colours by the seizure of 
Albania on A p r i l 7) was to be bolstered up by u n i l a t e r a l 
guarantees given by B r i t a i n to Greece and Roumanla 
(April 13) then to Denmark, Holland and Switzerland 
(April 16). 
From the declaration to France on February 7 t h i s 
policy might appear to resemble that of the inept chess 
player who incapable of formulating h i s t a c t i c s i n 
advance merely responds as best he can to each separate 
move h i s opponent makes. I n effect, these guarantees, 
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w h i l e meeting s p e c i f i c circumstances as they arose 
were an i n t r i n s i c p a r t o f a c e n t r a l and wide theme 
of B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Europe which had been i n s p i r e d by 
Munich and whioh would not f i n a l l y be abandoned u n t i l 
t h a t European war i t t r i e d to a v e r t had a t l a s t become 
r e a l i t y . 
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